References contributed by pth357-2660027
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2002. The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve. Review of Development Economics 6(2): 183–203.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2019. The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. New York: Penguin Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson. 2005. Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy 113(5): 949–95.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2003. An African Success Story: Botswana. In In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth, ed. Dani Rodrik. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 80–122.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2005. Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. In Handbook of Economic Growth, eds. Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 385–472.
Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed, and James A. Robinson. 2014. Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone. Journal of Political Economy 122(2): 319–68.
Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. Journal of Comparative Economics 31(4): 620–52.
Agrawal, Arun, and Clark C. Gibson. 1999. Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation. World Development 27(4): 629–49.
- Albertus, Michael, and Oliver Kaplan. 2013. Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia. Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(2): 198–231.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Alchian, Armen A. 1965. Some Economics of Property Rights. Il Politico: 816–29.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. American Economic Review 62(5): 777–95.
- Alden Wily, Liz. 2011. ‘The Law Is to Blame’: The Vulnerable Status of Common Property Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa. Development and Change 42(3): 733–57.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Aldy, Joseph E., Scott Barrett, and Robert N. Stavins. 2003. Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures. Climate Policy 3 (4): 373–97.
- Aligica, Paul Dragos, Peter J. Boettke, and Vlad Tarko. 2019. Public Governance and the Classical-Liberal Perspective: Political Economy Foundations. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Aligica, Paul Dragos. 2018. Public Entrepreneurship, Citizenship, and Self- Governance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Allen, Darcy W. E., and Jason Potts. 2016. How Innovation Commons Contribute to Discovering and Developing New Technologies. International Journal of the Commons 10(2): 1035–54.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Allen, Douglas W. 1991a. Homesteading and Property Rights; Or, ‘How the West Was Really Won.’ Journal of Law and Economics 34(1): 1–23.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Allen, Douglas W. 1991b. What Are Transaction Costs. Research in Law and Economics 14 (1): 1–18.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Allen, Douglas W. 2015. The Coase Theorem: Coherent, Logical, and Not Disproved. Journal of Institutional Economics 11(2): 379–90.
Allen, Douglas W. 2019. Establishing Economic Property Rights by Giving Away an Empire. Journal of Law and Economics 62(2): 251–80.
Allen, Douglas W., and Bryan Leonard. 2020. Rationing by Racing and the Oklahoma Land Rushes. Journal of Institutional Economics 16(2): 127–44.
Alston, Eric, Lee J. Alston, Bernardo Mueller, and Tomas Nonnenmacher. 2018. Institutional and Organizational Analysis: Concepts and Applications. Cambridge University Press.
Alston, Lee J. 2017. Beyond Institutions: Beliefs and Leadership. The Journal of Economic History 77(2): 353–72.
- Alston, Lee J., Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller. 1999. Titles, Conflict, and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Alston, Lee J., Marcus André Melo, Bernardo Mueller, and Carlos Pereira. 2016. Brazil in Transition: Beliefs, Leadership, and Institutional Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Altrichter, Mariana, and Xavier Basurto. 2008. Effects of Land Privatisation on the Use of Common-Pool Resources of Varying Mobility in the Argentine Chaco. Conservation and Society 6(2): 154.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Anderson, Perry. 1974. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: New Left Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Anderson, Terry L., and Bryan Leonard. 2016. Institutions and the Wealth of Indian Nations. In Unlocking the Wealth of Indian Nations, ed. Terry L. Anderson. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 3–17.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Anderson, Terry L., and Dean Lueck. 1992. Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on Indian Reservations. The Journal of Law and Economics 35(2): 427–54.
Anderson, Terry L., and Dominic P. Parker. 2008. Sovereignty, Credible Commitments, and Economic Prosperity on American Indian Reservations. The Journal of Law and Economics 51(4): 641–66.
Anderson, Terry L., and Fred S. McChesney. 1994. Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-White Relations. Journal of Law and Economics 37(1): 39–74.
- Anderson, Terry L., and Gary D. Libecap. 2014. Environmental Markets: A Property Rights Approach. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill. 1975. The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West. The Journal of Law and Economics 18(1): 163–79.
Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill. 1990. The Race for Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics 33(1): 177–97.
- Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill. 2004. The Not So Wild, Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill. eds. 2001. The Technology of Property Rights. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill.1983. Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement? Southern Economic Journal 50(2): 438–50.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Arruñada, Benito. 2014. Registries. Man and the Economy 1(2): 209–30.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Arslantaş, Yasin, Antoine Pietri, and Mehrdad Vahabi. 2019. State Predation in Historical Perspective: The Case of Ottoman Müsadere Practice during 1695–1839. Public Choice 182(3–4): 417–42.
Atwood, David A. 1990. Land Registration in Africa: The Impact on Agricultural Production. World Development 18(5): 659–71.
Baland, Jean-Marie, and James A. Robinson. 2012. The Political Value of Land: Political Reform and Land Prices in Chile. American Journal of Political Science 56(3): 601–19.
Bardhan, Pranab. 1973. Size, Productivity, and Returns to Scale: An Analysis of Farm-Level Data in Indian Agriculture. Journal of Political Economy 81(6): 1370–86.
Barrett, Scott, and Robert Stavins. 2003. Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements. International Environmental Agreements 3(4): 349–76.
Barrett, Scott. 2010. Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods. New York: Oxford University Press.
Barzel, Yoram. 1997. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Barzel, Yoram. 2002. A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bassett, Thomas J., Chantal Blanc-Pamard, and Jean Boutrais. 2007. Constructing Locality: The Terroir Approach in West Africa. Africa 77 (1): 104–29.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bates, Robert H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bates, Robert H. 2017. The Development Dilemma: Security, Prosperity, and a Return to History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Belloc, Marianna, and Samuel Bowles. 2013. The Persistence of Inferior Cultural-Institutional Conventions. American Economic Review 103(3): 93–98.
