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Buying the Right to Harm: The Economics of Buyouts. (2011). Leshem, Shmuel ; Guttel, Ehud.
In: CAE Working Papers.
RePEc:cgm:wpaper:93.

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  1. Bargaining around cost–benefit standards. (2013). Leshem, Shmuel ; Guttel, Ehud.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:103:y:2013:i:c:p:55-67.

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