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Dishonesty in Developing Countries -What Can We Learn From Experiments?. (2022). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Jiang, Shuguang.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03899654.

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    RePEc:qld:uq2004:528.

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  6. Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. (2014). Jain, Tarun ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Dasgupta, Utteeyo ; Abbink, Klaus.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:111:y:2014:i:c:p:17-28.

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  7. Bureaucratic competition and public corruption: Evidence from transition countries. (2014). Sylwester, Kevin ; Diaby, Aboubacar .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:35:y:2014:i:c:p:75-87.

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  8. Brazilian Anti-Corruption Legislation and its Enforcement: Potential Lessons for Institutional Design. (2014). Prado, Mariana Mota ; Carson, Lindsey .
    In: Global Development Institute Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:bwp:bwppap:iriba_wp09.

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  9. Mapping Corruption and its Institutional Determinants in Brazil. (2014). Prado, Mariana Mota ; Carson, Lindsey .
    In: Global Development Institute Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:bwp:bwppap:iriba_wp08.

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  10. The influence of wages on public officials corruptibility: A laboratory investigation. (2013). van Veldhuizen, Roel.
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013210.

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  11. Fiscal restraints by advisors. (2013). Bessho, Shun-ichiro ; Terai, Kimiko.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:14:y:2013:i:3:p:205-232.

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  12. Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict. (2013). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:46808.

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  13. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery. (2013). Goerg, Sebastian ; Engel, Christoph ; Yu, Gaoneng.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_01.

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  14. Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment. (2013). Vetter, Stefan.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:31:y:2013:i:c:p:188-204.

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  15. The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation. (2013). van Veldhuizen, Roel.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:39:y:2013:i:c:p:341-356.

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  16. Side-payments and the costs of conflict. (2013). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:31:y:2013:i:3:p:278-286.

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  17. Comparing Corruption in the Laboratory and in the Field in Burkina Faso and in Canada. (2013). Boly, Amadou ; Armantier, Olivier.
    In: Economic Journal.
    RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:123:y:2013:i:12:p:1168-1187.

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  18. Research note on an experimental approach to the intrinsic motivations of corruption. (2013). Burdea, Valeria.
    In: The Journal of Philosophical Economics.
    RePEc:bus:jphile:v:7:y:2013:i:1:n:5.

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  19. You Owe Me. (2012). Schmidt, Klaus ; Malmendier, Ulrike.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:392.

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  20. Delegation and Rewards. (2012). Vetter, Stefan.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:378.

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  21. The Influence of Wages on Public Officials Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation. (2012). van Veldhuizen, Roel.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120038.

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  22. Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. (2012). Jain, Tarun ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Dasgupta, Utteeyo ; Abbink, Klaus.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:42176.

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  23. Markets in political influence: rent-seeking, networks and groups. (2012). Murray, Cameron.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:42070.

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  24. Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature. (2012). Egbert, Henrik ; Bobkova, Nina.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38163.

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  25. You Owe Me. (2012). Schmidt, Klaus ; Malmendier, Ulrike.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18543.

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  26. You Owe Me. (2012). Schmidt, Klaus ; Malmendier, Ulrike.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:14241.

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  27. Delegation and Rewards. (2012). Vetter, Stefan.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lmu:muenec:12884.

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  28. Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation. (2012). Suetens, Sigrid ; Reuben, Ernesto.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:1:p:24-43.

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  29. Analyse économique du droit et méthode expérimentale. (2012). Gabuthy, Yannick.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00746617.

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  30. Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.. (2012). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-01.

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  31. You Owe Me. (2012). Schmidt, Klaus ; Malmendier, Ulrike.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4007.

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  32. Corrupt reciprocity - Experimental evidence on a mens game. (2011). Frank, Björn ; Lambsdorff, Johann Graf.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:31:y:2011:i:2:p:116-125.

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  33. A controlled field experiment on corruption. (2011). Boly, Amadou ; Armantier, Olivier.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:55:y:2011:i:8:p:1072-1082.

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  34. Bribing versus gift-giving - An experiment. (2010). Frank, Björn ; Lambsdorff, Johann Graf.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:3:p:347-357.

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  35. Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments. (2010). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-23.

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  36. Revisiting Strategic versus Non-strategic Cooperation. (2009). Suetens, Sigrid ; Reuben, Ernesto.
    In: Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:tiu:tiucen:4ed16b68-4a46-4565-a6ba-60ee077394bd.

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  37. Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation. (2009). Suetens, Sigrid ; Reuben, Ernesto.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4107.

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  38. Corruption in public service delivery: An experimental analysis. (2009). Serneels, Pieter ; Barr, Abigail ; Lindelow, Magnus.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:72:y:2009:i:1:p:225-239.

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  39. Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers. (2009). Samuel, Andrew.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:71:y:2009:i:2:p:441-450.

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  40. Conditional Cooperation : Disentangling Strategic from Non-Strategic Motivations. (2008). Suetens, Sigrid ; Reuben, Ernesto.
    In: Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a44873ae-177f-4f66-9a9c-9a04e4cca15b.

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  41. Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment. (2008). Boly, Amadou ; Armantier, Olivier.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
    RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-26.

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  42. Corrupt reciprocity: An experiment. (2007). Frank, Björn ; Lambsdorff, Johann Graf.
    In: Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe.
    RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v5107.

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  43. An experiment on corruption and gender. (2006). Rivas, M. Fernanda.
    In: Documentos de Trabajo (working papers).
    RePEc:ude:wpaper:0806.

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  44. Micro-économie de la corruption. (2006). Jacquemet, Nicolas.
    In: Revue Française d'Économie.
    RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2006_num_20_4_1586.

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  45. Culture and Corruption. (2006). Barr, Abigail ; Serra, Danila.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:gprg-wps-040.

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  46. Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. (2006). Hennig-Schmidt, Heike ; Abbink, Klaus.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:2:p:103-121.

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  47. Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments. (2005). Ortmann, Andreas ; Lizal, Lubomir ; Dusek, Libor ; Duek, Libor.
    In: Prague Economic Papers.
    RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2005:y:2005:i:2:id:259:p:147-162.

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  48. Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation. (2005). .
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00180044.

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  49. Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation. (2005). Jacquemet, Nicolas.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gat:wpaper:0506.

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  50. Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior. (2004). Zamir, Shmuel ; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ; Abbink, Klaus.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:57:y:2004:i:1:p:25-57.

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