Belloc, Marianna, and Samuel Bowles. 2017. Persistence and Change in Culture and Institutions under Autarchy, Trade, and Factor Mobility. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9(4): 245–76.
- Benjaminsen, Tor A., Stein Holden, Christian Lund, and Espen Sjaastad. 2009. Formalisation of Land Rights: Some Empirical Evidence from Mali, Niger and South Africa. Land Use Policy 26(1): 28–35.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Benson, Bruce L. 1989a. Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law without Government. Journal of Libertarian Studies 9(1): 1–26.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Benson, Bruce L. 1989b. The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law. Southern Economic Journal 55(3): 644–61.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Benson, Bruce L. 2006. Property Rights and the Buffalo Economy of the Great Plains. In Self-Determination: The Other Path for Native Americans, eds. Terry L. Anderson, Bruce L. Benson, and Thomas Flanagan. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 29–67.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Block, Walter E., and Peter L. Nelson. 2015. Water Capitalism: The Case for Privatizing Oceans, Rivers, Lakes, and Aquifers. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Boettke, Peter J. 1989. Evolution and Economics: Austrians as Institutionalists. Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology 6: 73–89.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Boettke, Peter J. 2001. Calculation and Coordination: Essays on Socialism and Transitional Political Economy. New York: Routledge.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Boettke, Peter J. 2012. Living Economics. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Boettke, Peter J., and Christopher J. Coyne. 2005. Methodological Individualism, Spontaneous Order and the Research Program of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 57(2): 145–58.
Boettke, Peter J., and Rosolino Candela. 2020. Productive Specialization, Peaceful Cooperation, and the Problem of the Predatory State: Lessons from Comparative Historical Political Economy. Public Choice 182 (3–4): 331–52.
Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne, and Patrick Newman. 2016. The History of a Tradition: Austrian Economics from 1871 to 2016. In Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 199–243.
Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson. 2011. Quasimarket Failure. Public Choice 149(1–2): 209–24.
Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson. 2013. Comparative Historical Political Economy. Journal of Institutional Economics 9(3): 285–301.
- Bonney, Richard. 1999. The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c. 1200–1815. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Boone, Catherine. 2009. Electoral Populism Where Property Rights Are Weak: Land Politics in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. Comparative Politics: 183–201.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Boone, Catherine. 2013. Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Borras Jr, Saturnino M. 2012. Land Grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3–4): 845–72.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Borras Jr, Saturnino M. et al. 2011. Towards a Better Understanding of Global Land Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction. The Journal of Peasant Studies 38(2): 209–16.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Brasselle, Anne-Sophie, Frederic Gaspart, and Jean-Philippe Platteau. 2002. Land Tenure Security and Investment Incentives: Puzzling Evidence from Burkina Faso. Journal of Development Economics 67(2): 373–418.
- Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Brewer, John. 1990. The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bromley, Daniel W. 1991. Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bromley, Daniel W. 2006. Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bromley, Daniel W. 2008. The Crisis in Ocean Governance: Conceptual Confusion, Spurious Economics, Political Indifference. MAST: Maritime Studies 6(2): 7–22.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bromley, Daniel W. 2009a. Abdicating Responsibility: The Deceits of Fisheries Policy. Fisheries 34(6): 280–90.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bromley, Daniel W. 2009b. Formalising Property Relations in the Developing World: The Wrong Prescription for the Wrong Malady. Land Use Policy 26(1): 20–27.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Bromley, Daniel W. 2019. Possessive Individualism: A Crisis of Capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Brulé, Rachel E. 2020. Women, Power, and Property: The Paradox of Gender Equality Laws in India. Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Buchanan, James M. 1949. The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach. Journal of Political Economy 57(6): 496–505.
- Buchanan, James M. 1965. An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica 32(125): 1–14.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Buchanan, James M. 1975. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Buchanan, James M. 1984. Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications. In The Theory of Public Choice II, eds. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 11–22.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Buchanan, James M. 1986. Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980s. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Bustamante, Pedro, Marcela M. Gomez, Ilia Murtazashvili, and Martin BH Weiss. 2020. Spectrum Anarchy: Why Self-Governance of the Radio Spectrum Works Better than We Think. Journal of Institutional Economics.
- Buxton, Carol R. 2004. Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. the First in Time, First in Right, Rule of Property. Journal of Air Law and Commerce 69(4): 689–707.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Cai, Meina, Ilia Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, and Hui Wang. (2021). Sugarcoating the Bitter Pill: Compensation, Land governance, and Opposition to Land Expropriation in China. Journal of Peasant Studies.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Cai, Meina, Ilia Murtazashvili, Jennifer Murtazashvili, and Raufhon Salahodjaev. 2020. Individualism and Governance of the Commons. Public Choice 184(1–2): 175–95.
Cai, Meina, Jennifer Murtazashvili, and Ilia Murtazashvili. 2020. The Politics of Land Property Rights. Journal of Institutional Economics 12(2): 151–67.
Cai, Meina, Pengfei Liu, and Hui Wang. 2020. Political Trust, Risk Preferences, and Policy Support: A Study of Land-Dispossessed Villagers in China. World Development 125: 104687.
Calvert, Randall. 1995. The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication. In Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, eds. Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek. New York: Cambridge University Press, 216–68.
Candela, Rosolino A., and Vincent J. Geloso. 2018. The Lightship in Economics. Public Choice 176(3–4): 479–506.
Carlson, Leonard A. 1981. Land Allotment and the Decline of American Indian Farming. Explorations in Economic History 18(2): 128.
