Neuroscience of Mary’s Room: Why “Knowing” Is Not the Same as “Experiencing”
Frank Jackson’s thought experiment Mary’s Room (1982) asks: if a scientist knows every theory about color but has never seen it, does she learn something new the moment she sees a red apple? This highlights qualia—the difference between theoretical knowledge and lived experience.
From a neuroscience perspective, comprehension and experience rely on distinct brain systems
Comprehension: the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe consolidate long-term memory (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991); the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) evaluates context (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006); the vmPFC integrates knowledge with values and identity (Bechara et al., 1997); and the dlPFC enables reappraisal and cognitive control (Ochsner & Gross, 2005).
Experience: sensory cortices (e.g., V1/V4 for vision) generate the immediate percept; the insula encodes interoception; the amygdala links perception to emotion. Studies (Lamme, 2006; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007) show that recurrent processing between sensory and higher-order areas is essential for conscious experience.
Thus, even if you understand everything about sadness, facing it activates an entirely different neural circuit. Knowledge prepares you—but experience transforms you.
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Ref
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1997). Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy. Science, 275(5304), 1293–1295.
Buhle, J. T., et al. (2014). Cognitive reappraisal of emotion: A meta-analysis of human neuroimaging studies. Cerebral Cortex, 24(11), 2981–2990.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136.
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. Journal of Philosophy, 83(5), 291–295.
Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. (2007). Attention and consciousness: Two distinct brain processes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(1), 16–22.
Lamme, V. A. F. (2006). Towards a true neural stance on consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(11), 494–501.
Padoa-Schioppa, C., & Assad, J. A. (2006). Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value. Nature, 441(7090), 223–226.
Rolls, E. T. (2019). The orbitofrontal cortex and emotion in health and disease, including depression. Neuropsychologia, 128, 14–43.
Squire, L. R., & Zola-Morgan, S. (1991). The medial temporal lobe memory system. Science, 253(5026), 1380–1386.
Takashima, A., et al. (2006). Shift from hippocampal to neocortical retrieval network with consolidation. Nature Neuroscience, 9(9), 1001–1007.
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(5), 242–249.
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3wLeonhard Schilbach Thank you for regularly posting about interpersonal synchrony – as a philosopher working on social epistemology I find this very inspiring, maybe even more: I vaguely have a hunch that this research could further the "acoustic turn" that has been aimed at for years in various areas of humanities and philosophy, i.e. cognitive folk theory (acoustic metaphors instead of visual ones for "contents and activities of the mind"). I wonder if the concept of "resonance" as coined by sociologist Hartmut Rosa has been employed in the context of interpersonal synchrony research or reflection upon this research. Did you by chance hear or know about anything in this vein?