Book Summary: "NO, MINISTER: Navigating Power, Politics and Bureaucracy with a Steely Resolve" - Subhash Chandra Garg
Subhash Garg Sir had worked as a bureaucrat, revealing how India manages its money, and the political landmines he navigated to protect public interest.
For over three decades, Subhash Chandra Garg was at the heart of India's bureaucratic battlefield – crafting policies, managing crises and manoeuvring through the power struggles that define governance. From the villages of Rajasthan, where land disputes could spark violent protests, to the corridors of power in Delhi, where economic decisions could make or break the nation, Garg's career as a civil servant was anything but ordinary.
As Finance Secretary of India, he played a pivotal role in reshaping India's economic policies, battling entrenched interests and pulling states back from financial ruin. He confronted corruption head-on, took on international financial institutions and steered high-stakes negotiations that impacted millions.
Unflinching and deeply revealing, No, Minister is more than a memoir – it is a front-row seat to the raw, often brutal realities of navigating the world of Indian bureaucracy. Power, politics and policy collide in this gripping account of a career spent at the helm of India's economic and administrative landscape.
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Book publication date: July 2025.
Brief about the Author:
Subhash Chandra Garg:- As a member of the Indian Administrative Service for more than thirty-six years, Subhash Garg was deeply involved in public administration, the execution of development programmes, managing state-level institutions, making Budgets both at state and Central government levels, and policymaking.
He crafted many Budgets as the finance secretary of the government of Rajasthan, the secretary of economic affairs, and the finance secretary of the Government of India. He served as the secretary of economic affairs for over two years, from 2017 to 2019.
After voluntary retirement from the IAS in October 2019, he now works as a policy observer, strategist, commentator, and writer on important economic and financial policy issues, focusing on monetary and fiscal affairs and India's policy. Garg's first book, The $10 Trillion Dream: The State of the Indian Economy and the Policy Reforms Agenda, was published in February 2022. His second book, Subhash Chandra Garg's Explanation and Commentary on Budget 2022–23, includes the results and outcome of Budget 2021–22 and the implementation of Budget 2022–23 and develops a national standard for analysing and commenting on Central government budgets.
He writes opinion editorials and columns for print and online news magazines, regularly speaks to think tanks, educational institutions, and investors, and appears on television channels to discuss the economy, budget, and other public policy matters.
Time Line:
Secretary, Ministry of Power - Government of India
July 2019 to October 2019
Secretary, Economic Affairs - Government of India
July 2017 to July 2019
Executive Director - World Bank
November 2014 to July 2017
Officer on Special Duty in the Department of Economic Affairs - Government of India
September 2014 to October 2014
Pr. Secretary Finance - Government of Rajasthan
December 2013 to September 2014
Additional & Joint Secretary, Cabinet Secretary
February 2022 to December 2013
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture - Government of India
August 2009 to February 2012
Finance & Principal Secretary, Finance - Government of Rajasthan
April 2006 to December 2008
Principal Consultant - National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi
June 2005 to March 2006
Director and Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance - Government of India
May 2000 to May 2005
No, Minister:- Book Review
Exordium:
Commemorative Coin Controversy: Garg opposed issuing a coin for Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia, citing that guidelines only allowed such coins for figures excelling in science, literature, arts, etc.—not politicians. Despite his objections, the proposal was approved by the PMO and released in 2020.
Fiscal Deficit Tensions: He recounts a clash over budgetary deficit targets: while he advocated a glide path to 3 % by 2020–21, the PMO pushed for slippage. His attempt to present directly to the Prime Minister led to pushback from Nripendra Misra, who rebuked him for "going over his head."
'Outside Committee' on Currency Presses: Garg relates that the PMO suspected the previous government of "fake" currency printing. He conducted a thorough audit and found nothing abnormal, but was nonetheless overruled when the PMO appointed an external expert committee (led by Bibek Debroy) to investigate further. Garg protested the external probing, citing security concerns.
Part I: Administration in Rajasthan:-
A white elephantine problem: A modern plant to process 60,000 tonnes of soybeans per year was designed and built to process the soybeans in Kota, along with 10,000 tons of godown, 5,000 tons of modern silos and other facilities.
The World Bank provided a concessional loan from the International Development Association (IDA) to the National Cooperative Development Corporation (NCDC), a Government of India undertaking for financing processing facilities in the cooperative sector, under a project called NCDC-III.
The NCDC used a part of the funds from the credit line to provide funds to Rajfed. Equity for the soybean project was routed through the state cooperative bank, Apex Bank, which received 40 per cent of the funds as a loan from the NCDC and gave it to Rajfed as equity. The remaining NCDC funds and state government share were loaned to Rajted by the state government.
The Rajfed Soybeans Processing Plant was the largest processing/ manufacturing facility created in Rajasthan in the public sector or the cooperative industry, other than power plants established under the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (RSEB). Over 735 crore of capital investment had been made in the project by 1989.