Carugati, Federica, Josiah Ober, and Barry R. Weingast. 2019. Is Development Uniquely Modern? Ancient Athens on the Doorstep. Public Choice 181 (1–2): 29–47.
- Carugati, Federica. 2019. Creating a Constitution: Law, Democracy, and Growth in Ancient Athens. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Castillo, Juan Camilo, Daniel Mejía, and Pascual Restrepo. 2020. Scarcity without Leviathan: The Violent Effects of Cocaine Supply Shortages in the Mexican Drug War. Review of Economics and Statistics 102(2): 269–86.
- Cheung, Steven N. S. 1969. The Theory of Share Tenancy: With Special Application to Asian Agriculture and the First Phase of Taiwan Land Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Cheung, Steven N.S. 1970. The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource. Journal of Law and Economics: 49–70.
- Chhatre, Ashwini, and Arun Agrawal. 2008. Forest Commons and Local Enforcement. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (36): 13286–91.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Choumert, Johanna, Pascale Combes Motel, and Hervé K. Dakpo. 2013. Is the Environmental Kuznets Curve for Deforestation a Threatened Theory? A Meta-Analysis of the Literature. Ecological Economics 90: 19–28.
- Clark, J. R., and Benjamin Powell. 2019. The ‘Minimal’ State Reconsidered: Governance on the Margin. The Review of Austrian Economics 32(2): 119–30.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Clay, Karen, and Gavin Wright. 2005. Order without Law? Property Rights during the California Gold Rush. Explorations in Economic History 42 (2): 155–83.
Clay, Karen. 1999. Property Rights and Institutions: Congress and the California Land Act 1851. Journal of Economic History 59(01): 122–42.
Coase, Ronald H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44.
Coase, Ronald H. 2013. The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics 56(4): 879–915.
- Coldham, Simon FR. 1979. Land-Tenure Reform in Kenya: The Limits of Law. The Journal of Modern African Studies 17(4): 615–27.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Cole, Daniel H., Graham Epstein, and Michael D. McGinnis. 2014. Digging Deeper into Hardin’s Pasture: The Complex Institutional Structure of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons.’ Journal of Institutional Economics 10(3): 353–69.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Cole, Daniel H., Graham Epstein, and Michael D. McGinnis. 2019. Combining the IAD and SES Frameworks. International Journal of the Commons 13(1): 244–75.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Conning, Jonathan H., and James A. Robinson. 2007. Property Rights and the Political Organization of Agriculture. Journal of Development Economics 82(2): 416–47.
- Cornell, Stephen, and Joseph P. Kalt. 2000. Where’s the Glue? Institutional and Cultural Foundations of American Indian Economic Development. The Journal of Socio- Economics 29(5): 443–70.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Cornell, Stephen, and Joseph P. Kalt. 1998. Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The Development Challenge in Indian Country Today. American Indian Culture and Research Journal 22(3): 187–214.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Costello, Christopher, Steven D. Gaines, and John Lynham. 2008. Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse? Science 321(5896): 1678–81.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Cowen, Nick, and Charles Delmotte. 2021. Ostrom, Floods and Mismatched Property Rights. International Journal of the Commons.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Cowen, Tyler. 1992. Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy. Economics & Philosophy 8(2): 249–67.
- Cox, Michael, Gwen Arnold, and Sergio Villamayor Tomás. 2010. A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource Management. In Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy: Resource Governance, eds. Daniel H. Cole and Michael D. McGinnis. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Crepelle, Adam, and Ilia Murtazashvili. 2020. COVID-19, Indian Reservations, and Self-Determination. Mercatus COVID-19 Response Policy Brief.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Davidson, Sinclair, Primavera De Filippi, and Jason Potts. 2018. Blockchains and the Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Journal of Institutional Economics 14(4): 639–58.
De Long, J. Bradford, and Andrei Shleifer. 1993. Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution. The Journal of Law and Economics 36(2): 671–702.
- de Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- de Soto, Hernando. 2002. The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism. New York: Basic Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Deakin, Simon, et al. 2017. Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law. Journal of Comparative Economics 45(1): 188–200.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Deal, Robert. 2016. The Law of the Whale Hunt: Dispute Resolution, Property Law, and American Whalers, 1780–1880. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Deininger, Klaus, and Gershon Feder. 2009. Land Registration, Governance, and Development: Evidence and Implications for Policy. The World Bank Research Observer 24(2): 233–66.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Demsetz, Harold. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review 57(2): 347–59.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Demsetz, Harold. 1969. Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint. Journal of Law and Economics 12(1): 1–22.
Denzau, Arthur T., and Douglass C. North. 1994. Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions. Kyklos 47(1): 3–31.
Di Tella, Rafael, Sebastian Galiani, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2007. The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters. The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 209–41.
- Dickson, Bruce J. 2003. Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Dickson, Bruce J. 2008. Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Diermeier, Daniel, Joel M. Ericson, Timothy Frye, and Steve Lewis. 1997. Credible Commitment and Property Rights: The Role of Strategic Interaction between Political and Economic Actors. In The Political Economy of Property Rights: 20–42.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Dikötter, Frank. 2010. Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962. Bloomsbury Publishing US.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Dincecco, Mark, and Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato. 2017. From Warfare to Wealth. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dincecco, Mark. 2011. Political Transformations and Public Finances: Europe, 1650–1913. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dippel, Christian, and Dustin Frye. 2019. The Effect of Land Allotment on Native American Households during the Assimilation Era. Technical report, Working Paper.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Dourado, Eli, and Alex Tabarrok. 2015. Public Choice Perspectives on Intellectual Property. Public Choice 163(1–2): 129–51.
Dutta, Nabamita, Peter T. Leeson, and Claudia R. Williamson. 2013. The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid’s Impact on Political Institutions. Kyklos 66(2): 208–28.
