1.

Dismisses the appeal;

2.

Orders Mowi ASA to pay the costs.

1.

Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a contractual term in a mortgage loan agreement concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier, which provides that the interest rate applicable to the loan is based on one of the official reference indices provided for by the national legislation that may be applied by credit institutions to mortgage loans, falls within the scope of that directive, where that national legislation does not provide either for the mandatory application of that index independently of the choice of the parties to the agreement or for the supplementary application thereof in the absence of other arrangements established by those parties.

2.

Directive 93/13, in particular Article 4(2) and Article 8 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the court of a Member State is required to verify that a contractual term relating to the main subject matter of the agreement is plain and intelligible, irrespective of whether or not Article 4(2) of that directive was transposed into the legal order of that Member State.

3.

Directive 93/13, in particular Article 4(2) and Article 5 thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that, with a view to complying with the transparency requirement of a contractual term setting a variable interest rate under a mortgage loan agreement, that term not only must be formally and grammatically intelligible but also enable an average consumer, who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, to be in a position to understand the specific functioning of the method used for calculating that rate and thus evaluate, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the potentially significant economic consequences of such a term on his or her financial obligations. Information that is particularly relevant for the purposes of the assessment to be carried out by the national court in that regard includes (i) the fact that essential information relating to the calculation of that rate is easily accessible to anyone intending to take out a mortgage loan, on account of the publication of the method used for calculating that rate, and (ii) the provision of data relating to past fluctuations of the index on the basis of which that rate is calculated.

4.

Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as not precluding the national court, where an unfair contractual term setting a reference index for calculating the variable interest of a loan is null and void, from replacing that index with a statutory index applicable in the absence of an agreement to the contrary between the parties to the contract, in so far as the mortgage loan agreement in question is not capable of continuing in existence if the unfair term is removed and annulment of that agreement in its entirety would expose the consumer to particularly unfavourable consequences.

1.

Sets aside the judgments of the General Court of the European Union of 6 December 2017, Tulliallan Burlington v EUIPO — Burlington Fashion (Burlington) (T-120/16, EU:T:2017:873), of 6 December 2017, Tulliallan Burlington v EUIPO — Burlington Fashion (BURLINGTON THE ORIGINAL) (T-121/16, not published, EU:T:2017:872), of 6 December 2017, Tulliallan Burlington v EUIPO — Burlington Fashion (Burlington) (T-122/16, not published, EU:T:2017:871), and of 6 December 2017, Tulliallan Burlington v EUIPO — Burlington Fashion (BURLINGTON) (T-123/16, not published, EU:T:2017:870);

2.

Annuls the decisions of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 January 2016 (Cases R 94/2014-4, R 2501/2013-4, R 2409/2013-4 and R 1635/2013-4) relating to four sets of opposition proceedings between Tulliallan Burlington Ltd and Burlington Fashion GmbH;

3.

Orders Burlington Fashion GmbH and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by Tulliallan Burlington Ltd in relation both to the first-instance proceedings in Cases T-120/16 to T-123/16 and the procedures on appeal, in equal shares.

1.

The concept of ‘legal person’ set out, inter alia, in Article 1(a) and Article 9(3) of Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted in the light of the law of the issuing State of the decision imposing a financial penalty.

2.

Framework Decision 2005/214, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, must be interpreted as meaning that that it does not require a national court not to apply a provision of national law that is incompatible with Article 9(3) of Framework Decision 2005/214, as amended by Framework Decision, since that provision is devoid of direct effect. Nevertheless, the referring court is required to give, as far as is possible, an interpretation of national law in accordance with EU law in order to ensure a result that is compatible with the aim pursued by Framework Decision 2005/214, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299.

1.

Article 132(1)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the competent authorities in a Member State may — for the purpose of determining whether the care services provided by a private hospital, which are in the public interest, are provided under social conditions comparable to those applicable to bodies governed by public law, within the meaning of that provision — take into account the fact that those services are provided under contracts concluded with public authorities of that Member State, at prices fixed by those contracts and whose costs are partially borne by the social security institutions of that Member State;

2.

Article 391 of Directive 2006/112, read in conjunction with Article 377 thereof, and the principles of legitimate expectation, legal certainty and fiscal neutrality, must be interpreted as precluding the exemption from VAT of supplies of care services provided by private hospitals which fall within Article 132(1)(b) of that directive owing to a change in the conditions under which it carried on its activities that occurred after it opted for the taxation regime laid down in the national law of the Member State concerned which laid down the requirement, for all taxable persons making such a choice, to remain subject to that regime for a certain period, where such a period has not yet expired.

1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of 24 January 2018, Constantin Film Produktion v EUIPO (Fack Ju Göhte) (T-69/17, not published, EU:T:2018:27);

2.

Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 1 December 2016 (Case R-2205/2015-5) relating to an application for registration of the word sign ‘Fack Ju Göhte’ as an EU trade mark;

3.

Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by Constantin Film Produktion GmbH in relation both to the proceedings at first instance in Case T-69/17 and on appeal.

1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 7 March 2018, Equivalenza Manufactory v EUIPO — ITM Entreprises (BLACK LABEL BY EQUIVALENZA) (T-6/17, not published, EU:T:2018:119);

2.

Dismisses the action for annulment brought by Equivalenza Manufactory SL before the General Court of the European Union in Case T–6/17;

3.

Orders Equivalenza Manufactory SL to bear its own costs relating both to the proceedings at first instance in Case T-6/17 and to the appeal proceedings and to pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) in both of those proceedings.

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

2.

Orders Buonotourist Srl to pay the costs.

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

2.

Orders CSTP Azienda della Mobilità SpA to pay the costs.

1.

Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which, in the event of theft of goods placed under a customs warehousing procedure, a pecuniary penalty is imposed on the holder of the customs warehousing authorisation for failure to comply with the customs legislation.

2.

Article 42(1) of Regulation No 952/2013 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which, in the event of removal from customs supervision of goods placed under a customs warehousing procedure, the holder of the customs warehousing authorisation is required to pay, in addition to a pecuniary penalty, a sum corresponding to the value of those goods.

1.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 25 September 2018, Foundation for the Protection of the Traditional Cheese of Cyprus named Halloumi v EUIPO — M. J. Dairies (BBQLOUMI) (T-328/17, not published, EU:T:2018:594);

2.

Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union;

3.

Reserves the costs.

1.

