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1. Disastrous Discretion: Ambiguous Decision Situations Foster Political Favoritism. (2021). Schneider, Stephan ; Kunze, Sven.
   In: KOF Working papers.
   RePEc:kof:wpskof:21-491.

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2. New Evidence on the Soft Budget Constraint: Chinese Environmental Policy Effectiveness in Private versus SOEs. (2020). Maurel, Mathilde ; Pernet-Coudrier, Thomas.
   In: Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers).
   RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02469382.

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3. Making the most of the European Fiscal Board. (2017). Yeter, Mustafa ; Odor, Ludovit ; Horvath, Michal ; Heinemann, Friedrich ; Debrun, Xavier ; Asatryan, Zareh.
   In: ZEW policy briefs.
   RePEc:zbw:zewpbs:32017.

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4. Law Enforcement, Municipal Budgets and Spillover Effects: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Italy. (2016). Galletta, Sergio.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5707.

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5. Elected or appointed? How the nomination scheme of the city manager influences the effects of government fragmentation. (2015). Garmann, Sebastian.
   In: Journal of Urban Economics.
   RePEc:eee:juecon:v:86:y:2015:i:c:p:26-42.

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6. Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence. (2015). redoano, michela ; Porcelli, Francesco ; Lockwood, Ben ; Bracco, Emanuele.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10407.

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7. Strengthening Post-Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise — A New Dataset. (2014). Kinda, Tidiane ; Debrun, Xavier.
   In: IMF Working Papers.
   RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2014/058.

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8. Shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision. (2014). Joanis, Marcelin.
   In: Journal of Development Economics.
   RePEc:eee:deveco:v:107:y:2014:i:c:p:28-37.

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9. Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China. (2014). Zhang, Xiaobo ; Mu, Ren.
   In: Journal of Development Economics.
   RePEc:eee:deveco:v:107:y:2014:i:c:p:17-27.

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10. Elected or Appointed? How the Nomination Scheme of the City Manager Influences the Effects of Government Fragmentation. (2013). Garmann, Sebastian.
    In: VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79892.

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11. Efficiency of Public Sector Organizations: Perspectives from Theories of Bureaucracy. (2013). Erkoc, Taptuk Emre .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:49386.

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12. The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states. (2013). Guerriero, Carmine.
    In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:91-107.

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13. Elected vs appointed public law enforcers. (2013). Obidzinski, Marie ; LANGLAIS, Eric.
    In: EconomiX Working Papers.
    RePEc:drm:wpaper:2013-35.

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14. Elected vs appointed public law enforcers. (2013). Obidzinski, Marie ; LANGLAIS, Eric.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:crb:wpaper:2013-06.

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15. The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia. (2013). Martinez-Bravo, Monica.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2013_1302.

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16. A Political Theory of Populism. (2013). Sonin, Konstantin ; Acemoglu, Daron ; Egorov, Georgy.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000654.

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17. Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats. (2013). Lawarree, Jacques ; Kim, Doyoung ; Khalil, Fahad.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4511.

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18. Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bureaucracy. (2013). Dodlova, Marina.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4443.

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19. Central Bank Design. (2013). Reis, Ricardo.
    In: Journal of Economic Perspectives.
    RePEc:aea:jecper:v:27:y:2013:i:4:p:17-44.

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20. Bureaucrats and short-term politics. (2012). Drometer, Marcus.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:151:y:2012:i:1:p:149-163.

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21. Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality. (2012). Prüfer, Jens ; Binswanger, Johannes.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:3:p:358-372.

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22. A property rights approach to legislative delegation. (2011). Grajzl, Peter.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:12:y:2011:i:2:p:177-200.

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23. From Reluctant Privatization to Municipal Capitalism: an Overview on Ownership, Political Connections and Decentralization. (2011). Boggio, Margherita.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:46232.

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24. Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics. (2011). Zudenkova, Galina.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:30231.

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25. Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies. (2011). Debrun, Xavier.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2011/173.

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26. Are tenured judges insulated from political pressure?. (2011). Leaver, Clare ; Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, .
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7:p:570-586.

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27. Accountability in government and regulatory policies: Theory and evidence. (2011). Guerriero, Carmine.
    In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:39:y:2011:i:4:p:453-469.

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28. Making politicians and bureaucrats deliver: decentralization and interlinked tasks. (2010). Goyal, Ashima.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:41416.

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29. Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers. (2010). Whalley, Alexander.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15643.

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30. Policy Making with Reputation Concerns. (2010). Li, Ming ; Fu, Qiang.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2010.

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31. Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects. (2010). Jametti, Mario ; Joanis, Marcelin.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2010/4/doc2010-7.

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32. The Allocation of Decision-Making Authority when Principal has Reputation Concerns. (2009). Tsai, Tsung-Sheng ; Tamada, Yasunari.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:20225.

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33. Accountability and Cheap Talk. (2009). Di Maggio, Marco.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:18652.

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34. Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities. (2009). Knight, Brian ; Coate, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14857.

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35. Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing. (2009). Muller, Markus.
    In: CER-ETH Economics working paper series.
    RePEc:eth:wpswif:09-114.

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36. Intertwined Federalism: Accountability Problems under Partial Decentralization. (2009). Joanis, Marcelin.
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
    RePEc:cir:cirwor:2009s-39.

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37. Intertwined Federalism: Accountability Problems under Partial Decentralization. (2008). Joanis, Marcelin.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:shr:wpaper:08-22.

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38. Pandering Judges. (2008). Vidal, Jordiblanes I ; Leaver, Clare.
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:390.

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39. A Theory of Military Dictatorships. (2008). Vindigni, Andrea ; Ticchi, Davide ; Acemoglu, Daron.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13915.

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40. A Theory of Military Dictatorships. (2008). Ticchi, Davide ; Acemoglu, Daron ; Vindigni, Andrea.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3392.

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41. International Coordination and Domestic Politics. (2008). Terai, Kimiko.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:irv:wpaper:080907.

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42. Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks. (2008). Tabellini, Guido ; Alesina, Alberto.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:426-447.

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43. Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks. (2008). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Roszbach, Kasper ; Frisell, Lars .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6888.

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44. Intergovernmental Grants and Bureaucratic Power. (2008). Mörk, Eva ; Lundqvist, Heléne ; Dahlberg, Matz ; Mork, Eva.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2430.

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45. The Political Competition-Economic Performance Puzzle: Evidence from the OECD Countries and the Italian Regions. (2008). Ricciuti, Roberto ; Padovano, Fabio.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2411.

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46. Pandering Judges. (2008). Vidal, Jordiblanes I ; Leaver, Clare.
    In: STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:cep:stieop:002.

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47. How Delegation Improves Commitment. (2008). Perino, Grischa.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:awi:wpaper:0466.

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48. Who is going to save us now? Bureaucrats, Politicians and Risky Tasks. (2007). Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore ; Raschky, Paul.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-29.

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49. Vote-share Contracts and Democracy. (2007). Gersbach, Hans.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6497.

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50. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks. (2007). Tabellini, Guido ; Alesina, Alberto.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000875.

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