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2. INCENTIVES AND SOCIAL NORMS: A MOTIVATION‐BASED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL NORMS. (2010). Festré, Agnès ; Festre, Agnes.
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3. The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy. (2009). Garrouste, pierre ; Festré, Agnès ; Festre, Agnes.
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4. The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayeks legacy. (2009). Festré, Agnès ; Festre, Agnes.
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5. The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayeks legacy. (2009). Garrouste, pierre ; Festré, Agnès ; Festre, Agnes.
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6. Piaci rend és társadalmi normák. Hayek elmélete a társadalmi evolúcióról. (2007). Gedeon, Peter.
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7. LAnalyse Economique des Normes Sociales: una Réévaluation de lHéritage Hayékien. (2007). Garrouste, pierre ; Festré, Agnès.
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1. .

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2. OPEC, the Seven Sisters, and oil market dominance: An evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling approach. (2016). Wood, Aaron ; Mason, Charles ; Finnoff, David.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:132:y:2016:i:pb:p:66-78.

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3. Learning (Not) To Yield: An Experimental Study of Evolving Ultimatum Game Behavior. (2010). Otsubo, Hironori ; Güth, Werner ; Guth, Werner ; Hertwig, Ralph ; Avrahami, Judith ; Kareev, Yaakov.
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4. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process. (2009). Ania, Ana ; Wagener, Andreas.
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5. Reinforcement Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas. (2008). Izquierdo, Luis ; GOTTS, NICHOLAS M..
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6. Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games. (2007). Izquierdo, Luis ; GOTTS, NICHOLAS M. ; Polhill, Gary J..
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7. A Note on Equilibrium Selection in Polya-Urn Coordination Games. (2005). Fagiolo, Giorgio.
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8. Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms. (2005). Andreozzi, Luciano.
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9. ENDOGENOUS NETWORKS IN RANDOM POPULATION GAMES. (2004). Valente, Marco ; Marengo, Luigi ; Fagiolo, Giorgio.
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10. Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?. (2004). Villena, Mauricio.
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11. Social Reciprocity. (2004). Matthews, Peter ; Carpenter, Jeffrey.
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12. Social Reciprocity. (2004). Matthews, Peter ; Carpenter, Jeffrey.
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13. Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets. (2003). Riedl, Arno ; Kirchsteiger, Georg ; Fehr, Ernst.
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14. Endogenous Networks in Random Population Games. (2003). Valente, Marco ; Marengo, Luigi ; Fagiolo, Giorgio.
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15. Theory of the Avatar. (2003). Castronova, Edward.
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16. Social Reciprocity. (2002). Matthews, Peter ; Carpenter, Jeffrey.
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17. Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms. (2002). Matthews, Peter ; Carpenter, Jeffrey.
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18. Rule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection. (2002). Juang, Wei-Torng.
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19. LEARNING, NETWORK FORMATION AND COORDINATION. (2001). Vega-Redondo, Fernando ; Goyal, Sanjeev ; Vegaredondo, Fernando.
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20. Two Notes on Replication in Evolutionary Modelling. (2001). Riechmann, Thomas.
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21. Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance. (2001). Nyberg, Sten.
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22. Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks. (2000). Gilles, Robert P. ; Droste, Edward ; Johnson, Cathleen.
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23. Learning, Network Formation and Coordination. (2000). Vega-Redondo, Fernando ; Goyal, Sanjeev.
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24. Why do People Veto? An Experimental Analysis of the Valuation and the Consequences of Varying Degrees of Veto Power. (2000). Güth, Werner ; Kovaczs, Judit.
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25. The evolution of conventions with mobile players. (1999). Dieckmann, Tone .
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26. Stochastic Learning and the Evolution of Conventions. (1998). .
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27. The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach. (1997). Garoupa, Nuno.
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28. The Evolution of conventions with Mobile Players. (1997). Dieckmann, Tone .
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29. Muddling Through:Noisy Equilibrium Selection. (1994). Samuelson, Larry ; Binmore, Ken.
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30. Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?. (). Gächter, Simon ; Fehr, Ernst.
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31. Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection. (). Samuelson, Larry ; Binmore, Ken.
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