Article 22(3) of Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services must be interpreted as precluding national legislation extending the obligation, in respect of 1998, imposed on a telecommunications undertaking holding an existing authorisation on the date of entry into force of that directive to pay a charge calculated on the basis of turnover and not merely the administrative costs incurred in the issue, management, control and enforcement of the applicable general authorisation scheme and individual licences;

2.

EU law must be interpreted as not requiring a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a judgment, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy an infringement of a provision of EU law, without prejudice to the possibility for the parties concerned of rendering the State liable in order to obtain legal protection of their rights under EU law.

1.

Article 132(1)(c) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that services provided by telephone, consisting of advice relating to health and illness, can fall within the exemption provided for in that provision, provided that they pursue a therapeutic aim, which it is for the referring court to determine.

2.

Article 132(1)(c) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as not requiring that, due to the fact that medical services are provided by telephone, nurses and medical assistants who provide those services are subject to additional professional qualification requirements in order for those services to benefit from the exemption provided for in that provision, provided that they can be regarded as being of a level of quality equivalent to that of services provided by other service providers using the same means of communication, which is a matter for the referring court to determine.

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

2.

Orders Credito Fondiario SpA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Single Resolution Board;

3.

Orders the Italian Republic and the European Commission to bear their own costs.

1.

A benefit such as the rehabilitation allowance at issue in the main proceedings is a sickness benefit, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 465/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012.

2.

Regulation No 883/2004, as amended by Regulation No 465/2012, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation in which a person who has ceased to be insured under the social security system of his or her Member State of origin after ceasing to be employed there and moving his or her place of residence to another Member State, where he or she worked and completed the majority of his or her periods of insurance, is refused a benefit such as the rehabilitation allowance at issue in the main proceedings by the competent institution of his or her Member State of origin, since that person is subject not to the legislation of the State of origin but to that of the Member State in which his or her place of residence is situated.

1.

Declares that, by failing to adopt the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of 23 April 2015 in Commission v Greece (C-149/14, not published, EU:C:2015:264), by the expiry of the period prescribed in the letter of formal notice sent by the European Commission, namely 5 December 2017, the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU.

2.

Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the European Commission a lump sum of EUR 3 500 000, to an account to be indicated by it.

3.

Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.

—

Set aside the judgment of 12 September 2019 (T-225/18);

—

Rule again on the action and grant the appellant the relief sought at first instance;

—

Order the CdT to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings.

1.

Is Article 56 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that, in the assessment of the impermissible advertising practices of the licence holder formulated by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its established case-law in the case of a State gambling monopoly, the relevant issue is whether there has in fact been growth in the gambling market considered overall in the relevant period, or is it sufficient that the advertising is aimed at stimulating active participation in gambling, such as by trivialising gambling, conferring on it a positive image because revenues derived from it are used for activities in the public interest, or by increasing its attractiveness by means of enticing advertising messages holding out the tantalising prospect of major winnings?

2.

Is Article 56 TFEU also to be interpreted as meaning that advertising practices of a monopolist, should they exist, in any event rule out the coherence of the monopoly system, or is it possible for active participation in gambling also to be stimulated by the monopolist in the event of corresponding advertising activities of private providers, such as by trivialising gambling, giving it a positive image because revenues derived from it are used for activities in the public interest, or by increasing its attractiveness by means of enticing advertising messages holding out the tantalising prospect of major winnings?

3.

Is a national court which is called upon, within the scope of its jurisdiction, to apply Article 56 TFEU under a duty, of its own motion, to give full effect to those provisions by refusing to apply any, in its opinion, conflicting provision of national law, even if the compliance of such a provision with EU law has been confirmed in constitutional-law proceedings?

(a)

Must Article 6 and Article 38(4) of the Procedures Directive, and recital 34 thereto, which imposes an obligation to examine applications for international protection, read in the light of Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’), be interpreted as meaning that the competent asylum authority of a Member State must ensure that the applicant has the opportunity to initiate the asylum procedure if it has not examined the substance of the application for asylum by relying on the ground of inadmissibility mentioned in Question 1 above and has subsequently ordered the return of the applicant to a third country which has however refused to readmit him?

(b)

If the answer to question 2(a) is in the affirmative, what is the exact extent of that obligation? Does it imply an obligation guaranteeing the possibility to submit a new application for asylum, thereby excluding the negative consequences of subsequent applications referred to in Articles 33(2)(d) and 40 of the Procedures Directive, or does it imply the automatic start or conduct of the asylum procedure?

(c)

If the answer to Question 2(a) is in the affirmative, taking account also of Article 38(4) of the Procedures Directive, can the Member State — the factual situation remaining unchanged — re-examine the inadmissibility of the application in the context of that new procedure (thereby giving it the possibility of applying any type of procedure provided for in Chapter III, for example reliance once again on a ground of inadmissibility) or must it examine the substance of the application for asylum in the light of the country of origin?

(d)

Does it follow from Article 33(1) and (2)(b) and (c) and Articles 35 and 38 of the Procedures Directive, read in the light of Article 18 of the Charter, that readmission by a third country is one of the cumulative conditions for the application of a ground of inadmissibility, that is to say, for the adoption of a decision based on such a ground, or is it sufficient to verify that that condition is satisfied at the time of the enforcement of such a decision?

(a)

Must Article 43 of the Procedures Directive be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which the applicant may be detained in a transit zone for more than four weeks?

(b)

Must Article 2(h) of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) (‘the Reception Directive’), (2) applicable pursuant to Article 26 of the Procedures Directive, read in the light of Article 6 and Article 52(3) of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that accommodation in a transit zone in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings (a zone which an applicant cannot lawfully leave on a voluntary basis regardless of his destination) for a period exceeding the four-week period referred to in Article 43 of the Procedures Directive constitutes detention?

(c)

Is the fact that the detention of the applicant for a period exceeding the four-week period referred to in Article 43 of the Procedures Directive takes place only because he cannot meet his needs (accommodation and food) due to a lack of material resources to cover those needs compatible with Article 8 of the Reception Directive, applicable pursuant to Article 26 of the Procedures Directive?

(d)

Is the fact that (i) accommodation which constitutes de facto detention for a period exceeding the four-week period referred to in Article 43 of the Procedures Directive has not been ordered by a detention order, (ii) no guarantee that the lawfulness of the detention and its continuation may be challenged before the courts has been provided, (iii) the de facto detention takes place without any examination of the necessity or proportionality of that measure, or whether there are any alternatives measures and (iv) the exact duration of the de facto detention is not fixed, including the date on which it ends, compatible with Articles 8 and 9 of the Reception Directive, applicable pursuant to Article 26 of the Procedures Directive?

