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Property Rights. (2012). Whinston, Michael D. ; Segal, Ilya.
In: Introductory Chapters.
RePEc:pup:chapts:9889-3.

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  1. Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange. (2017). Kotowski, Maciej ; Balbuzanov, Ivan.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp17-016.

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  2. Beyond asset ownership: Employment and assetless firms in the property rights theory of the firm. (2016). He, Leshui.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:130:y:2016:i:c:p:261-273.

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  3. Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. (2016). Schmitz, Patrick ; Muller, Daniel.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:87:y:2016:i:c:p:92-107.

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  4. Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights. (2016). Gattai, Valeria ; Natale, Piergiovanna.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:109-113.

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  5. Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. (2014). Schmitz, Patrick ; Muller, Daniel.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10207.

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  6. Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design. (2013). Pavlov, Gregory ; Neeman, Zvika.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:473-501.

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  29. The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms. (2000). Zingales, Luigi ; Rajan, Raghuram.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7546.

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  30. Decentralisation of Active Labour Market Policy: The Case of Swedish Local Employment Service Committees. (2000). Skedinger, Per ; Lundin, Martin.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0537.

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  31. Decentralisation of active labour market policy: The case of Swedish local employment service committees. (2000). Skedinger, Per ; Lundin, Martin.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2000_006.

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  32. Transferring Knowledge in MNCs: The Role of Sources of Subsidiary Knowledge and Organizational Context. (2000). Foss, Nicolai ; Pedersen, Torben.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhb:cbsint:2000-006.

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  33. Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability. (2000). Mester, Loretta ; Berlin, Mitchell.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedpwp:00-1.

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  34. Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?. (2000). Roberts, Kevin ; Felli, Leonardo.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1714.

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  35. Delegation and Information Revelation. (2000). Paolini, Dimitri ; Gautier, Axel.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1292.

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  36. Delegation of Authority, Managerial Initiatives, and the Design of Divisional Structure. (2000). Riyanto, Yohanes.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1061.

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  37. Interference, Contracts and Authority with Insecure Communication. (2000). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0650.

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  38. When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?. (2000). Chiu, Y. ; Chatterjee, Kalyan.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0518.

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  39. Delegation and information revelation. (2000). Paolini, Dimitri ; Gautier, Axel.
    In: LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES.
    RePEc:ctl:louvir:2000015.

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  40. The Rise and Fall of the Size of Firms. (2000). Trau, Fabrizio.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp156.

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  41. Self-Confidence and Social Interactions. (1999). Tirole, Jean ; Benabou, Roland.
    In: Princeton Economic Theory Papers.
    RePEc:wop:prinet:00s2.

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  42. Balancing Incentives: The Tension Between Basic and Applied Research. (1999). Henderson, Rebecca ; Cockburn, Iain ; Stern, Scott.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6882.

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  43. Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors. (1999). Mester, Loretta ; Berlin, Mitchell.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedpwp:99-8.

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  44. Corporate Governance. (1999). Tirole, Jean.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2086.

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  45. A Tale of Two Wages: Separating Contract from Governance. (1997). James, Harvey.
    In: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9705001.

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  46. Public vs. Private Ownership of Firms: Evidence from Rural China. (1997). Qian, Yingyi ; Jin, Hehui.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:stanec:97047.

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  47. Costly Coasian Contracts. (1997). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
    In: CARESS Working Papres.
    RePEc:wop:pennca:97-11.

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  48. Influence activity and the organization of research and development. (1997). Cassiman, Bruno.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:264.

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  49. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting.. (1997). Che, Yeon-Koo ; Hausch, D. B..
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:att:wimass:9714.

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  50. Costly Coasian Contracts. (1996). Felli, Leonardo ; Anderlini, Luca.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9610006.

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