Improved vault efficiency with envelope encryption

Pryvaye Messenger uses Ephemeral Per-Session Key Exchange Pryvate uses ephemeral key exchange protocols, generating unique encryption keys for every session, ensuring that each call, message, or file transfer is protected with fresh cryptographic material. This prevents retrospective decryption, even if a previous session key were compromised.

💡 Tip #36: Automate creation of encrypted disk images with `cryptsetup`. Secure sensitive data by creating encrypted containers that can be mounted and unmounted as needed. Example: Format a partition for LUKS encryption: `sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdb1`. Then open it: `sudo cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdb1 myencrypteddisk`. This protects sensitive data at rest.

TP-BCF (https://lnkd.in/guvUq-ir) A framework for intercepting HTTP Requests/ Responses and creating a Cipher tab to perform Encryption/ Decryption based on predefined configurations -Example Decrypt Interactsh response: https://lnkd.in/gyNWiE4b

Combining Temp Mail with VPNs + encryption is the silent shield smart users need, this blog shows you how to stay truly anonymous online. 🔗 https://lnkd.in/dFPC_Vvt

Hey Folks, We successfully demonstrated the execution of Sirraya Codons across two different transport layers: 1.Peer-to-Peer over Wi-Fi – One PC issued a Codon, and another PC on the same Wi-Fi network received, verified, and executed the intent. 2.API-based Transport – The same Codon was transmitted via a standard HTTP API call and was similarly verified and executed on the receiving system. 🔹 What We Proved ✅Transport Independence: Codons function correctly regardless of whether the underlying medium is raw Wi-Fi sockets or structured APIs. The network is simply a carrier; the Codon itself contains the trust. ✅Built-in Authentication & Integrity: The receiving system executed the intent only after verifying the Codon’s telomere signature against the sender’s UDNA DID. Any tampering would have caused instant rejection. ✅Zero-Trust Validation: No reliance on Wi-Fi encryption, API keys, or TLS channels. Trust was derived entirely from the self-contained cryptographic structure of the Codon. ✅Practical Interoperability: Codons can be transmitted seamlessly across different existing infrastructures (Wi-Fi, APIs, and beyond) without modification.

You may have seen the term KeeLoq rolling code in reference to transmitters and receivers... but what does it actually mean and how does it work? 🤔 A rolling code system encrypts the data sent between the transmitter and receiver so they can share passwords securely. This makes it far harder for attackers to intercept or guess the code 👌 KeeLoq rolling code utilises a 66-bit transmission code, of which 32 bits are encrypted. KeeLoq uses a 66-bit transmission code, with 32 bits encrypted. That encrypted portion alone offers nearly 4 billion possible code combinations, which would take around 17 years to scan by brute force! It prevents attackers from simply recording a valid signal and replaying it later to unlock a door or gate. Read more about it here: https://zurl.co/aRzO

Validin launched Dashboard Feeds featuring Threat Indicator and Project Updates for faster analyst triage, plus daily PTR scanning of IPv4 to track short-lived DNS changes like 91.247.36.102 & free.friendhosting.net #ThreatIntel #DNSMonitoring link: https://ift.tt/WwLuKgF

How is the encryption key created for your access to this article? Well, it involves an ECDH handshake and then uses the HMAC Key Derivation function (HKDF) to create the shared encryption key. HKDF is used to derive an encryption key from some information. Initially, HKDF creates a pseudorandom key (PRK) using a pass phrase and a salt value (and any other relevant random functions), in order to produce an HMAC hash function (such as HMAC-SHA256), and along with a salt value. Next, the PRK output is used to produce a key of the required length. If we generate a 16-byte output (32 hex characters), we have a 128-bit key, and a 32-byte output (64 hex characters) will generate a 256-bit key. HKDF is used in TLS 1.3 for generating encryption keys. In this case, we will use OpenSSL and C. Try it here: https://lnkd.in/eZjua7xt

I often come across findings related to TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 still being enabled on the server. Many automated scanners flag this as a medium or even high risk vulnerability. In reality, for regular web applications this should be treated as an informational issue. Modern browsers no longer support TLS 1.0 and 1.1, meaning a real-world attacker cannot force a downgrade through a normal user’s browser. Even if a client did support these protocols, the theoretical weaknesses are far beyond what could realistically be exploited outside of extremely resourceful state-level actors. The same logic also applies to many older cipher suites that scanners highlight as insecure. That doesn’t mean there is no reason to clean up legacy protocols, but it does highlight the gap between automated scanner results and actual risk. As penetration testers we have the responsibility to put findings into context and to differentiate between theoretical cryptographic weaknesses and practical exploitation potential. How do you handle these kinds of findings?

“By writing to these specific registry keys, the threat actor enabled the malicious DLLs to be loaded via COM hijacking. Shortly after, telemetry showed Explorer.exe being relaunched through a WMI query (ProcessCreatedUsingWmiQuery), resulting in a new process ID. This relaunch triggered the COM hijacks, as evidenced by the previously observed image load events. At the same moment the DLLs were loaded, Explorer.exe initiated a connection to a C2 server.” ➡️ The above is from a recent Private Threat Brief: "RomComRAT via Clickfix Results in Domain Compromise and Exfiltration" ➡️➡️Interested in receiving reports like this one? Contact us for a demo or pricing - https://lnkd.in/gk-yfpJm