(e)

Can Article 47 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that, when a manifestly unlawful detention is brought for consideration before a court of a Member State, that court may, as an interim measure, until the administrative proceedings come to an end, require the authority to designate for the benefit of the third-country national a place of stay outside the transit zone which is not a place of detention?

(a)

Must recitals 17 and 24 and Article 16 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (‘the Return Directive’), (3) read in the light of Article 6 and Article 52(3) of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that accommodation in a transit zone in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings (a zone which an applicant cannot lawfully leave on a voluntary basis regardless of his destination) constitutes deprivation of liberty for the purposes of those provisions?

(b)

Is the fact that the detention of an applicant, national of a third country, takes place solely because he is subject to a return order and cannot meet his needs (accommodation and food) due to a lack of material resources to cover those needs compatible with Recital 16 and Article 15(1) of the Return Directive, read in the light of Articles 6 and 52(3) of the Charter?

(c)

Is the fact that (i) accommodation which constitutes de facto detention has not been ordered by a detention order, (ii) no guarantee that the lawfulness of the detention and its continuation may be challenged before the courts has been provided and (iii) the de facto detention takes place without any examination of the necessity or proportionality of that measure, or whether there are any alternatives measures, compatible with Recital 16 and Article 15(2) of the Return Directive, read in the light of Articles 6, 47 and 52(3) of the Charter?

(d)

Can Article 15(1) and (4) to (6) and recital 16 of the Return Directive, read in the light of Articles 1, 4, 6 and 47 of the Charter be interpreted as precluding detention from taking place without its exact duration being fixed, including the date on which it ends?

(e)

Can EU law be interpreted as meaning that, when a manifestly unlawful detention is brought for consideration before a court of a Member State, that court may, as an interim measure, until the administrative proceedings come to an end, require the authority to designate for the benefit of the third-country national a place of stay outside the transit zone which is not a place of detention?

(a)

Must Article 6 and Article 38(4) of the Procedures Directive, and recital 34 thereto, which imposes an obligation to examine applications for international protection, read in the light of Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’), be interpreted as meaning that the competent asylum authority of a Member State must ensure that the applicant has the opportunity to initiate the asylum procedure if it has not examined the substance of the application for asylum by relying on the ground of inadmissibility mentioned in Question 1 above and has subsequently ordered the return of the applicant to a third country which has however refused to readmit him?

(b)

If the answer to question 2(a) is in the affirmative, what is the exact extent of that obligation? Does it imply an obligation guaranteeing the possibility to submit a new application for asylum, thereby excluding the negative consequences of subsequent applications referred to in Articles 33(2)(d) and 40 of the Procedures Directive, or does it imply the automatic start or conduct of the asylum procedure?

(c)

If the answer to Question 2(a) is in the affirmative, taking account also of Article 38(4) of the Procedures Directive, can the Member State — the factual situation remaining unchanged — re-examine the inadmissibility of the application in the context of that new procedure (thereby giving it the possibility of applying any type of procedure provided for in Chapter III, for example reliance once again on a ground of inadmissibility) or must it examine the substance of the application for asylum in the light of the country of origin?

(d)

Does it follow from Article 33(1) and (2)(b) and (c) and Articles 35 and 38 of the Procedures Directive, read in the light of Article 18 of the Charter, that readmission by a third country is one of the cumulative conditions for the application of a ground of inadmissibility, that is to say, for the adoption of a decision based on such a ground, or is it sufficient to verify that that condition is satisfied at the time of the enforcement of such a decision?

(a)

Must Article 43 of the Procedures Directive be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which the applicant may be detained in a transit zone for more than four weeks?

(b)

Must Article 2(h) of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) (‘the Reception Directive’), (2) applicable pursuant to Article 26 of the Procedures Directive, read in the light of Article 6 and Article 52(3) of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that accommodation in a transit zone in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings (a zone which an applicant cannot lawfully leave on a voluntary basis regardless of his destination) for a period exceeding the four-week period referred to in Article 43 of the Procedures Directive constitutes detention?

(c)

Is the fact that the detention of the applicant for a period exceeding the four-week period referred to in Article 43 of the Procedures Directive takes place only because he cannot meet his needs (accommodation and food) due to a lack of material resources to cover those needs compatible with Article 8 of the Reception Directive, applicable pursuant to Article 26 of the Procedures Directive?

(d)

Is the fact that (i) accommodation which constitutes de facto detention for a period exceeding the four-week period referred to in Article 43 of the Procedures Directive has not been ordered by a detention order, (ii) no guarantee that the lawfulness of the detention and its continuation may be challenged before the courts has been provided, (iii) the de facto detention takes place without any examination of the necessity or proportionality of that measure, or whether there are any alternatives measures and (iv) the exact duration of the de facto detention is not fixed, including the date on which it ends, compatible with Articles 8 and 9 of the Reception Directive, applicable pursuant to Article 26 of the Procedures Directive?

(e)

Can Article 47 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that, when a manifestly unlawful detention is brought for consideration before a court of a Member State, that court may, as an interim measure, until the administrative proceedings come to an end, require the authority to designate for the benefit of the third-country national a place of stay outside the transit zone which is not a place of detention?

(a)

Must recitals 17 and 24 and Article 16 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (‘the Return Directive’), (3) read in the light of Article 6 and Article 52(3) of the Charter, be interpreted as meaning that accommodation in a transit zone in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings (a zone which an applicant cannot lawfully leave on a voluntary basis regardless of his destination) constitutes deprivation of liberty for the purposes of those provisions?

(b)

Is the fact that the detention of an applicant, national of a third country, takes place solely because he is subject to a return order and cannot meet his needs (accommodation and food) due to a lack of material resources to cover those needs compatible with Recital 16 and Article 15(1) of the Return Directive, read in the light of Articles 6 and 52(3) of the Charter?

(c)

Is the fact that (i) accommodation which constitutes de facto detention has not been ordered by a detention order, (ii) no guarantee that the lawfulness of the detention and its continuation may be challenged before the courts has been provided and (iii) the de facto detention takes place without any examination of the necessity or proportionality of that measure, or whether there are any alternatives measures, compatible with Recital 16 and Article 15(2) of the Return Directive, read in the light of Articles 6, 47 and 52(3) of the Charter?

