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2. A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program. (2023). Carvalho, Margarida ; Lodi, Andrea.
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1. Market Design for Altruistic Supply: Evidence from the Lab. (2016). Wang, Carmen ; Slonim, Robert.
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2. Solving Shortage in a Priceless Market: Insights from Blood Donation. (2015). Sun, Tianshu ; Lu, Susan Feng ; Jin, Ginger Zhe.
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3. Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. (2014). Roth, Alvin ; Ashlagi, Itai.
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4. Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges. (2014). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Saidman, Susan L. ; Delmonico, Francis L..
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5. Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations. (2014). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Saidman, Susan L. ; Delmonico, Francis .
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6. Loopholes undermine donation: An experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in Israel. (2014). Roth, Alvin ; Kessler, Judd B..
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7. Kidney exchange: Further utilization of donors via listed exchange. (2014). Yılmaz, Özgür ; Ylmaz, ozgur .
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8. Removing financial barriers to organ and bone marrow donation: The effect of leave and tax legislation in the U.S.. (2014). Stith, Sarah ; Macis, Mario ; Lacetera, Nicola.
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9. College admissions in China: A mechanism design perspective. (2014). ZHU, MIN.
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10. College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective. (2013). Zhu, Min.
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11. College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective. (2013). Zhu, Min.
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12. New insights on integer-programming models for the kidney exchange problem. (2013). Klimentova, Xenia ; Constantino, Miguel ; Viana, Ana ; RAIS, Abdur .
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13. Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy. (2013). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Switzer, Tobias B. ; Sonmez, Tayfun.
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14. Another success for game theory: Nobel laureates in economic sciences in 2012. (2013). Stankiewicz, Waclaw .
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15. Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange. (2013). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun.
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16. Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley: Stable allocations and the practice of market design. (2012). Committee, Nobel Prize.
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17. The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange. (2012). Roth, Alvin ; Rees, Michael A. ; Ashlagi, Itai ; Gamarnik, David.
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18. Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange. (2012). Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo ; Nicolo', Antonio.
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19. Student Placement Problems: An Application to the ERASMUS Exchange Program. (2012). Mumcu, Ayşe ; Akkaya, Ekrem .
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20. Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate. (2011). Roth, Alvin ; Kessler, Judd B..
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21. Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange. (2011). Roth, Alvin ; Ashlagi, Itai.
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22. Competition and Post-Transplant Outcomes in Cadaveric Liver Transplantation under the MELD Scoring System. (2011). Paarsch, Harry ; Roberts, John P. ; Halldorson, Jeffrey B. ; Segre, Alberto M..
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23. Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach. (2011). Unver, Utku ; Kurt, Murat ; Roberts, Mark S. ; Schaefer, Andrew J..
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24. Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions. (2010). Roth, Alvin.
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25. Optimal production of transplant care services. (2010). Ythier, Jean Mercier ; Deffains, Bruno.
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26. The roommates problem revisited. (2010). Morrill, Thayer.
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27. Optimal production of transplant care services.. (2009). Ythier, Jean Mercier ; Deffains, Bruno.
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28. What Have We Learned from Market Design?. (2009). Roth, Alvin E..
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29. If You are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Grosskopf, Brit.
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30. If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Grosskopf, Brit.
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31. Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
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32. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
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33. What Have We Learned From Market Design?. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
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34. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
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35. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
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36. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
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37. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
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38. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2006). Roth, Alvin.
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39. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
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40. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2006). Roth, Alvin.
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41. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
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42. If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, Should you accept? An Investigation of Contract Design. (2006). Roth, Alvin ; Grosskopf, Brit.
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43. Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan Donors: A Characterization. (2006). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun.
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44. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
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45. The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation. (2006). Roth, Alvin ; Bereby-Meyer, Yoella.
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46. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0506001.

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47. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11402.

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48. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000126.

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49. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:621.

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50. The Boston Public School Match. (2005). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:368-371.

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