1. Financial Instability and Economic Crises: Lessons from Minsky. (2018). Vymyatnina, Yulia ; Ostapenko, Vsevolod ; Grishchenko, Vadim ; Ryazanov, Viktor T.
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2. Central Bank Design in a Non-optimal Currency Union A Lender of Last Resort for Government Debt?. (2016). Spahn, Peter.
   In: ROME Working Papers.
   RePEc:rmn:wpaper:201610.

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