(d)

Can Article 15(1) and (4) to (6) and recital 16 of the Return Directive, read in the light of Articles 1, 4, 6 and 47 of the Charter be interpreted as precluding detention from taking place without its exact duration being fixed, including the date on which it ends?

(e)

Can EU law be interpreted as meaning that, when a manifestly unlawful detention is brought for consideration before a court of a Member State, that court may, as an interim measure, until the administrative proceedings come to an end, require the authority to designate for the benefit of the third-country national a place of stay outside the transit zone which is not a place of detention?

1.

Is the scheme on compensation in the event of a cancellation under Article 5 in conjunction with Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that passengers who are re-routed to the final destination more than one hour before the scheduled departure time, and who then by virtue of the alternative flight arrive earlier at the final destination than would otherwise have been the case with the scheduled (cancelled) flight, also receive compensation by way of an application by analogy of Article 7 of that regulation?

2.

1.

Do the phrases ‘new elements or findings’ that ‘have arisen or have been presented by the applicant’ in Article 40(2) and 40(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (1) (‘the Procedures Directive’) also cover circumstances that already existed before the previous asylum procedure was definitively concluded?

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative:

2.

In a case in which new facts or evidence come to light which could not have been relied on in the earlier procedure through no fault of the foreign national, is it sufficient that an asylum applicant is able to request the re-opening of a previous procedure which has been definitively concluded?

3.

If the applicant is at fault for not having relied in the previous asylum procedure upon the newly invoked grounds, is the authority allowed to deny substantive examination of a subsequent application on the basis of a national standard laying down a principle which is generally applicable in the administrative procedure, even though, in the absence of the adoption of special standards, the Member State has not correctly transposed Article 40(2) and 40(3) of the Procedures Directive and, as a consequence, has also not made express use of the possibility granted by Article 40(4) of the Procedures Directive to provide for an exception from substantive examination of the subsequent application?

1.

Is a judicial interpretation (according to which the repayment of sums unduly paid under a costs clause included in a mortgage loan agreement concluded with a consumer is the effect not of a declaration of invalidity but of an independent action subject to a limitation period) which allows a consumer to be permanently bound by the costs clause, inasmuch as he will not be able to recover those costs if that action has become time-barred, compatible with the principle that unfair terms are not binding, recognised in Article 6(1) of Directive (1) [93/13]?

2.

Is the act of time-barring a claim for the restitution of sums unduly paid pursuant to the application of a clause which has been declared unfair compatible with that principle, inasmuch as it may cause the right to restitution to be lost, notwithstanding the declaration as to the invalidity of that clause?

3.

If the answer is in the affirmative, is the concept of a ‘reasonable limitation period’ to which the Court of Justice refers to be interpreted within an exclusively national context or, conversely, must reasonableness be subject to some form of requirement aimed at providing a minimum level of protection for borrowers throughout the European Union and ensuring that the substantive content of the right not to be bound by a clause which has been declared unfair is not adversely affected?

4.

If the view is taken that the reasonableness of the limitation period must be subject to certain minimum preconditions, may reasonableness depend on the point in time at which a national law stipulates that the action may be brought?; is it reasonable for the limitation period to start to run on the date on which the agreement was concluded, or, conversely, does the principle that unfair terms are not binding require a prior or simultaneous declaration as to the invalidity of the costs clause so as to ensure that the borrower has a reasonable period within which to seek the reimbursement of the sums which have been unduly paid?

1.

In the event of unlawful collective redundancies, must Article 30 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union] be interpreted as recognising a right to protection qualified by parameters of effectiveness, efficacy, adequacy and deterrence, inasmuch as those requirements are a feature of the penalties laid down by ‘Union law’ to safeguard respect for fundamental values and must be complied with by the piece of national legislation — or national practice — that guarantees concrete penalties for any unjustified dismissal? Consequently, do the abovementioned parameters constitute an external limitation that is relevant and applicable for the decision concluding proceedings in actions falling within the jurisdiction of the national courts for the purposes of ascertaining whether that piece of national legislation or national practice implementing Directive 98/59/EC (1) is in line with EU law?

2.

For the purposes of determining the level of protection required by the EU legal order in the event of unlawful collective redundancy, must Article 30 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union] be interpreted by giving ‘due regard’ to, and therefore considering relevant, the material meaning of Article 24 of the revised European Social Charter, referred to in the Explanations [relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights], as resulting from the decisions of the European Committee of Social Rights? Consequently, does EU law preclude a piece of national legislation or a national practice that, by excluding job reinstatement, limits the protection provided to a purely compensatory remedy characterised by a ceiling value set primarily on the basis of length of service and not making good the damage sustained by a worker as a result of the loss of his or her source of income?

3.

When assessing the degree of compatibility of domestic legislation implementing or establishing the extent of protection in the event of unlawful collective redundancies (for breach of selection criteria), must the national court therefore consider the content developed by the European Social Charter resulting from the decisions made by its component bodies and, in any event, deem it necessary to provide compensation in full, or at least essentially so, for the financial consequences arising from the loss of the employment contract?

4.

Do Articles 20, 21, 34 and 47 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union] preclude the introduction of a piece of legislation or a practice by a Member State implementing Directive 98/59/EC that imposes a sanctioning system, solely for workers hired after 7 March 2015 and involved in a single procedure, that excludes job reinstatement and, in any event, relief from the consequences arising from the loss of income and the loss of social security cover, unlike the protection afforded to other workers subject to the same procedure but hired before that date? Can such a system recognise only compensation in the form of an amount determined primarily on the basis of length of service and therefore apply a different penalty based on the date of hiring, so as to create different levels of protection based on the abovementioned criterion and not on the consequences actually sustained as a result of the unjustified loss of a worker’s source of income?

1.

Is Article 10(2)(l) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the credit agreement

2.

Is Article 10(2)(r) of Directive 2008/48/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the credit agreement must specify a particular method that the consumer can understand for calculating the compensation payable in the event of early repayment of the loan, so that the consumer can calculate at least approximately the compensation payable in the event of early termination?

3.

