1. Growth volatility and technical progress: a simple rent-seeking model. (2005). Leung, Charles ; Kantang, Sam Hak ; Groenewold, Nicolaas.
   In: Departmental Working Papers.
   RePEc:chk:cuhked:_174.

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2. Growth volatility and technical progress: a simple rent-seeking model. (2005). Leung, Charles ; Kantang, Sam Hak ; Groenewold, Nicolaas.
   In: Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:chk:cuhkdc:00016.

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6. Manipulating Allocation Justice: How Framing Effects can Increase the Prevalence of the Talmudic Division Principle Shnaim Ohazin. (2008). Berzak, Yevgeni ; Fink, Michael.
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7. On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach. (2007). Thomson, William.
   In: Review of Economic Design.
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8. On the convergence of the random arrival rule in large claims problems. (2007). Chun, Youngsub ; Lee, Junghoon.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:259-273.

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9. Composition, Securement, and Concede-and-divide. (2006). Moreno-Ternero, Juan.
   In: Spanish Economic Review.
   RePEc:spr:specre:v:8:y:2006:i:3:p:227-237.

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10. Protective Properties and the Constrained Equal Awards Rule for Claims Problems: A Note. (2006). Yeh, Chun-Hsien.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:221-230.

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11. New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule. (2006). Villar, Antonio ; Moreno-Ternero, Juan.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:73-84.

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12. Minimal rights based solidarity. (2006). LUTTENS, R. I..
    In: Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium.
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13. Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims. (2006). Yeh, Chun-Hsien ; Thomson, William.
    In: RCER Working Papers.
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14. A Characterization of a Family of Rules for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims. (2006). Thomson, William.
    In: RCER Working Papers.
    RePEc:roc:rocher:530.

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15. The Two-Agent Claims-Truncated Proportional Rule Has No Consistent Extension: A Constructive Proof. (2006). Thomson, William.
    In: RCER Working Papers.
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16. On the Existence of Consistent Rules to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims: A Constructive Geometric Approach. (2006). Thomson, William.
    In: RCER Working Papers.
    RePEc:roc:rocher:528.

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17. Evolution of Division Rules. (2006). Rai, Birendra.
    In: Papers on Strategic Interaction.
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18. Lost in Translation? Basis Utility and Proportionality in Games. (2005). Feldman, Barry.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0507001.

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19. Using Game Theory to Increase Students Motivation to Learn Mathematics. (2005). Ein-Ya, Gura.
    In: Discussion Paper Series.
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20. Sharing Variable Returns of Cooperation. (2005). Koster, Maurice.
    In: CeNDEF Working Papers.
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21. Economic utopia of the Torah. Economic concepts of the Hebrew Bible interpreted according to the Rabbinical Literature. (2004). Mangeloja, Esa.
    In: Method and Hist of Econ Thought.
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22. Convergence under Replication of Rules to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims. (2004). Thomson, William ; Chun, Youngsub.
    In: RCER Working Papers.
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23. A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims. (2004). Thomson, William ; Dominguez, Diego.
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24. On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study. (2004). Moreno-Ternero, Juan ; Herrero, Carmen ; C., .
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
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25. Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003. (2004). Serrano, Roberto.
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26. Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. (2003). Vidal-Puga, Juan ; Bergantiños, Gustavo.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
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27. EVEN ALLOCATIONS FOR GENERALISED RATIONING PROBLEMS. (2003). Mariotti, Marco.
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28. THE TALMUD RULE AND THE SECUREMENT OF AGENTS? AWARDS. (2003). Villar, Antonio ; Moreno-Ternero, Juan ; Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero, ; Notario, Antonio Villar .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
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29. AN EXPERIMENT ON BANKRUPTCY. (2003). Ponti, Giovanni ; Moreno-Ternero, Juan ; Herrero, Carmen ; Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero, ; Blanco, Carmen Herrero .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
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30. Probabilistic choice in games: properties of Rosenthals t-solutions. (2003). Voorneveld, Mark.
    In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
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31. Sustainability in bankruptcy problems. (2002). Villar, Antonio ; Herrero, Carmen.
    In: TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research.
    RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:10:y:2002:i:2:p:261-273.

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32. Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory. (2002). Gilli, Mario.
    In: Working Papers.
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33. BANKRUPTCY GAMES AND THE IBN EZRAS PROPOSAL. (2002). Silva, Jose ; Alcalde, Jose ; Maria del Carmen Marco, .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
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34. BANKRUPTCY RULES AND PROGRESSIVE TAXATION. (2002). Villar, Antonio ; Moreno-Ternero, Juan ; Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero, ; Notario, Antonio Villar .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
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35. Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox. (2001). Heidhues, Paul ; Chae, Suchan.
    In: CIG Working Papers.
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36. Axiomatization of Ratio Equilibria in Public Good Economies.. (2001). Wooders, Myrna ; van den Nouweland, A..
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:585.

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37. Operations research games: A survey. (2001). Hendrickx, Ruud ; Borm, Peter ; Hamers, Herbert.
    In: TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research.
    RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:9:y:2001:i:2:p:139-199.

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38. THE TAL-FAMILY OF RULES FOR BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS. (2001). Villar, Antonio ; Moreno-Ternero, Juan ; Juan D. Moreno Ternero, ; Notario, Antonio Villar .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
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39. A Minimal Test for Convex Games and the Shapley Value. (2001). Voorneveld, Mark ; Grahn, Sofia .
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40. A Dual Egalitarian Solution. (2001). Slikker, Marco ; Klijn, Flip ; Tijs, Stef.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
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41. THE THREE MUSKETEERS: FOUR CLASSICAL SOLUTIONS TO BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS. (2000). Villar, Antonio ; Herrero, Carmen ; Blanco, Carmen Herrero ; Notario, Antonio Villar .
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42. The Three Musketeers. Old Solutions to Bankruptcy Problems. (2000). Herrero, Carmen.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
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43. Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods. (1999). Volij, Oscar ; Serrano, Roberto ; Dagan, Nir.
    In: Economic theory and game theory.
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44. - PREEMINENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS. (1998). Villar, Antonio ; Herrero, Carmen ; Blanco, Carmen Herrero ; Notario, Antonio Villar .
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45. On the Determinant of Economic Growth.. (1997). Rebelo, Sergio.
    In: RCER Working Papers.
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46. A proposal to unify some concepts in the theory of fairness. (1997). Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo ; Corchon, Luis.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-21.

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47. New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules. (1996). Dagan, Nir.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:51-59.

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48. Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods. (1996). Bevia, Carmen.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:113-126.

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49. Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules. (1995). Jackson, Matthew ; Barberà, Salvador.
    In: Discussion Papers.
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50. Compromise values in cooperative game theory. (1993). Tijs, Stef ; Otten, Gert-Jan .
    In: TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research.
    RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:1:y:1993:i:1:p:1-36.

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51. Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games. (1993). Mailath, George.
    In: Discussion Papers.
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52. A Strategic Form for a Convex Game. (1988). Nakayama, M..
    In: Discussion Papers.
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53. Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations. (). Agastya, Murali.
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54. Too much cocited documents. This list is not complete

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