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The Decline and Rise of Institutions. (2017). Palagashvili, Liya ; Piano, Ennio ; Skarbek, David.
In: Cambridge Books.
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    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6735.

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  12. The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives. (2007). Tabellini, Guido.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000866.

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  13. Macroeconomic policy and the distribution of growth rates. (2006). Temple, Jonathan ; Sirimaneetham, Vatcharin.
    In: Bristol Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bri:uobdis:06/584.

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  14. Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India. (2006). Visaria, Sujata.
    In: Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-157.

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  15. Altruism and Climate. (2006). Weibull, Jörgen ; Alger, Ingela.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:643.

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  16. The Choice of Institutions: The Role of Risk and Risk-Aversion. (2005). Weinhold, Diana ; Zak, Paul J..
    In: Others.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0508004.

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  17. Intelligence, Human Capital, and Economic Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach. (2005). Jones, Garett ; SCHNEIDER, JOEL W..
    In: Development and Comp Systems.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0507005.

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  18. IQ in the Ramsey Model: A Naive Calibration. (2005). Jones, Garett.
    In: Development and Comp Systems.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0507004.

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  19. The overhang hangover. (2005). Ranciere, Romain ; Imbs, Jean.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3673.

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  20. Institution building and growth in transition economies. (2005). Laeven, Luc ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3657.

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  21. Will political liberalisation bring about financial development?. (2005). Huang, Yongfu.
    In: Bristol Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bri:uobdis:05/578.

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  22. Fooling Ourselves: Evaluating the Globalization and Growth Debate. (2004). Levinsohn, James ; Hallak, Juan.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10244.

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  23. Voter Turnout, Regulatory Commitment, and Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector. (2003). .
    In: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0311002.

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  24. Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance. (2003). Schwartz, Shalom ; Goldschmidt, Chanan ; Licht, Amir N..
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-605.

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  25. Institutional and Non-Institutional Explanations of Economic Differences. (2003). Engerman, Stanley L. ; Sokoloff, Kenneth L..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9989.

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  26. Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle. (2003). Antras, Pol.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9945.

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  27. Unbundling Institutions. (2003). Johnson, Simon ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9934.

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  28. Geography and Export Performance: External Market Access and Internal Supply Capacity. (2003). Venables, Anthony ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9637.

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  29. Institutions Dont Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income. (2003). Sachs, Jeffrey D..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9490.

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  30. Distance, Skill Deepening and Development: Will Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich?. (2003). Schott, Peter ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9447.

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  31. Do Firms in Countries with Poor Protection of Investor Rights Hold More Cash?. (2003). Stulz, René ; Williamson, Rohan ; Pinkowitz, Lee.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10188.

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  32. Consequences of Constitutions. (2003). Persson, Torsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10170.

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  33. Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule. (2003). Verdier, Thierry ; Robinson, James ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10136.

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  34. The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies. (2003). Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10037.

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  35. Geography and Institutions: A Review of Plausible and Implausible Linkages. (2003). Olsson, Ola.
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0106.

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  36. More on finance and growth: more finance, more growth?. (2003). Levine, Ross.
    In: Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2003:i:jul:p:31-46:n:v.85no.4.

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  37. Distance, Skill Deepening and Development: Will Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich?. (2003). Schott, Peter ; Redding, Stephen.
    In: CEP Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0572.

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  38. The Roads To and From Serfdom. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0212011.

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  39. Mortality and early growth in England, France, and Sweden. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0212010.

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  40. The Roads To and From Serfdom. (2002). Lagerlof, Nils-Petter.
    In: GE, Growth, Math methods.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:0212002.

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  41. Does it Take a Lula to go to Davos? A Brief Overview of Brazilian Reforms, 1980-2000. (2002). Moreira, Mauricio ; Campos, Nauro ; Giambiagi, Fabio ; Pinheiro, Armando Castellar.
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-580.

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  42. Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9379.

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  43. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. (2002). Trebbi, Francesco ; Subramanian, Arvind ; Rodrik, Dani.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9305.

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  44. Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economics. (2002). Engerman, Stanley L ; Sokoloff, Kenneth L..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9259.

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  45. International Financial Integration and Economic Growth. (2002). Slok, Torsten ; Ricci, Luca ; Levine, Ross ; Edison, Hali.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9164.

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  46. Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Easterly, William.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9106.

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  47. R&D, Implementation and Stagnation: A Schumpeterian Theory of Convergence Clubs. (2002). Mayer-Foulkes, David ; Howitt, Peter.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9104.

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  48. Law, Endowment, and Finance. (2002). Levine, Ross ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Beck, Thorsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9089.

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  49. Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth. (2002). Zilibotti, Fabrizio ; Aghion, Philippe ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9066.

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  50. Property Rights and Finance. (2002). Woodruff, Christopher ; Johnson, Simon.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8852.

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