Is Article 10(2)(s) of Directive 2008/48/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the credit agreement

(1)

Does clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (‘the Directive’), (1) entitled ‘Measures to prevent abuse’, read in conjunction with recitals 6 and 7 and clause 4 of that agreement (‘Principle of non-discrimination’), and in the light of the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and practical effect of [European Union] law, preclude national legislation, specifically Article 24(3)(a) and Article 22(9) of Law No 240/2010, which allows universities to make unlimited use of fixed-term three-year contracts for researchers which may be extended for a further two years, without making the conclusion and extension of such contracts contingent on there being an objective reason connected with the temporary or exceptional requirements of the university offering such contracts, and which only stipulates, as the sole limit on the use of multiple fixed-term contracts with the same person, a maximum duration of 12 years, continuous or otherwise?

(2)

Does clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, read in conjunction with recitals 6 and 7 of the Directive and clause 4 of the Framework Agreement, and in the light of the practical effect of [European Union] law, preclude national legislation (specifically Articles 24 and 29(1) of Law No 240/2010), in so far as it allows universities to recruit researchers on a fixed-term basis only — without making the decision to employ such researchers contingent on the existence of temporary or exceptional requirements and without imposing any limit on this practice — through the potentially indefinite succession of fixed-term contracts, to cover the ordinary teaching and research requirements of those universities?

(3)

Does clause 4 of that Framework Agreement preclude national legislation, such as Article 20(1) of Legislative Decree No 75/2017 (as interpreted by the above-mentioned Ministerial Circular No 3/2017), which — while recognising that researchers on fixed-term contracts with public research bodies may be made permanent members of staff, provided that they have been employed for at least three years prior to 31 December 2017 — does not permit this for university researchers on fixed-term contracts solely because Article 22(16) of Legislative Decree No 75/2017 applies the ‘public law regime’ to the employment relationship — even though, as a matter of law, that relationship is based on a contract of employment — and despite the fact that Article 22(9) of Law No 240/2010 imposes the same rule on researchers at research bodies and at universities regarding the maximum duration of fixed-term employment relationships with universities and research bodies, whether in the form of the contracts referred to in Article 24 of that law or the research projects referred to in Article 22?

(4)

Do the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and practical effect of EU law, with regard to the Framework Agreement, and the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in clause 4 thereof, preclude national legislation (Article 24(3)(a) of Law No 240/2010 and Article 29(2)(d) and (4) of Legislative Decree No 81/2015) which — notwithstanding the existence of rules applicable to all public-sector and private-sector workers recently set out in Legislative Decree No 81 which establish (from 2018) that the maximum duration of a fixed-term relationship is 24 months (including extensions and renewals) and make the use of such relationships by the public authorities contingent on the existence of ‘temporary and exceptional requirements’ — allows universities to hire researchers on a three-year fixed-term contract, which may be extended for two years in the event of a favourable assessment of the research and teaching activities carried out during those three years, without making either the conclusion of the initial contract or its extension conditional on the university having such temporary or exceptional requirements, and even allowing it, at the end of the five-year period, to enter into another fixed-term contract of the same type with the same individuals or with other individuals, in order to cover the same teaching and research requirements as those of the earlier contract?

(5)

Does clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, in the light of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence and clause 4 of that agreement, preclude national legislation (Article 29(2)(d) and (4) of Legislative Decree No 81/2015 and Article 36(2) and (5) of Legislative Decree No 165/2001) which prevents university researchers hired on a three-year fixed-term contract, which may be extended for a further two years (pursuant to Article 24(3)(a) of Law No 240/2010), from subsequently establishing a relationship of indefinite duration, there being no other measures within the Italian legal system which can prevent and penalise the misuse of successive fixed-term contracts by universities?

(a)

Must clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999 and annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999, (1) be construed as requiring that the periods of service carried out by a fixed-term worker employed by the Authority, in duties which coincide with those of a permanent employee in the corresponding category of that authority, be taken into account to determine his or her length of service, even where his or her subsequent permanent recruitment takes place further to an open competition, and notwithstanding the specific features of the open competition procedure, which, for the reasons already stated, leads to a complete novation of the relationship and, with an interruption acknowledged by the participant in the open competition procedure, to a new relationship characterised by official recruitment, special obligations and the special features of greater permanency?

(b)

If the answer to question (a) above is in the affirmative, must the past length of service be recognised in full, or are there objective grounds to differentiate the recognition criteria as regards full recognition on the basis of the abovementioned special features?

(c)

If the answer to question (b) above is in the negative, on the basis of which criteria must the length of service that is capable of being recognised be calculated in order for that length of service not to be discriminatory?

1.

In the procedure for a non-minor amendment of the specification, can any actual or potential — provided that it is not entirely implausible — economic effect on a natural or legal person be sufficient to establish the existence of the legitimate interest, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 53(2), in conjunction with the first subparagraph of Article 49(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 49(4), of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, (1) that is necessary for the purposes of an opposition to the application or an appeal against the favourable decision on the application?

2.

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

In the procedure for a non-minor amendment of the specification, does a legitimate interest within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 53(2), in conjunction with the first subparagraph of Article 49(3) and the second subparagraph of Article 49(4), of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 lie (only) with operators that produce products or foodstuffs comparable to those of operators for which a protected geographical indication is registered?

3.

If Question 2 is answered in the negative:

1.

Can Article 13(2) and (6) of Directive 2012/34 (1) (Article 15(5) and (6) of Regulation 2017/2177) (2) apply in such a manner that the regulatory body can impose on the owner of an infrastructure, who is not the owner of the service facility, the obligation to ensure access to the services?

2.

Must Article 13(6) of Directive 2012/34 (Article 15(5) and (6) of Regulation 2017/2177) be interpreted as meaning that it permits the owner of a building to end a lease agreement and reconvert a service facility?

3.

Must Article 13(6) of Directive 2012/34 (Article 15(5) and (6) of Regulation 2017/2177) be interpreted as requiring the regulatory body to ascertain only whether the operator of the service facility (in the present case, the owner of the service facility) has in fact decided to reconvert that facility?

1.

Is a remedy, provided by domestic law to asylum seekers who have been requested to have their applications for international protection examined in another Member State, which does not have suspensory effect and may acquire such effect only if the asylum seeker is deprived of liberty with a view to his imminent transfer an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation? (1)

2.

Must the effective remedy prescribed in Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation be interpreted as precluding only the implementation of a measure of enforced transfer while an action brought against that transfer decision is being examined or as prohibiting any measure preparatory to removal, such as relocation to a centre which establishes return paths for asylum seekers who have been requested to have their asylum applications examined in another European country?

1.

