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2. Communication in Cournot competition: An experimental study. (2014). Waichman, Israel ; Requate, Till ; Siang, Chng Kean .
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1. Whistleblowing determinants and the effectiveness of reporting channels in the international sports sector. (2020). Verschuuren, Pim.
   In: Sport Management Review.
   RePEc:eee:spomar:v:23:y:2020:i:1:p:142-154.

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2. Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study. (2020). Serra, Danila ; Ryvkin, Dmitry.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:175:y:2020:i:c:p:439-451.

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3. Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion. (2020). Mittone, Luigi ; Dimant, Eugen ; Buckenmaier, Johannes.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:175:y:2020:i:c:p:296-313.

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4. Does trust in the government matter for whistleblowing on tax evaders? Survey and experimental evidence. (2020). pavesi, filippo ; Corazzini, Luca ; Antinyan, Armenak.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:171:y:2020:i:c:p:77-95.

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5. Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence. (2019). Masclet, David ; Viennot-Briot, Nathalie ; Montmarquette, Claude.
   In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
   RePEc:eee:soceco:v:83:y:2019:i:c:s2214804318304695.

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6. Whistleblowing and diffusion of responsibility: An experiment. (2019). Horvath, Gergely ; Choo, Lawrence ; Grimm, Veronika ; Nitta, Kohei.
   In: European Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:119:y:2019:i:c:p:287-301.

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7. Once bitten, twice shy? Market size affects the effectiveness of a leniency program by (de-)activating hysteresis effects. (2018). von Blanckenburg, Korbinian ; Tebbe, Eva.
   In: VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking.
   RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168304.

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8. Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogenous Firms: Experimental Evidence. (2017). Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
   In: EconStor Preprints.
   RePEc:zbw:esprep:169380.

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9. Voting For a Cartel as a Sign of Cooperativeness. (2017). Gillet, Joris.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:82160.

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10. Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogeneous Firms: Experimental Evidence. (2017). Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:81132.

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11. Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogenous Firms: Experimental Evidence. (2017). Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
    In: 2017 Papers.
    RePEc:jmp:jm2017:pgo786.

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12. Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China. (2017). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Berlin, Maria.
    In: SITE Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:hasite:0034.

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13. Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery. (2017). Abbink, Klaus ; Wu, Kevin.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:133:y:2017:i:c:p:256-272.

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14. Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogeneous Firms : Experimental Evidence. (2017). Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:25251.

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15. The effects of endogenous enforcement on strategic uncertainty and cartel deterrence. (2016). Lu, Liang ; Crede, Carsten.
    In: Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS).
    RePEc:uea:wcbess:16-08.

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16. Business Ethics in Organizations: An Experimental Examination of Whistleblowing and Personality. (2016). Fahr, René ; Bartuli, Jenny ; Djawadi, Behnud Mir.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10190.

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17. The effects of group composition in a strategic environment: Evidence from a field experiment. (2016). Price, Michael ; Neilson, William ; List, John.
    In: Natural Field Experiments.
    RePEc:feb:natura:00604.

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18. The effects of group composition in a strategic environment: Evidence from a field experiment. (2016). Price, Michael ; Neilson, William ; List, John.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:90:y:2016:i:c:p:67-85.

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19. Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies. (2016). Sonnemans, Joep ; Onderstal, Sander ; Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:132-141.

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20. Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?. (2015). Schultz, Luis Manuel ; Rosch, Jurgen ; Normann, Hans-Theo.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:109:y:2015:i:c:p:72-84.

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21. Do Leniency Policies facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence. (2014). Rau, Holger ; Clemens, Georg.
    In: VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100509.

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22. Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence. (2014). Rau, Holger ; Clemens, Georg.
    In: DICE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:dicedp:130.

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23. The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing. (2014). Wen, Quan ; Motchenkova, Evgenia ; Houba, Harold.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140146.

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24. Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. (2014). Jain, Tarun ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Dasgupta, Utteeyo ; Abbink, Klaus.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:111:y:2014:i:c:p:17-28.

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25. Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions. (2014). Onderstal, Sander ; Hinloopen, Jeroen.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:70:y:2014:i:c:p:317-336.

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26. Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence. (2014). Fonseca, Miguel ; Normann, Hans-Theo.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:223-225.

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27. Are leniency programs too generous?. (2014). sauvagnat, julien.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:323-326.

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28. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery. (2013). Goerg, Sebastian ; Engel, Christoph ; Yu, Gaoneng.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_01.

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29. The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings. (2013). Kujal, Praveen ; Hernan Gonzalez, Roberto ; Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto ; Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-30.

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30. Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. (2012). Jain, Tarun ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Dasgupta, Utteeyo ; Abbink, Klaus.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:42176.

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31. Reducing deception through subsequent transparency - An experimental investigation. (2012). García-Gallego, Aurora ; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván ; Behnk, Sascha ; Garcia-Gallego, Aurora.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:jau:wpaper:2012/14.

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32. Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation. (2012). Roux, Catherine ; Lefouili, Yassine.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:6:p:624-640.

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33. Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation. (2012). Gerlach, Heiko ; Choi, Jay.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:30:y:2012:i:6:p:528-540.

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34. Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments. (2012). Normann, Hans-Theo ; Fonseca, Miguel.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:8:p:1759-1772.

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35. Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration. (2011). Zhou, Jun.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
    RePEc:trf:wpaper:353.

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36. Strictness of leniency programs and asymmetric punishment effect. (2011). Motchenkova, Evgenia ; Laan, Rob .
    In: International Review of Economics.
    RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:58:y:2011:i:4:p:401-431.

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37. A comment on School choice: An experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. (2011). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume ; Calsamiglia, Caterina.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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38. Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules. (2011). Sonnemans, Joep ; Schram, Arthur ; Gillet, Joris.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:1:p:126-133.

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39. Pre-play communication in Cournot competition: An experiment with students and managers. (2010). Waichman, Israel ; Requate, Till ; Siang, Ch'ng Kean, .
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    RePEc:zbw:cauewp:201009.

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40. Prosecution and Leniency Programs: a Fools Game. (2010). sauvagnat, julien.
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41. Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer. (2010). Huck, Steffen ; Armstrong, Mark.
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42. Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs. (2010). Walzl, Markus ; Feess, Eberhard.
    In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
    RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201012)166:4_573:edofri_2.0.tx_2-v.

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43. Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory. (2010). Sherstyuk, Katerina ; Hampton, Kyle.
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44. Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer. (2010). Huck, Steffen ; Armstrong, Mark.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2937.

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45. Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory. (2010). Sherstyuk, Katerina ; Hampton, Kyle.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ala:wpaper:2010-09.

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46. An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program. (2009). Brenner, Steffen.
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    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:6:p:639-645.

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47. Group size effects on cartel formation and the enforcement power of leniency programs. (2009). Hamaguchi, Yasuyo ; Kawagoe, Toshiji ; Shibata, Aiko.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
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48. Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment. (2009). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Le Coq, Chloe ; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof ; Bigoni, Maria.
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49. On cheating, doping and whistleblowing. (2008). Loertscher, Simon ; Bruegger, Esther ; Berentsen, Aleksander.
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50. An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs. (2005). Hamaguchi, Yasuyo ; Kawagoe, Toshiji.
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