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30. Contests with multi-tasking. (2006). Konrad, Kai ; Clark, Derek J..
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35. The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly. (2005). Vardy, Felix.
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43. Mixed-strategy play in single-stage first-price all-pay auctions with symmetric players. (2004). Rapoport, Amnon ; Amaldoss, Wilfred.
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45. Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments. (2003). Sunde, Uwe ; Sela, Aner ; Moldovanu, Benny ; Groh, Christian .
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46. A Contest Success Function with a Tractable Noise Parameter. (2003). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
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47. Financing Public Goods Via Lotteries. (2003). Myers, Gordon.
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48. Optimal Contest Design when the Designer’s Payoff Depends on Competitive Balance. (2003). Runkel, Marco.
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49. TWO-STAGE CONTESTS WITH ADDITIVE CARRYOVERS*. (2001). Lee, Sanghack.
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50. A political economy model of immigration quotas. (2000). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
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