The plant was announced as ready in 1987. However, it was still formally and technically in the commissioning stage in 1989, as it had not met the performance parameters that the project management agency (PMC), the National Heavy Engineering Cooperative Ltd (NHEC), another Government of India enterprise, was to demonstrate before Rajfed could take over the plant.
For about two years, this tussle was on. For more than a year, the plant was operating at less than 20 per cent capacity utilisation. It had already run up financial losses of more than 10 crore. There was terrible press about it, and unflattering stories were published incessantly.
For most, especially the people of Kota, the plant had become a white elephant.
An amiable and efficient officer of the 1980 batch of the IAS, Atul Kumar Gupta, was first posted as CEO of the Rajfed Soybeans Processing Plant, Kota. He replaced a technocrat, D. Kothari, a senior oil technologist, who was sacked when he could not achieve commercial production in the plant, and bad publicity about the plant started creating perceptual problems about the state government. I was to replace a reluctant Atul Gupta.
V.B.L. Mathur, my state mentor during probation and chief secretary of Rajasthan in 1989, called me on the day my posting orders were issued for the Kota Rajfed Soybeans Plant. He was forthright and told me that while the posting as CEO of the project was not an exciting one for an IAS officer, he would like me to try and turn the plant around. For me, a cost accountant by training, the posting appeared interesting as I would get to work as the CEO of a big plant. In any case, nothing was exciting to do in the Jaipur zila parishad. I assured him I would put my best foot forward.
Part II: Budget and Finance in Rajasthan:-
Reforms and investment instead of populism: A quick review of the state of finances revealed the profound impact of the contrasting approaches of Vasundhara Raje and Ashok Gehlot. Ashok Gehlot had adopted a populist approach, unlike Vasundhara Raje's solid investment-oriented approach.
From 2008 to 2013, the Rajasthan government had not undertaken much capital expenditure. It had also suspended governance reforms envisaged under the Bhamashah programme. There were no good initiatives, even under Aadhaar-linked direct benefit initiatives.
Vasundhara Raje recharges field machinery: I was keen to build a long-term investment and governance reforms agenda for Rajasthan. Vasundhara Raje wholeheartedly supported this. The arrival of Rajiv Mehrishi as chief secretary strengthened her resolve further. The appointment of a relatively junior officer, Tanmay Kumar, as secretary to the chief minister assured that there would not be any roadblocks from the CMO.
Vasundhara Raje embarked on a strong field-connect programme, which envisaged the entire government (all cabinet ministers and senior officers) going to a region, staying there for at least three days, discussing issues with local representatives and organising discussions with industrialists, investors and consultants about initiatives needed to solve the development issues. Cabinet meetings were also organised during these camps, and on-the-spot decisions were taken. The finance secretary is present in all cabinet meetings in Rajasthan.
The finance secretary also has, conventionally, the right to speak on any agenda before the Cabinet.
Governance reforms: Constructing Rajiv Mehrishi and Labour and Employment Secretary Rajat Mishra, previously anjor resident secretary to Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot, had begun working on a slew of reforms in industrial and labour laws immediately after the Vasundhara Raje government assumed office.
The Industrial Disputes Act was amended to raise the limit of employees from 100 to 300 for enterprises to require permission from the government to close. Compensation payable upon retrenchment and such closures was raised by 50 per cent. Reforms were also undertaken in the central part.
Factories Act, Contract Labour (Employment and Regulation) Act, Apprentice Act and Boilers Act. The budget alluded to these reforms, which had come to be known nationally as the 'Rajasthan model of labour reforms'. The chief minister announced the revival of the Rajasthan Mission on Livelihood, which had become an excellent fulcrum for the interface between employers and labour (the Ashok Gehlot government had shut it down). A labour market information system (LMIS) was proposed to create an online database of all willing youths looking for skill training and employment.
Part III: At the World Bank and the Centre:-
Projects in disputed territories: Territorial disputes between neighbouring countries are common across the world. When member countries of the World Bank wanted to take up projects in any disputed territories held by them, it was almost always opposed by the member country that claimed the area to be its own, even if it did not physically have it. Passions ran high in both the concerned countries whenever such projects came up for World Bank funding.
The Bank had evolved a policy and a process to deal with such projects in disputed territories, which centred on two key elements. First, the Bank sought the other member's views and concurrence, reserving the right to take such projects to the Board for approval in case of an objection by the other member, if the project served necessary development objectives. Second, the Bank invariably attached a disclaimer to the effect that its financing of the project was in no way an endorsement of the disputed territory belonging to any party to the dispute. The Bank also used a map where the disputed territory was shown in both solid and dotted lines, and not as part of internationally accepted borders. India has territorial disputes with its neighbours, Pakistan and China. Two of the cour projects in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) came up for approval during my time at the World Bank. The IFC proposed to invest $50 million directly in the Gulpur hydro project in PoK, which was a subsidiary of Korea South East Power Co. Ltd (KOSEP), to construct, operate and maintain. This project had earlier been proposed as part of eight power projects to be funded by the World Bank and IFC in 2013, with a good part of the funding coming from China as well. Mukesh Prasad, my predecessor, had welcomed the investment in the power-starved area. The MEA had cleared it.
