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2. Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities. (2020). ROTA GRAZIOSI, Grégoire ; Hoffmann, Magnus.
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3. Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment. (2020). Thille, Henry ; Mitraille, Sebastien.
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4. Simultaneous and sequential choice in a symmetric two-player game with canyon-shaped payoffs. (2020). Sun, Chia-Hung.
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5. Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs. (2020). Takahashi, Satoru ; Tercieux, Olivier.
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6. Threats and promises in bargaining. (2019). Chung, Bobby (Wing Yin) ; Wood, Daniel H.
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7. Tailored Cheap Talk: The Effects of Privacy Policy on Ad Content and Market Outcomes. (2018). Bart, Yakov ; Gardete, Pedro M.
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8. Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader. (2017). Guha, Brishti.
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9. Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment. (2017). Thille, Henry ; Mitraille, Sebastien.
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10. Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result. (2016). Stamatopoulos, Giorgos.
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11. Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the cost to re-auction. (2015). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Jun, Byoung Heon.
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12. Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal. (2014). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Jun, Byoung.
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13. Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneers type. (2013). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Jun, Byoung.
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14. The Fragility of Commitment. (2013). Vardy, Felix ; Morgan, John.
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15. Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal. (2013). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Jun, Byoung.
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16. OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS IN THE CURRENT MILLENNIUM. (2013). Suetens, Sigrid ; Potters, Jan ; Tucker, Steven ; Noussair, Charles.
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17. Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations. (2012). tercieux, olivier ; Kunimoto, Takashi ; Holden, Richard ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Aghion, Philippe.
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18. Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly. (2012). Mitraille, Sebastien ; Moreaux, Michel.
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19. Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations. (2012). tercieux, olivier ; Kunimoto, Takashi ; Holden, Richard ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Aghion, Philippe.
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20. Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment. (2011). Sloof, Randolph ; de Haan, Thomas ; Offerman, Theo.
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21. Do Firms sell forward for Strategic Reasons? An Application to the Wholesale Market for Natural Gas. (2010). van Eijkel, Remco ; Moraga, Jose Luis.
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22. Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem. (2009). Holden, Richard ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Aghion, Philippe.
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23. Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem. (2009). Holden, Richard ; Fudenberg, Drew ; Aghion, Philippe.
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24. Commitment and observability in a contracting environment. (2009). Bhaskar, V.
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25. Strategic incentives for market share. (2008). Ritz, Robert.
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26. A note on commitment when there are errors in communication. (2008). .
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27. Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence. (2007). Poulsen, Anders.
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28. Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly. (2007). Mitraille, Sebastien ; Sbastien, MITRAILLE.
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29. The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly. (2007). Vardy, Felix.
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30. Noisy leadership : An experimental approach. (2006). Müller, Wieland ; Spiegel, Y. ; Guth, W..
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37. An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs. (2004). Vardy, Felix.
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38. The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs. (2004). Vardy, Felix.
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49. Reputation with Noisy Precommitment. (1998). Martinelli, Cesar ; Levine, David.
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50. Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games. (1998). Ritzberger, Klaus ; Kirchsteiger, Georg ; Guth, Werner.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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