Is a remedy, provided by domestic law to asylum seekers who have been requested to have their applications for international protection examined in another Member State, which does not have suspensory effect and may acquire such effect only if the asylum seeker is deprived of liberty with a view to his imminent transfer an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation? (1)

2.

Must the effective remedy prescribed in Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation be interpreted as precluding only the implementation of a measure of enforced transfer while an action brought against that transfer decision is being examined or as prohibiting any measure preparatory to removal, such as relocation to a centre which establishes return paths for asylum seekers who have been requested to have their asylum applications examined in another European country?

1.

Is a remedy, provided by domestic law to asylum seekers who have been requested to have their applications for international protection examined in another Member State, which does not have suspensory effect and may acquire such effect only if the asylum seeker is deprived of liberty with a view to his imminent transfer an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation? (1)

2.

Must the effective remedy prescribed in Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation be interpreted as precluding only the implementation of a measure of enforced transfer while an action brought against that transfer decision is being examined or as prohibiting any measure preparatory to removal, such as relocation to a centre which establishes return paths for asylum seekers who have been requested to have their asylum applications examined in another European country?

1.

Is Rule 3(а) of the General Rules for the interpretation of the Combined Nomenclature in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1754 (1) of 6 October 2015 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff to be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of the classification of products such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which are made up of different materials, the heading covering the material that outweighs the other materials by quantity (bulk) is the ‘heading which provides the most specific description’ or is that interpretation only possible if the heading itself provides for quantity (bulk) as a criterion that provides the most specific, precise and complete description?

2.

Depending on the answer to the first question and in light of the [Harmonised System, (‘HS’)] Explanatory Notes on headings 4410 and 4419: Is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1754 to be interpreted as meaning that heading 4419 does not include products of particle board (fibre) in which the weight of the binding substance (thermosetting resin) exceeds 15 % of the weight of the board?

3.

Is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1754 to be interpreted as meaning that goods such as those at issue in the main proceedings, that is beakers manufactured from a composite material made up of plant lignocellulosic fibres in a proportion of 72,33 % and a melamine resin binding substance in a proportion of 25,2 %, are to be categorised under subheading 3924 10 00 of Annex I?

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rule on their action of 31 July 2019, without referring the order under appeal back to the General Court;

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set aside the order registered under case number 923557, of 11 December 2019, of the Ninth Chamber of the General Court of the European Union relating to the abovementioned action and uphold that action in its entirety;

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annul Regulation (ΕU) 2019/1157 (1) of 20 June 2019;

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order the other parties to the proceedings to pay the costs.

1.

First ground of appeal , by which it is submitted that the order under appeal, in dismissing their action as inadmissible and ruling, first, that, ‘…the contested regulation does not affect the applicants who are natural persons by reason of certain characteristics peculiar to them or a factual situation distinguishing them from all other persons, but by reason of their beliefs, which are professed, potentially or in practice, by an indefinite number of persons. Consequently, those applicants are not individually concerned by the contested regulation within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU’, infringed the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the principle of proportionality, the preamble and Articles 47 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), Article 5(1) and (4) of the Treaty on European Union (individually and in conjunction with Protocol No 2 on the application of the principle of proportionality), as well as the relevant case-law. This is because, by their action, the appellants submit that the contested regulation infringes their human rights, including the fundamental rights laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (human dignity, religious belief, right to object on the grounds of freedom of religion, personal life and liberty, personal data, the right to express consent for all processing of that data), so that the regulation is of direct and individual concern to them and, by reason of the very nature of the rights affected as fundamental human rights , they are entitled to bring an action for annulment before the General Court under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, and the General Court is obliged to review the validity of the regulations in the event of a breach of fundamental human rights.

2.

Second ground of appeal , based on the fact that the General Court, when making the order under appeal, ruled that the representation of the sixth applicant before that court by the lawyer Christos Papasotiriou was inadmissible, because ‘the … sixth applicant did not avail of the services of a lawyer, a third party, to be represented, but acted in his own name, signing the application himself and availing of his status as a lawyer on the basis of the identity document referred to in Article 51(2) of the Rules of Procedure …’, and thereby misinterpreted, contra legem, the provision of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and infringed Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of proportionality, as well as the relevant provisions of EU legislation guaranteeing that principle.

1.

Does Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, interpreted in the light of Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating thereto, preclude a duplication of criminal proceedings and administrative proceedings of a criminal nature whose subject matter is a single act (cold calling) prosecuted under two different classifications?

2.

If it does — which means a single set of proceedings for the same act — does not Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which enshrines the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, interpreted in the light of the rights and freedoms in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating thereto, require that the conditions and criteria for a single set of proceedings be defined in advance, having regard in particular to the gravity of the infringement?

3.

If it does not — which means a duplication of proceedings — does not Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which enshrines the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, interpreted in the light of the rights and freedoms in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating thereto, require that that duplication of criminal proceedings and administrative proceedings of a criminal nature for a single act (cold calling) be limited to the most serious cases and, in that case, that the criteria for determining gravity be defined in advance?

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that national legislation, in the present case the Belgian legislation, does not require employers to set up a reliable system enabling the duration of time worked each day by each worker to be measured; and

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the employer has not spontaneously set up such a system,

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so that it is impossible in practice for a worker to demonstrate that he has exceeded normal working time?’

1.

Must the principle non bis in idem, as guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter, be interpreted as not precluding the competent administrative authority of a Member State from imposing a fine for infringing EU competition law, in a situation such as that of the present case, where the same legal person has already been finally acquitted of an offence for which an administrative fine had been imposed on it by the national postal regulator for an alleged infringement of postal legislation, on the basis of the same or similar facts, in so far as the criterion that the legal interest protected must be the same is not satisfied because the case at issue relates to two different infringements of different legislation applicable in two separate fields of law?

2.

Must the principle non bis in idem, as guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter, be interpreted as not precluding the competent administrative authority of a Member State from imposing a fine for infringing EU competition law, in a situation such as that of the present case, where the same legal person has already been finally acquitted of an offence for which an administrative fine had been imposed on it by the national postal regulator for an alleged infringement of postal legislation, on the basis of the same or similar facts, on the grounds that a limitation of the principle non bis in idem is justified by the fact that competition legislation pursues a complementary general interest objective, that is to say, protecting and maintaining a system of undistorted competition within the internal market, and does not go beyond what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objective that such legislation legitimately pursues, and/or in order to protect the right and freedom to conduct business of those other operators under Article 16 of the Charter?

