1. Fair solutions to the random assignment problem. (2016). Basteck, Christian.
   In: BDPEMS Working Papers.
   RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2016001.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Efficient lottery design. (2015). Nesterov, Alexander ; Kurino, Morimitsu ; Kesten, Onur.
   In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
   RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2015203.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. A theory of school choice lotteries. (2015). Unver, Utku ; Kesten, Onur.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:1558.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Inferring School Quality from Rankings: The Impact of School Choice. (2015). Herresthal, Claudia.
   In: Economics Series Working Papers.
   RePEc:oxf:wpaper:747.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match. (2015). Pathak, Parag ; Agarwal, Nikhil ; Abdulkadirolu, Atila.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21046.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study. (2015). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume ; Calsamiglia, Caterina.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bge:wpaper:365.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice. (2014). Hakimov, Rustamdjan ; Kesten, Onur.
   In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior.
   RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2014210.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance. (2014). Harless, Patrick.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:61417.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Efficiency versus Equity in the Allocation of Medical Specialty Training Positions in Spain: A Health Policy Simulation Based on a Discrete Choice Model. (2014). Ortun, Vicente ; Barber, Patricia ; Harris, Jeffrey E. ; Lopez-Valcarcel, Beatriz G..
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19896.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Estimating Mis-reporting in Dyadic Data: Are Transfers Mutually Beneficial?. (2014). Fafchamps, Marcel ; Comola, Margherita.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8664.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences. (2014). Iehlé, Vincent ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00980794.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism. (2013). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Tayfun Sönmez, .
    In: Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/669915.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice. (2013). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Pathak, Parag ; Kominers, Scott ; Dur, Umut ; Sonmez, Tayfun.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18981.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules. (2012). watabe, masahiro ; Kumano, Taro.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:428-434.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The Boston Mechanism Reconsidered. (2011). Yasuda, Yosuke ; Che, Yeon-Koo ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:1:p:399-410.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets. (2010). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16028.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag Abishek ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:11077572.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India. (2009). Lafortune, Jeanne ; Ghatak, Maitreesh ; Duflo, Esther ; Banerjee, Abhijit.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2144.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:537-569.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579651.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13225.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000283.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. [1] Abdnlkadirogln, A., P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth (2005): The New York City high school match, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95, 364-367.

2. [10] Dnbins, L. E. and D.A. Freedman (1981): Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm, American Mathematical Monthly, 88, 485-494.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

3. [11] Ehlers, L. (2006): Respecting priorities when assigning stndents to schools, University of Montreal, mimeo.

4. [12] Erdil, A. (2006): Two-sided matching with ties, PhD dissertation, University of Chicago.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
5. [13] Erdil, A. and H. Ergin (2006): Two-sided matching with indifferences, HBS and MIT, mimeo.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
6. [14] Ergin, H. (2002): Efficient resonrce allocation on the basis of priorities, Econometrica, 70, 2489-2497.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

7. [15] Ergin, H. and T. Sánmez (2006): Games of school choice nnder the Boston mechanism, Journal of Public Economics, 90, 2 15-237.

8. [16] Gale, D. and L. Shapley (1962): College admissions and the stability of marriage, Amen can Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
9. [17] Halldórsson, M., R. W. Irving, K. Iwama, D. F. Manlove, S. Miyazaki, Y. Morita, and S. Scott (2003): Approximability resnlts for stable marriage problems with ties, Theoretical Computer Science, 306, 431-447.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
10. [18] Kesten, 0. (2004): Stndent placement to pnblic schools in the US: Two new solntions, University of Rochester, mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

11. [19] Kesten, 0. (2006): On two competing mechanisms for priority based allocation problems, Journal of Economic Theory, 127, 155-171. 27

12. [2] Abdnlkadirogln, A., P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth (2006): Strategy-proofness versns Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match, mimeo.

13. [20] Manlove, D. F., R. W. Irving, K. Iwama, S. Miyazaki, and Y. Morita (2002): Hard variants of the stable marriage, Theoretical Computer Science, 276 (1-2), 261-279.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

14. [21] Pápai, 5. (2000): Strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange, Econometrica, 68, 1403-1433.

15. [22] Roth, A. E. (1982): The economics of matching: Stability and incentives, Mathematics of Operations Research, 7, 617-628.

16. [23] Roth, A. E. (1984): The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory, Journal of Political Economy, 92 (6), 991-1016.

17. [24] Roth, A. E. (2002): The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics, Econometrica 70, 1341-1378.

18. [25] Roth, A. E. (2003): The origins, history, and design of the resident Match, Journal of the American Medical Association, 289 (7), 909-912.

19. [26] Roth, A. E. and E. Peranson (1999): The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design, American Economic Review, 89, 748-780.

20. [27] Roth, A. E. and U.G. Rothblum (1999): Truncation strategies in matching markets -In search for advice for participants, Econometrica, 67, 21-43.