Eggertsson, Thrainn. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ely Jr, James W. 2007. The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Ferrell, Perry. 2019. Titles for Me but Not for Thee: Transitional Gains Trap of Property Rights Extension in Colombia. Public Choice 178(1): 95–114.
Field, Barry C. 1989. The Evolution of Property Rights. Kyklos 42(3): 319–45.
Field, Erica. 2005. Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums. Journal of the European Economic Association 3(2-3): 279–90.
Field, Erica. 2007. Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4): 1561–1602.
- Fogel, Robert W., and Stanley L. Engerman. 1974. Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Foner, Eric. 1971. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Foss, Nicolai J. 1997. On Austrian and Neo-Institutionalist Economics. In Austrian Economics in Debate, eds. Willem Keizer, Bert Teiben, and Rudy van Zijp. London and New York: Routledge, 243.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Friedman, David D. 2005. From Imperial China to Cyberspace: Contracting without the State. Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 1: 349–70.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Friedman, David. 1979. Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case. The Journal of Legal Studies 8(2): 399–415.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Frischmann, Brett M., Alain Marciano, and Giovanni Battista Ramello. 2019. Retrospectives: Tragedy of the Commons after 50 Years. Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(4): 211–28.
- Frischmann, Brett M., Michael J. Madison, and Katherine Jo Strandburg. 2014. Governing Knowledge Commons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Frye, Dustin. 2016. Paternalism versus Sovereignty: The Long Run Economic Effects of the Indian Reorganization Act. In Unlocking the Wealth of Indian Nations, ed. Terry L. Anderson. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Furubotn, Eirik G., and Svetozar Pejovich. 1972. Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature. Journal of Economic Literature 10(4): 1137–62.
Galiani, Sebastian, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2010. Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling. Journal of Public Economics 94(9): 700–29.
Gehlbach, Scott, and Philip Keefer. 2011. Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies. Journal of Comparative Economics 39(2): 123–39.
Geloso, Vincent J., and Alexander W. Salter. (2020). State Capacity and Economic Development: Causal Mechanism or Correlative Filter? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 170: 372–85.
- Geloso, Vincent, and Ilia Murtazashvili. 2020. Can Governments Deal with Pandemics? SSRN.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Geloso, Vincent, and Jamie Bologna Pavlik. (forthcoming). Economic Freedom and the Economic Consequences of the 1918 Pandemic. Contemporary Economic Policy.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Granovetter, Mark S. 1977. The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. Social Networks 1: 201–33.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Grossman, Herschel I., and Minseong Kim. 1995. Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property. Journal of Political Economy: 1275–88.
- Grossman, Shelby. 2020. The Politics of Order in Informal Markets: Evidence from Lagos. World Politics.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Guardado, Jenny. 2018. Land Tenure, Price Shocks, and Insurgency: Evidence from Peru and Colombia. World Development 111: 256–69.
- Haber, Stephen, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer. 2003. The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Haddock, David D., and Lynne Kiesling. 2002. The Black Death and Property Rights. The Journal of Legal Studies 31(S2): S545–87.
Hadfield, Gillian K. 2016. Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans Invented Law and How to Reinvent It for a Complex Global Economy. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hadfield, Gillian K. 2017. The Problem of Social Order: What Should We Count as Law? Law & Social Inquiry 42(1): 16–27.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hadfield, Gillian K., and Barry R. Weingast. 2014. Microfoundations of the Rule of Law. Annual Review of Political Science 17: 21–42.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hafer, Catherine. 2006. On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Production in the State of Nature. The Review of Economic Studies 73 (1): 119–43.
- Hall, Ruth, et al. 2015. Resistance, Acquiescence or Incorporation? An Introduction to Land Grabbing and Political Reactions ‘from Below.’ Journal of Peasant Studies 42(3–4): 467–88.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162(3859): 1243–48.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Harris, Colin, and Adam Kaiser. (2020). Burying the Hatchet. SSRN.
Harris, Colin. 2018. Institutional Solutions to Free-Riding in Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Case Study of Online Pirate Communities. Journal of Institutional Economics 14(5): 901–24.
- Hayek, F. A. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review: 519–30.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hayek, F. A. 1973. Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hayek, F. A. 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hazlett, Thomas W. 2017. The Political Spectrum: The Tumultuous Liberation of Wireless Technology, from Herbert Hoover to the Smartphone. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Heilmann, Sebastian. 2008. Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise. Studies in Comparative International Development 43(1): 1–26.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Heller, Michael A. 1998. The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets. Harvard Law Review: 621–88.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hendrickson, Joshua R., Alexander William Salter, and Brian C. Albrecht. 2018. Preventing Plunder: Military Technology, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Growth. Journal of Macroeconomics 58: 154–73.
- Heritier, Adrienne. 2007. Explaining Institutional Change in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hess, Charlotte, and Elinor Ostrom. 2007. Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Heurlin, Christopher. 2016. Responsive Authoritarianism in China. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hill, Peter J. 2014. Are All Commons Tragedies? The Case of Bison in the Nineteenth Century. The Independent Review 18(4): 485–502.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ho, Peter. 2001. Who Owns China’s Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity. The China Quarterly 166: 394–421.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Ho, Peter. 2005. Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights and Social Conflict in China. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ho, Peter. 2014. The ‘Credibility Thesis’ and Its Application to Property Rights: (In) Secure Land Tenure, Conflict and Social Welfare in China. Land Use Policy 40: 13–27.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ho, Peter. 2016. An Endogenous Theory of Property Rights: Opening the Black Box of Institutions. Journal of Peasant Studies 43(6): 1121–44.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ho, Peter. 2017. Unmaking China’s Development: The Function and Credibility of Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 1996. Economics and Evolution: Bringing Life Back into Economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2002. How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science. London and New York: Routledge.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2007. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New Mainstream? Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 4(1): 7–25.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2009. On the Institutional Foundations of Law: The Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering. Journal of Economic Issues 43(1): 143–66.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2015a. Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, Evolution, Future. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2015b. Much of the ‘Economics of Property Rights’ Devalues Property and Legal Rights. Journal of Institutional Economics 11(4): 683–709.
