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9. The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy. (2020). Sand-Zantman, Wilfried ; Jullien, Bruno.
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10. The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy. (2020). Sand-Zantman, Wilfried ; Jullien, Bruno.
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50. The Diamond Paradox: A Dynamic Resolution. (1992). Ramey, Garey ; Bagwell, Kyle.
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51. Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games. (1989). Stacchetti, Ennio ; Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David G..
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52. Information Leakage Forces Cooperation. (1988). Matsui, Akihiko.
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53. Tacit Collusion and Product Differentiation. (1986). wernerfelt, birger.
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54. Too much cocited documents. This list is not complete

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