21. [28] Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayor (1990): Two-sided matching, New York: Cambridge University Press.

22. [29] Shapley, L. and H. Scarf (1974): On cores and indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 23-28. 28

23. [3] Abdnlkadirogln, A., P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sánmez (2005): The Boston pnblic school match, Harvard Bnsiness School, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95, 368-371.

24. [4] Abdnlkadirogln, A., P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sánmez (2006): Changing the Boston School Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Eqnal Access, mimeo.

25. [5] Abdnlkadirogln, A. and T. Sánmez (2003): School choice: A mechanism design approach, American Economic Review, 93, 729-747.

26. [6] Balinski, M. and T. Sánmez (1999): A tale of two mechanisms: Stndent placement, Journal of Economic Theory, 84, 73-94. 26

27. [7] Boston Pnblic Schools (2007): Introdncing the Boston Pnblic Schools 2007: A Gnide for Parents and Stndents, available at http://www.boston.k12.ma.ns/schools/assign.asp
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

28. [8] Chen, Y. and T. Sánmez (2006): School Choice: An Experimental Stndy, Journal of Economic Theory, 127, 202-231.

29. [9] Cormen, T. H., C. E. Leiserson, R. L. Rivest (1997): Introduction to Algorithms, MIT Press, Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

1. Effective affirmative action in school choice. (2013). Yenmez, M. Bumin ; Hafalir, Isa ; Yildirim, Muhammed Ali.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:1135.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. (2012). Troyan, Peter.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:936-947.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result. (2011). Pathak, Parag ; Sethuraman, Jay.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:816.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Robust stability in matching markets. (2011). Kojima, Fuhito.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:780.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. On Integration Policies and Schooling. (2011). Subiza, Begoña ; Alcalde, Jose.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:29145.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion. (2010). Rothblum, Uriel ; Perach, Nitsan.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:4:p:657-667.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets. (2010). AFACAN, MUSTAFA.
   In: Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:sip:dpaper:09-019.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms. (2010). Kojima, Fuhito.
   In: Economics Letters.
   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:69-70.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. School assignment, school choice and social mobility. (2010). Burgess, Simon ; Briggs, Adam.
   In: Economics of Education Review.
   RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:29:y:2010:i:4:p:639-649.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14864.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. What Have We Learned from Market Design?. (2009). Roth, Alvin E..
    In: NBER Chapters.
    RePEc:nbr:nberch:8185.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Constrained school choice. (2009). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:1921-1947.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. (2009). Hatfield, John William ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:745-749.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Grosskopf, Brit.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:1:p:176-204.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:1954-78.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets. (2009). Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:3:p:608-27.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures. (2008). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:3:p:357-365.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:537-569.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles. (2008). Oviedo, Jorge ; Neme, Alejandro ; Masso, Jordi ; Martínez Valenzuela, Ruth ; Martinez, Ruth.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:497-518.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2008). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Scholarly Articles.
    RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579651.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market. (2008). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:581-584.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets. (2008). .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:67:p:1-12.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets. (2008). Boudreau, James.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c70058.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Constrained School Choice. (2008). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:671.06.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences. (2007). Knoblauch, Vicki ; Celik, Onur.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-16.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. What`s the Matter with Tie-breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. (2007). Erdil, Aytek ; Ergin, Haluk.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:349.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. What Have We Learned From Market Design?. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13530.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13225.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany. (2007). Kübler, Dorothea ; Dwenger, Nadja ; Braun, Sebastian ; Kubler, Dorothea.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3261.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany. (2007). Kübler, Dorothea ; Dwenger, Nadja ; Braun, Sebastian ; Kubler, Dorothea.
    In: SFB 649 Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2007-070.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off. (2007). Kübler, Dorothea ; Dwenger, Nadja ; Kubler, Dorothea.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp759.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000283.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Journal of Economic Perspectives.
    RePEc:aea:jecper:v:21:y:2007:i:3:p:37-58.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences. (2007). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Sonmez, Tayfun ; M. Utku Ünver, .
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:3:p:828-851.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets. (2006). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:25-28.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2006). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12702.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11965.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. (2006). Roth, Alvin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000629.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001022.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, Should you accept? An Investigation of Contract Design. (2006). Roth, Alvin ; Grosskopf, Brit.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001017.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. School Assignment, School Choice and Social Mobility. (2006). Burgess, Simon ; Briggs, Adam.
    In: The Centre for Market and Public Organisation.
    RePEc:bri:cmpowp:06/157.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:639.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0506001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11402.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000126.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:621.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism. (2005). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Ergin, Haluk.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:619.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Matching with Contracts. (2005). Milgrom, Paul ; Hatfield, John William.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:913-935.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare). (2005). Roth, Alvin ; Niederle, Muriel ; McKinney, Nicholas C..
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:3:p:878-889.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. The Boston Public School Match. (2005). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:368-371.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-09-24 10:59:05 || Missing content? Let us know