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rule that the institutions of the European Union gravely breached their obligations and caused the applicant harm on the grounds that:

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determine, that the defendant is required to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 4 800 000 by way of compensation for the harm caused by the above, within three days of the date on which the judgment becomes final;

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award the applicant the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that harm was caused to the applicant on the grounds of the EU’s non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

As a result of the public aid provided to the applicant’s competitors in breach of the TFEU, the applicant’s company was damaged in competitive terms in such a way as first led to a reduction in its annual turnover and to a reduction in its annual profit of CZK several million. Having regard to the fact that the duration of the public aid, and thus of the related unsatisfactory economic situation of the company, was several years, a decision to declare insolvency was made by the competent court in the Czech Republic.

In the event that Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 (General block exemption Regulation) was lawful, then the aid which was granted selectively and on a discriminatory basis in the context of the OPEI subsidy programme caused the applicant particular and exceptional harm, which entirely exceeded the limits of the economic risk connected with the economic activity of the applicant’s company.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 (General block exemption Regulation) in a form which does not ensure observance of Article 107 TFEU.

Under Article 109 TFEU, the Council is authorised to specify by regulation areas in which the standard procedure, in which the Commission assesses the proposal for State aid and tests it in accordance with Article 107 TFEU, does not apply. The Council adopted Regulation No 659/1999 and in that regulation (in accordance with Article 108(4) TFEU) authorised the Commission to issue regulations governing the conditions for the provision of State aid outside the standard ‘ad hoc’ approval regime. The Commission adopted Regulation No 70/2001, subsequently Regulation No 800/2008 and subsequently Regulation No 651/2014 (General block exemption Regulations).

However, in their regulations neither the Council nor the Commission could go beyond the framework of Article 107 TFEU; their role must consist in laying down the conditions for State aid so that Member States who implement State aid in ‘exempted’ areas could not implement State aid which would conflict with the principle of non-interference in competition, even if the aid is exempted from the standard procedure before the Commission. This is another reason why the Commission’s monitoring (set out and guaranteed under the TFEU) of aid regimes even in exempted areas is ongoing, why (at least in theory) proceedings for the recovery of unlawful aid are available, and why the EU still declares itself to be a market economy, that is an economy which produces goods and services which consumers voluntarily procure in an attempt to optimise the income/expense ratio, and not goods and services which are determined by politicians and officials.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission adopted its decision of 3 December 2007 on the Operational Programme (OPEI) in breach of the Treaties and the Charter and did not publish that decision.

The Commission is the only EU institution competent to check that State aid is implemented in accordance with Article 107 TFEU.

The Commission did not examine, with regard to the approved operational programme, whether and why there was a market failure, which is a condition for the implementation of State aid. The Commission further did not ask the Czech Republic for a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), objectively set indicators, an analysis of the impact on competition and further matters upon which, in the applicant’s opinion, the implementation of State aid is conditional. The Commission’s decision was therefore unlawful and in breach of the Commission’s mission.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission received from the applicant a series of complaints, including detailed analyses, which demonstrate the unlawfulness of the aid implemented on the basis of the OPEI, that it did not act in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 and that it did not comply with the principle of sound administration guaranteed to the applicant under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Without taking any steps to check them or requesting any additional documents, the Commission refused to deal with the applicant’s complaints on the ground that ‘prima facie’ it did not see any irregularity in the implementation of the OPEI subsidy programme.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging a denial of justice by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) due to excessive formalism.

The applicant contacted the CJEU with an application for annulment of the 3 block exemption Regulations on the grounds that they infringed the Treaties and the Charter. The CJEU in both instances dismissed the applicant’s application for annulment of the block exemption Regulations as manifestly inadmissible. The reason for the dismissal was the failure to comply with the objective two-month time limit set by Article 263 TFEU. The CJEU did not in any way address the merits of the case and in a purely formalistic manner applied the time limit for the submission of the application. The applicant meanwhile argued that the fact that the Commission’s control mechanism did not function properly was revealed only on the basis of the Commission’s answer to the applicant’s complaint. In the application, the applicant stated that he took the view that the limitation period started to run from the Commission’s reply refusing to address in detail his complaint.

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annul Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1973 of 27 November 2019 not approving silver copper zeolite as an existing active substance for use in biocidal products product-types 2 and 7; (1)

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order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

2.

3.

4.

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annul the decision of the Director General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion contained in the e-mail of 2 July 2019 of the competent HR business correspondent by which the request of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) for the third renewal of the secondment of the applicant was rejected;

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annul the decision of 23 January 2020 of the Appointing Authority rejecting the complaint submitted by the applicant under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations;

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order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the irregularity of the pre-litigation procedure, which did not lead to a proper review by the Appointing Authority of the contested decision of 2 July 2019.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an essential and procedural violation of Article 38 of the Staff Regulations.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the general principle of the duty of care, as part of the right to sound administration with regard to the non-consideration of all the factual elements of the case and the lack of statement of reasons.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging violation of the right of protection of the family enshrined in Article 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

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in primary order, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU:

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in subsidiary order, pursuant to Article 272 TFEU:

1.

First plea in law under Article 263 TFEU, alleging that the defendant has committed an error in law and misapplied the eligibility criteria for the SME Instrument grant laid down in Regulation No 1290/2013. (1)

2.

Second plea in law under Article 263 TFEU, alleging that the defendant has committed an error in law as the contested decision is in breach of the principle of equal treatment.

3.

Third plea in law under Article 263 TFEU, alleging that the contested decision breaches the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.

4.

Single plea in law under Article 272 TFEU, alleging that the contested decision results, notably because of the identified error in the interpretation of the applicable law and discriminatory practice, also in a misinterpretation and breach of the contractual obligations vis-à-vis the applicant.

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annul the decision of the European Commission of 18 December 2019, pursuant to Article 4 of the Implementing rules to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, (1) which rejected the applicant’s confirmatory application of 13 November 2019 for access to documents under that regulation;

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order the European Commission to grant access to the applicant to the non-confidential versions of the document listing the beneficiaries of tax rulings submitted by Luxembourg on 22 December 2014 in response to the Commission’s letter of 19 June 2013, which is referred to in paragraph 4 of the Commission decision of 7 March 2019 opening a formal State aid investigation in case State Aid SA.50400 (2019/NN-2) — Luxembourg — Possible State aid, and the tax rulings issued by the tax administration of Luxembourg referred to by the European Commission at paragraphs 4 and 7 of the said Commission decision of 7 March 2019;

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order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law in considering that the general presumption of non-disclosure established by the case law is applicable with respect to the applicant’s request for access to the requested documents.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that, assuming that the presumption of non-disclosure would be applicable in the present case (quod non), the absence of any possible harm for the interests protected by Article 4(2), first and third indent, of Regulation 1049/2001, would rebut the application of that presumption (first limb of the second plea). In addition, the applicant claims that the application of this presumption would, in any event, be reversed, since there are overriding reasons of public interest justifying disclosure of the requested documents (second limb of the second plea).