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 2017. 1688 and All That: Property Rights, the Glorious Revolution and the Rise of British Capitalism. Journal of Institutional Economics 13(1): 79–107.
- Holland, Alisha C. 2017. Forbearance as Redistribution: The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Hoock, Holger. 2017. Scars of Independence: America’s Violent Birth. New York: Crown.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Horowitz, Jeremy, and Kathleen Klaus. 2018. Can Politicians Exploit Ethnic Grievances? An Experimental Study of Land Appeals in Kenya. Political Behavior: 1–24.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hou, Yue. 2019. The Private Sector in Public Office: Selective Property Rights in China. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hsing, You-tien. 2010. The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China. New York: Oxford University Press.
Huang, Yasheng. 2008. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State. Cambridge University Press.
- Hummel, Jeffrey. 2013. Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American Civil War. Peru, IL: Open court.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hunt, Diana. 2004. Unintended Consequences of Land Rights Reform: The Case of the 1998 Uganda Land Act. Development policy review 22(2): 173–91.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Jacoby, Hanan G., and Bart Minten. 2007. Is Land Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa Cost-Effective? Evidence from Madagascar. The World Bank Economic Review 21(3): 461–85.
Joireman, Sandra F. 2008. The Mystery of Capital Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Women, Property Rights and Customary Law. World Development 36(7): 1233–46.
- Kerekes, Carrie B., and Claudia R. Williamson. 2008. Unveiling de Soto’s Mystery: Property Rights, Capital Formation, and Development. Journal of Institutional Economics 4(3): 299.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Kerekes, Carrie B., and Claudia R. Williamson. 2010. Propertyless in Peru, Even with a Government Land Title. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 69(3): 1011–33.
- Kerekes, Carrie B., and Claudia R. Williamson. 2012. Discovering Law: Hayekian Competition in Medieval Iceland. Griffith Law Review 21(2): 432–47.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Klaus, Kathleen, and Matthew I. Mitchell. 2015. Land Grievances and the Mobilization of Electoral Violence: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya. Journal of Peace Research 52(5): 622–35.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Klaus, Kathleen. 2020. Political Violence in Kenya: Land, Elections, and Claim-Making. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Klaus, Kathleen. 2020. Raising the Stakes: Land Titling and Electoral Stability in Kenya. Journal of Peace Research 57(1): 30–45.
- Knight, Jack, and Douglass C. North. 1997. Explaining the Complexity of Institutional Change. In The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies.New York: Cambridge University Press, 349–54.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Knight, Jack, and Itai Sened, eds. 1995. Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Kopsidis, Michael, and Daniel W. Bromley. 2016. The French Revolution and German Industrialization: Dubious Models and Doubtful Causality. Journal of Institutional Economics 12(1): 161–90.
Kornai, Janos. 1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Krueger, Anne O. 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. The American Economic Review 64(3): 291–303.
- Kuran, Timur. 2004. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Kuran, Timur. 2011. The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kuran, Timur. 2020. Zakat: Islam’s Missed Opportunity to Limit Predatory Taxation. Public Choice 182(3–4): 395–416.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Kuznets, Simon. 1955. Economic Growth and Income Inequality. American Economic Review 45(1): 1–28.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Leeson, Peter T. 2007a. Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 163(3): 467–82.
Leeson, Peter T. 2007b. An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization. Journal of political economy 115(6): 1049–94.
Leeson, Peter T. 2007c. Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after Government Collapse. Journal of Comparative Economics 35(4): 689–710.
Leeson, Peter T. 2007d. Trading with Bandits. The Journal of Law and Economics 50(2): 303–21.
Leeson, Peter T. 2008. Coordination without Command: Stretching the Scope of Spontaneous Order. Public Choice 135(1–2): 67–78.
Leeson, Peter T. 2009. The Laws of Lawlessness. The Journal of Legal Studies 38(2): 471–503.
Leeson, Peter T. 2010a. Pirational Choice: The Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 76(3): 497–510.
- Leeson, Peter T. 2010b. Two Cheers for Capitalism? Society 47(3): 227–33.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Leeson, Peter T. 2011. The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Leeson, Peter T. 2014a. Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better than You Think. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Leeson, Peter T. 2014b. Human Sacrifice. Review of Behavioral Economics 1(1–2): 137–65.
Leeson, Peter T. 2020. Logic Is a Harsh Mistress: Welfare Economics for Economists. Journal of Institutional Economics 16(2): 145–50.
Leeson, Peter T., and Claudia R. Williamson. 2009. Anarchy and Development: An Application of the Theory of Second Best. The Law and Development Review 2(1): 77–96.
Leeson, Peter T., and Colin Harris 2018b. Wealth-Destroying Private Property Rights. World Development 107: 1–9.
Leeson, Peter T., and Colin Harris. 2018a. Testing Rational Choice Theories of Institutional Change. Rationality and Society 30(4): 420–31.
Leeson, Peter T., and Douglas B. Rogers. 2012. Organizing Crime. Supreme Court Economic Review 20(1): 89–123.
Leeson, Peter T., and Paola A. Suarez. 2016. An Economic Analysis of Magna Carta. International Review of Law and Economics 47: 40–46.
Leeson, Peter T., Colin Harris, and Andrew Myers. 2020. Kornai Goes to Kenya. Public Choice.
