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Inflation Targeting: The Delegation and Co-Ordination of Monetary Policy. (1999). Hall, Stephen ; S. G. Brian HENRY, ; Nixon, James.
In: Computing in Economics and Finance 1999.
RePEc:sce:scecf9:842.

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  1. Discretionary Fiscal Policy in the EMU Context: An Empirical Approach (1981-2010) & the Recent Reform in European Governance. (2012). Solomos, Dionysios K. ; Koumparoulis, Dimitrios N..
    In: European Research Studies Journal.
    RePEc:ers:journl:v:xv:y:2012:i:2:p:117-136.

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References

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    References contributed by fischer-15983

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  29. Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1977) “Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 87 (June), pp. 473-492.

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