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated the requirements to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU and the applicant’s right to good administration provided for in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

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annul the contested decision with the exception to the finding that the Contested EUTM must be upheld for the products ‘Common metals and their alloys’ in Class 6;

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order EUIPO to pay the costs.

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Infringement of Article 8(4) in conjunction with Article 60(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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Manifest lack of motivation in the contested decision.

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annul the contested decision;

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order EUIPO and the other party to pay the costs.

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Infringement of the procedural rules derived from Article 24 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/626;

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Infringement of the procedural rules derived from Article 7(1) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625;

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Breach of the principle of the right to a fair hearing;

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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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annul the following parts of the contested act: (i) Articles 1(b) and 2(b) of Annex VI in the part where they provide that ‘these values are considered as the declared values for the purpose of the verification procedure in Annex IX’; (ii) paragraph 2(a) of Annex IX in the part where it states that ‘declared values’ correspond to those ‘values given in the technical documentation’; and (iii) paragraph 2(b) of Annex IX;

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annul Table 9 on ‘Verification tolerances’ of Annex IX in the part where it contains parameters that are included in Annex VI and are not listed in Annex V, namely: ‘EW, full, EW,½, EW,¼, EWD, full, EWD,½’ and ‘WW, full, WW,½ WW, ¼, WWD, full, WWD,½’; and

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order the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the contested act violates Articles 3, 12 and 16 of the Framework Regulation (2) and the Commission acted ultra vires by introducing inconsistent requirements as regards the technical documentation suppliers have to upload in the database and the verification procedure market surveillance authorities are entitled to carry out.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the contested act infringes the principle of legal certainty and of equality of treatment because it fails to establish a clear and univocal regulatory framework putting the suppliers in the impossibility to determine their duties, as regards the data to be provided in the technical documentation; and the applicable verification procedure to assess the accuracy of the data.

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annul the following parts of the contested act: (i) Article 1(42) of Annex I providing for the definition of ‘declared value’; (ii) paragraph 2(2)(a) of Annex IX in the part where it states that ‘declared values’ correspond to those ‘values given in the technical documentation’; and (iii) paragraph 2(2)(b) of Annex IX;

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annul Table 9 on ‘Verification tolerances’ of Annex IX in the part where it contains parameters that are included in Annex VI and are not listed in Annex V, namely: ‘Total mains efficacy ηTM’, ‘Lumen maintenance factor (for FL and HID)’, ‘Survival factor (for FL and HID)’ and ‘Excitation purity’;

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order the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the contested act violates Articles 3, 12 and 16 of the Framework Regulation (2) and the Commission acted ultra vires by introducing inconsistent requirements as regards the technical documentation suppliers have to upload in the database and the verification procedure market surveillance authorities are entitled to carry out.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the contested act infringes the principle of legal certainty and of equality of treatment because it fails to establish a clear and univocal regulatory framework putting the suppliers in the impossibility to determine their duties, as regards the data to be provided in the technical documentation; and the applicable verification procedure to assess the accuracy of the data.

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annul the following parts of the contested act: (i) paragraph 3(2)(a) of Annex IX in the part where it states that ‘declared values’ correspond to those ‘values given in the technical documentation’; and (iii) paragraph 3(2)(b) of Annex IX;

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annul Table 8 on ‘Verification tolerances for measured parameters’ of Annex IX in the part where it contains parameters that are included in Annex VI and are not listed in Annex V, namely: ‘E16, E32’ and ‘Eaux’;

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order the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the contested act violates Articles 3, 12 and 16 of the Framework Regulation (2) and the Commission acted ultra vires by introducing inconsistent requirements as regards the technical documentation suppliers have to upload in the database and the verification procedure market surveillance authorities are entitled to carry out.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the contested act infringes the principle of legal certainty and of equality of treatment because it fails to establish a clear and univocal regulatory framework putting the suppliers in the impossibility to determine their duties, as regards the data to be provided in the technical documentation; and the applicable verification procedure to assess the accuracy of the data.

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annul the following parts of the contested act: (i) Article 1(b), of Annex VI in the part where it provides that ‘these values are considered as the declared values for the purpose of the verification procedure in Annex IX’; (ii) paragraph 3(2)(a) of Annex IX in the part where it states that ‘declared values’ correspond to those ‘values given in the technical documentation’; and (iii) paragraph 3(2)(b) of Annex IX;

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order the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging the contested act violates Articles 3, 12 and 16 of the Framework Regulation (2) and the Commission acted ultra vires by introducing inconsistent requirements as regards the technical documentation suppliers have to upload in the database and the verification procedure market surveillance authorities are entitled to carry out.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the contested act infringes the principle of legal certainty and of equality of treatment because it fails to establish a clear and univocal regulatory framework putting the suppliers in the impossibility to determine their duties, as regards the data to be provided in the technical documentation; and the applicable verification procedure to assess the accuracy of the data.

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annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2131 of 28 November 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1198 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tableware and kitchenware originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

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order the European Commission to pay the applicant’s costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated Article 13 (3) in conjunction with Articles 5 (10) and 5 (11) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (‘basic Regulation’), along with Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 12.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations by not including the Applicant in the exhaustive list of subject exporters in the regulation initiating the anti-circumvention investigation and then subsequently expanding the scope of the investigation to also cover the Applicant.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission did not have a legal basis for including the applicant in the Contested Regulation, as Article 13 (3) basic Regulation does not cover the imposition of anti-circumvention measures based on a mere risk of circumvention and moreover, requires the prior registration of all subject imports. In addition, the reasoning that the Commission did provide is logically flawed, unsubstantiated and disregards essential evidence and therefore represents a manifest error of assessment.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed the rights of defence of the applicant and violated the principle of non-discrimination by basing its final decision on two new factual elements on which the applicant had no opportunity to comment during the review investigation.