- Lemke, Jayme S. 2016. Interjurisdictional Competition and the Married Women’s Property Acts. Public Choice 166(3–4): 291–313. Leonard, Bryan, Dominic Parker, and Terry Anderson. (forthcoming). Land Quality, Land Rights, and Indigenous Poverty. Journal of Development Economics.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Lesorogol, Carolyn K. 2005. Privatizing Pastoral Lands: Economic and Normative Outcomes in Kenya. World Development 33(11): 1959–78.
- Levien, Michael. 2011. Special Economic Zones and Accumulation by Dispossession in India. Journal of Agrarian Change 11(4): 454–83.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Levien, Michael. 2012. The Land Question: Special Economic Zones and the Political Economy of Dispossession in India. The Journal of Peasant Studies 39 (3–4): 933–69.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Levien, Michael. 2018. Dispossession without Development: Land Grabs in Neoliberal India. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Libecap, Gary D. 2009. Chinatown Revisited: Owens Valley and Los Angeles – Bargaining Costs and Fairness Perceptions of the First Major Water Rights Exchange. Journal of Law, Economics, and organization 25(2): 311–38.
- Libecap, Gary D. 1989a. Contracting for Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Libecap, Gary D. 1989b. Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics: 6–24.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Libecap, Gary D. 2005. Chinatown: Owens Valley and Western Water Reallocation – Getting the Record Straight and What It Means for Water Markets. Texas Law Review 83(7): 2055–89.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Libecap, Gary D. 2018. Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Libecap, Gary D., and Dean Lueck. 2011. The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions. Journal of Political Economy 119(3): 426–67.
Libecap, Gary D., and James L. Smith. 1999. The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreements: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15(2): 526–48.
Libecap, Gary D., and James L. Smith. 2002. The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States. The Journal of Legal Studies 31(S2): S589–608.
Libecap, Gary D., and Steven N. Wiggins. 1985. The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization. Journal of Political Economy 93(4): 690–714.
Liebowitz, Stan J., and Stephen E. Margolis. 1995. Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 11: 205.
Lin, Justin Yifu. 1992. Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China. The American Economic Review: 34–51.
Lipsey, Richard G., and Kelvin Lancaster. 1956. The General Theory of Second Best. The Review of Economic Studies 24(1): 11–32.
- Liu, Lizhi, and Barry R. Weingast. 2018. Taobao, Federalism, and the Emergence of Law, Chinese Style. Minnesota Law Review 111: 1563–90.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Lueck, Dean. 1995. The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law. The Journal of Law and Economics 38(2): 393–436.
Lueck, Dean. 2002. The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison. The Journal of Legal Studies 31(S2): S609–52.
- Lund, Christian. 2008. Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Macaulay, Stewart. 1963. Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study. American Sociological Review 28(1): 55–67.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Madison, Michael J., Brett M. Frischmann, and Katherine J. Strandburg. 2009. Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment. Cornell Law Review 95: 657.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Mailath, George J., and Larry Samuelson. 2006. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. New York: Oxford University Press.
Maskin, Eric, Yingyi Qian, and Chenggang Xu. 2000. Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form. Review of Economic Studies 67(2): 359–78.
McChesney, Fred S. 1990. Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets. Journal of Legal Studies: 297–335.
- McCloskey, Deirdre N. 2010. Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
McCloskey, Deirdre N. 2016. Max U versus Humanomics: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalism. Journal of Institutional Economics 12(1): 1–27.
- McCloskey, Deirdre N. 2019. Why Liberalism Works: How True Liberal Values Produce a Freer, More Equal, Prosperous World for All. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
McCloskey, Donald N. 1991. The Prudent Peasant: New Findings on Open Fields. Journal of Economic History 51(2): 343–55.
McGinnis, Michael D. 2005. Beyond Individualism and Spontaneity: Comments on Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 57(2): 167–72.
- McGinnis, Michael D. 2011. An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework. Policy Studies Journal 39(1): 169–83.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
McGuire, Martin C., and Mancur Olson. 1996. The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force. Journal of Economic Literature 34(1): 72–96.
Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. 2006. Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic Journal 116(508): 1–20.
- Menger, Carl. 1892. On the Origin of Money. Economic Journal 2: 239–55.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Menkhaus, Ken. 2007. Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping. International Security 31(3): 74–106.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Migot-Adholla, Shem E. et al. 1994. Land, Security of Tenure, and Productivity in Ghana. In Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, eds. John W. Bruce and Shem E. Migot-Adholla. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 97–118.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Miller, Melinda C. (2021). ‘The Righteous and Reasonable Ambition for Forty Acres and a Mule:’ Land and Racial Inequality in the Postbellum South. Review of Economics and Statistics.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Miller, Melinda C. 2011. Land and Racial Wealth Inequality. American Economic Review 101 (3): 371–76.
- Mises, Ludwig von. 1935. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth. In Collectivist Economic Planning, ed. Friedrich A. Hayek. London: Routledge and Kegan.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Mokyr, Joel. 1990. The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. New York: Beacon.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Murtazashvili, Ilia, and Jennifer Murtazashvili. 2015. Anarchy, Self-Governance, and Legal Titling. Public Choice 162(3): 287–305.
- Murtazashvili, Ilia, and Jennifer Murtazashvili. 2016a. Can Community-Based Land Adjudication and Registration Improve Household Land Tenure Security? Evidence from Afghanistan. Land Use Policy 55: 230–39.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Murtazashvili, Ilia, and Jennifer Murtazashvili. 2016b. Does the Sequence of Land Reform and Political Reform Matter? Evidence from State-Building in Afghanistan. Conflict, Security & Development 16(2): 145–72.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Murtazashvili, Ilia, and Jennifer Murtazashvili. 2016c. The Origins of Property Rights: States or Customary Organizations? Journal of Institutional Economics 12(1): 105–28.
