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   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:196:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01052-1.

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2. Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications. (2023). Friehe, Tim ; Bienenstock, Sophie ; Ropaul, Maiva ; Baumann, Florian.
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3. Understanding cross-cultural differences in peer reporting practices: evidence from tax evasion games in Moldova and France. (2022). Dimant, Eugen ; Prohnitchi, Valeriu ; Romaniuc, Rustam ; Dubois, Dimitri ; Lupusor, Adrian.
   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:190:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00925-7.

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4. Understanding Cross-Cultural Dfferences in Peer Reporting Practices: Evidence from Tax Evasion Games in Moldova and France. (2020). DUBOIS, Dimitri ; Dimant, Eugen ; Prohnitchi, Valeriu ; Romaniuc, Rostan ; Lupusor, Adrian.
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   RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-02991776.

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5. Understanding Cross-Cultural Dfferences in Peer Reporting Practices: Evidence from Tax Evasion Games in Moldova and France. (2020). DUBOIS, Dimitri ; Dimant, Eugen ; Prohnitchi, Valeriu ; Romaniuc, Rostan ; Lupusor, Adrian.
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   RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02991776.

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6. Moral judgment of environmental harm caused by a single versus multiple wrongdoers: A survey experiment. (2020). Mzoughi, Naoufel ; Ibanez, Lisette ; Grolleau, Gilles.
   In: Ecological Economics.
   RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:170:y:2020:i:c:s0921800919302241.

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7. The stickiness of norms. (2019). Romaniuc, Rustam ; Farrow, Katherine.
   In: International Review of Law and Economics.
   RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:58:y:2019:i:c:p:54-62.

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8. Follow-the-leader? Measuring the internalisation of law. (2017). Swanson, Timothy ; Panzone, Luca ; Larcom, Shaun.
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   RePEc:gii:ciesrp:cies_rp_50.

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40. Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and cooperation. (2014). Yu, Jing ; Tan, Fanagfang .
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41. Do Beliefs Justify Actions or Do Actions Justify Beliefs? An Experiment on Stated Beliefs, Revealed Beliefs, and Social-Image Manipulation. (2014). Andreoni, James ; Sanchez, Alison.
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42. Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and cooperation. (2014). Tan, Fangfang ; Kocher, Martin ; Yu, Jing.
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43. Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence?. (2014). Xiao, Erte ; Tan, Fangfang.
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44. Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and cooperation. (2014). Tan, Fangfang ; Kocher, Martin ; Yu, Jing.
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45. Judicial Error and Cooperation. (2014). Tyran, Jean-Robert ; Putterman, Louis ; Markussen, Thomas.
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46. The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract. (2014). Bednarik, Peter ; Sigmund, Karl ; Silva, Hannelore ; Li, Cong ; Zhang, Boyu.
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47. Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions. (2014). Nihonsugi, Tsuyoshi ; Kamijo, Yoshio ; Funaki, Yukihiko ; Takeuchi, A..
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48. Are the elder more effective implementing punishment? Experimental evidence from urban Ghana. (2014). Ibanez, Marcela ; Asiedu, Edward.
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49. Top Contributors as Punishers. (2013). Zarri, Luca ; Grieco, Daniela ; Faillo, Marco.
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50. Punishment Mechanisms and their Effect on Cooperation - A Simulation Study. (2013). Faillo, Marco ; W. F. G. Haselager, ; Farjam, M. D. ; Sprinkhuizen-Kuyper, I. G..
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