Kishanganga hydroelectric power plant dispute: The Indus Waters Ireaty was brokered by the World Bank in 1960, Under its provisions, India could construct run of the water (not resulting into consumption or storage of water) hydroelectric power projects on thret western rivers - Indus; Jhelum and Chenab (including on their tributaries) - the waters of which were otherwise almost exclusively allocated to Pakitan, subject, of course, to the detailed provisions and conditions laid down in the treaty. India was constructing a hydroelectric power plant on the Kishangang River, a tributary of the Jhelum, in J8cK. The project involved permissible non-consumptive use of water with an inter-basin transfer.
Pakistan did not like this as it felt that the Kishanganga power plant stored more water than was permissible under the treaty, among other reasons. It was also unhappy about another hydroelectric power plant, Ratle, being built on the Chenab in the Kishtwar district of J&K.
At one stage, unlike the Ratle dispute that wasn't taken to the International Court of Justice (ICJ, Pakistan had taken the Kishanganga dispute to it. which had ruled that India had the right to construct the Kishanganga power project. The IC) also gave specific directions regarding the water storage in the dam being built for temporary holding of water. India redesigned the Kishanganga project, taking into account the IC's rulings and observations, and began construction again sometime in 2015.
The Indus Waters Treaty is quite complex. At the same time, the Indus commission was appointed by the Ministry of Water Resources, which also managed the water-related operations of the system, the administration, political and diplomatic aspects of the treaty were handled by the MEA. While the ED, World Bank is the principal agency for the Government of India to deal with the World Bank, the MEA preferred and decided to deal directly with the World Bank.
Taranjit Sandhu was designated India's point person for the 2016 Kishanganga dispute. On the advice of Jaishankar, Ripendra Mista, principal secretary to the prime minister, told me to keep off the matter and attend meetings between the Taranjit Sandhu-led MEA delegation and the World Bank delegation just for the sake of form and courtesy. I knew this would not carry the MEA too far, as they did not understand the World Bank's personnel and work processes. I abided by the directions but decided to study the subject thoroughly and stay informed to be fully ready if and when the situation arises.
Epilogue:
Commemorative Coin Controversy: Garg opposed issuing a coin for Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia, citing that guidelines only allowed such coins for figures excelling in science, literature, arts, etc.—not politicians. Despite his objections, the proposal was approved by the PMO and released in 2020.
Fiscal Deficit Tensions: He recounts a clash over budgetary deficit targets: while he advocated a glide path to 3 % by 2020–21, the PMO pushed for slippage. His attempt to present directly to the Prime Minister led to pushback from Nripendra Misra, who rebuked him for "going over his head."
'Outside Committee' on Currency Presses: Garg relates that the PMO suspected the previous government of "fake" currency printing. He conducted a thorough audit and found nothing abnormal, but was nonetheless overruled when the PMO appointed an external expert committee (led by Bibek Debroy) to investigate further. Garg protested the external probing, citing security concerns.
Learning:
Rare institutional candour: Few serving or recently retired secretaries name names and recount live fault lines with this clarity. The coin episode, fiscal-target scuffles, and the "outside expert" idea on currency presses all feel consequential, not petty.
A study in 'saying no': The book's best throughline is what it takes for a civil servant to refuse, from process arguments to personal consequences. That moral geometry feels instructive beyond India.
Breadth across eras: The older World Bank/Naidu section widens the lens and keeps this from being only a 2018–19 North Block diary.
One vantage point: This is still the author's case file. Where contemporaries reply (or records surface), some judgments could look harsher/softer. At the time of writing, professional reviews are sparse, and retailer/reader ratings haven't yet reached critical mass—so triangulation is limited.
Score-settling overhang: The book revisits the well-known breakdown with Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman; readers may wish for more of the counter-view or documentary appendices. (Prior reporting and interviews make clear the rift pre-dated this book.)
Policy analysis lite: It's stronger on who-did-what-when than on deep dives into policy efficacy or downstream outcomes; those seeking technical evaluation may need to pair it with other sources.
Students of governance and public administration: For a realpolitik primer on how formal rules, Cabinet notes, and the PMO's centre of gravity interact.
Policy journalists & political junkies: The chapters double as primary source material for late-2010s–early-2020s economic governance spats.
Corporate/public-sector leaders: As a casebook on principled dissent inside hierarchical organisations.
No, Minister delivers a procedural, unvarnished view of bureaucracy in action—how red tape, institutional norms, and personal ethics collide. Garg's narrative reveals the personal and professional cost of maintaining integrity in environments steeped in political calculation.
In No, Minister, the "administration in Rajasthan" incident revolves around Garg's ambition to serve at the World Bank and the strong resistance he faced from CM Vasundhara Raje, leading to a fraught exit from the state cadre. This illustrates the personal and political tensions that can arise when a state officer is abruptly reassigned to a central role.