Murtazashvili, Ilia, and Jennifer Murtazashvili. 2016d. When Does the Emergence of a Stationary Bandit Lead to Property Insecurity? Rationality and Society 28(3): 335–60.
Murtazashvili, Ilia, and Jennifer Murtazashvili. 2019. The Political Economy of Legal Titling. Review of Austrian Economics 32: 251–68.
Murtazashvili, Ilia. 2013. The Political Economy of the American Frontier. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Murtazashvili, Ilia. 2017. Institutions and the Shale Boom. Journal of Institutional Economics 13(1): 189–210.
Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick, and Ilia Murtazashvili. (2021). Land, the State, and War: Property Rights and Political Order in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press.
Murtazashvili, Jennifer, and Ilia Murtazashvili. 2020. Wealth-Destroying States. Public Choice 182(3–4): 353–71.
- Murtazashvili, Jennifer. 2016. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Myerson, Roger. 2004. Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria. Chicago Journal of International Law 5: 91.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
North, Douglass C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- North, Douglass C., and Andrew Rutten. 1987. The Northwest Ordinance in Historical Perspective. Essays on the Economy of the Old Northwest: 19–31.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. Journal of Economic History 49(4): 803–32.
- North, Douglass C., and Robert Paul Thomas. 1973. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nugent, Jeffrey B., and Nicolas Sanchez. 1993. Tribes, Chiefs, and Transhumance: A Comparative Institutional Analysis. Economic Development and Cultural Change 42(1): 87–113.
Nunn, Nathan. 2008. The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(1): 139–76.
- Oi, Jean C. 1999. Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform. University of California Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Olson, Mancur. 1993. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science Review 87(3): 567–76.
- Olson, Mancur. 2000. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ostrom, Elinor, and Toh-Kyeong Ahn. 2009. The Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to Collective Action. In Handbook of Social Capital: The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics, eds. Gert Tinggaard Svendsen and Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 17–35.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ostrom, Elinor, Marco A. Janssen, and John M. Anderies. 2007. Going beyond Panaceas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(39): 15176–78.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges. Science 284(5412): 278–82.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. A Diagnostic Approach for Going beyond Panaceas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(39): 15181–87.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2009. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. Science 325(5939): 419–22.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Ostrom, Elinor. 2010a. Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems. American Economic Review 100(3): 641–72.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 2010b. Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change. Global environmental change 20(4): 550–57.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren. 1961. The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry. American Political Science Review 55(4): 831–42.
- Ostrom, Vincent. 2008. The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Palagashvili, Liya, Ennio Piano, and David Skarbek. 2017. The Decline and Rise of Institutions – A Modern Survey of the Austrian Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pennington, Mark. 2013. Elinor Ostrom and the Robust Political Economy of Common-Pool Resources. Journal of Institutional Economics 9(4): 449–68.
- Percy, Sarah, and Anja Shortland. 2013. The Business of Piracy in Somalia. Journal of Strategic Studies 36(4): 541–78.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Platteau, Jean-Philippe. 2000. Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development. New York: Routledge.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Posner, Eric A., and E. Glen Weyl. 2017. Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly. Journal of Legal Analysis 9(1): 51–123.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Posner, Eric A., and E. Glen Weyl. 2018. Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Potts, Jason. 2018. Governing the Innovation Commons. Journal of Institutional Economics 14(6): 1025–47.
- Potts, Jason. 2019. Innovation Commons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford, and Alex Nowrasteh. 2008. Somalia after State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 67(3–4): 657–70.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. The Prosperous Community. The American Prospect 4(13): 35–42.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1994. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Qian, Yingyi, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4): 83–92.
- Rajan, Raghuram. 2004. Assume Anarchy. Finance and Development 41(3): 56–57.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Riker, William H., and David L. Weimer. 1993. The Economic and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy 10(02): 79–102.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Riker, William H., and David L. Weimer. 1995. The Political Economy of Transformation: Liberalization and Property Rights. In Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 80–107.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Rithmire, Meg Elizabeth. 2015. Land Bargains and Chinese Capitalism: The Politics of Property Rights under Reform. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth 9(2): 131–65.
Root, Hilton L. 1989. Tying the King’s Hands – Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy during the Old Regime. Rationality and Society 1(2): 240–58.
- Rutten, M. M. 1992. Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty: The Process of the Individualization of Landownership among the Maasai Pastoralists of Kajiado District, Kenya, 1890–1990. Saarbrücken, Germany: Verlag brei- tenbach Publishers.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Safner, Ryan. 2016. Institutional Entrepreneurship, Wikipedia, and the Opportunity of the Commons. Journal of Institutional Economics 12(4): 743–71.
Salter, Alexander William, and Peter T. Leeson. 2014. Celestial Anarchy. Cato Journal 34(3).
Salter, Alexander William. 2015. Rights to the Realm: Reconsidering Western Political Development. American Political Science Review 109(4): 725–34.
- Sargeson, Sally. 2012. Villains, Victims and Aspiring Proprietors: Framing ‘Land-Losing Villagers’ in China’s Strategies of Accumulation. Journal of Contemporary China 21(77): 757–77.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Sargeson, Sally. 2013. Violence as Development: Land Expropriation and China’s Urbanization. The Journal of Peasant Studies 40(6): 1063–85.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Schlager, Edella, and Elinor Ostrom. 1992. Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics: 249–62.
- Scott, James C. 1999. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Scott, James C. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Sened, Itai. 1997. The Political Institution of Private Property. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Seth, Michael J. 2019. A Concise History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Shinn, Charles Howard. 1884. Mining Camps: A Study in American Frontier Government. Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Shortland, Anja, and Federico Varese. 2016. State-Building, Informal Governance and Organised Crime: The Case of Somali Piracy. Political Studies 64(4): 811–31.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Shortland, Anja. 2019. Kidnap: Inside the Ransom Business. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Sjaastad, Espen, and Daniel W. Bromley. 1997. Indigenous Land Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Appropriation, Security and Investment Demand. World Development 25(4): 549–62.
Sjaastad, Espen, and Daniel W. Bromley. 2000. The Prejudices of Property Rights: On Individualism, Specificity, and Security in Property Regimes. Development Policy Review 18(4): 365–89.
Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights. The American Economic Review: 720–39.
Skarbek, David. 2011. Governance and Prison Gangs. American Political Science Review 105(04): 702–16.
- Skarbek, David. 2014. The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System. New York: Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Skarbek, David. 2016. Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally. American Political Science Review 110(4): 845–62.
- Skarbek, David. 2020. The Puzzle of Prison Order: Why Life Behind Bars Varies Around the World. Oxford University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Smith, Adam C., David B. Skarbek, and Bart J. Wilson. 2012. Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: An Experiment on the Emergence of Protective Associations. Social Choice and Welfare 38(2): 325–53.
- Smith, Vernon L., and Bart J. Wilson. 2019. Humanomics: Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 217–32.
Stasavage, David. 2003. Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain 1688–1789. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stasavage, David. 2011. States of Credit: Size, Power, and the Development of European Polities. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Stasavage, David. 2014. Was Weber Right? City Autonomy, Political Oligarchy, and the Rise of Europe. American Political Science Review 108(2): 337–354.
Stavins, Robert N. 2011. The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100 Years. American Economic Review 101(1): 81–108.
Steele, Abbey. 2011. Electing Displacement: Political Cleansing in Apartadó, Colombia. Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3): 423–45.
Stern, David I. 2004. The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve. World Development 32(8): 1419–39.
Storr, Virgil Henry, and Arielle John. 2020. Cultural Considerations within Austrian Economics. Cambridge University Press.
Sugden, Robert. 1989. Spontaneous Order. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(4): 85–97.
- Sun, Li, and Peter Ho. 2018. Formalizing Informal Homes, a Bad Idea: The Credibility Thesis Applied to China’s ‘Extra-Legal’ Housing. Land Use Policy 79: 891–901.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Tang, Shipping. 2011. A General Theory of Institutional Change. London: Routledge.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Thompson, Earl A. 1974. Taxation and National Defense. Journal of Political Economy 82(4): 755–82.
- Thompson, Neil, and Douglas Hanley. 2018. Science Is Shaped by Wikipedia: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5238–17.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64(5): 416–24.
- Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion Capital and European States: AD 990–1990. Oxford: Blackwell.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Tripp, Aili Mari. 1997. Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Tripp, Aili Mari. 2004. Women’s Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in Africa: The Case of Uganda. African Studies Quarterly 7(4): 1–19.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Troesken, Werner. 2015. The Pox of Liberty: How the Constitution Left Americans Rich, Free, and Prone to Infection. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Tsai, Kellee S. 2007. Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China. Cornell University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Tullock, Gordon. 1967. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Economic Inquiry 5(3): 224–32.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Tyler, Tom R. 2006. Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation. Annual Review of Psychology 57: 375–400.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Umbeck, John. 1977. A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush. Journal of Law and Economics 20: 421.
- Umbeck, John. 1981. A Theory of Property Rights: With Application to the California Gold Rush. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Vahabi, Mehrdad. 2004. The Political Economy of Destructive Power. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Vahabi, Mehrdad. 2011. Appropriation, Violent Enforcement, and Transaction Costs: A Critical Survey. Public Choice 147(1–2): 227–53.
Vahabi, Mehrdad. 2015. The Political Economy of Predation: Manhunting and the Economics of Escape. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Vahabi, Mehrdad. 2016. A Positive Theory of the Predatory State. Public Choice 168(3–4): 153–75.
Vahabi, Mehrdad. 2020. Introduction: A Symposium on the Predatory State. Public Choice 182: 233–242.
Wagner, Richard E. 2016. Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Weimer, David L. 1997. The Political Economy of Property Rights. In The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies, ed. David L. Weimer. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Weingast, Barry R. 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11(1): 1–31.
Weingast, Barry R. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. American Political Science Review 91(2): 245–63.
Weingast, Barry R. 2017. Adam Smith’s Theory of Violence and the Political Economics of Development. In Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, eds. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and John Joseph Wallis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 51–81.
Wiggins, Steven N., and Gary D. Libecap. 1985. Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information. American Economic Review 75(3): 368–85.
Williamson, Claudia R. 2009. Informal Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements and Economic Performance. Public Choice 139(3–4): 371–87.
Williamson, Claudia R., and Carrie B. Kerekes. 2011. Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions. Journal of Law and Economics 54(3): 537–72.
- Wintrobe, Ronald. 2018. Il Padrino’s Dilemma: A Simple Model of Mafia Decision Making. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 33(1): 45–61.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Wittfogel, Karl. 1957. Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Worm, Boris, et al. 2009. Rebuilding Global Fisheries. Science 325(5940): 578–85.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Xu, Chenggang. 2011. The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development. Journal of Economic Literature 49(4): 1076–1151.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Yandle, Bruce, and Andrew P. Morriss. 2001. The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons. Ecology Law Quarterly 28: 123–68.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Young, Andrew T. 2016. What Does It Take for a Roving Bandit to Settle Down? Theory and an Illustrative History of the Visigoths. Public Choice 168(1–2): 75–102.
Young, Andrew T. 2018. Hospitalitas: Barbarian Settlements and Constitutional Foundations of Medieval Europe. Journal of Institutional Economics 14(4): 715–37.