Designed to Fail: How Systems Theory Can improve Design and Procurement
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Designed to Fail: How Systems Theory Can improve Design and Procurement

(An adaptation of Richard L. Cook’s How Complex Systems Fail)

Most discussions about improving construction projects focus on best practices. But best practices are often just a reflection of what has worked within existing frameworks—not necessarily what is fundamentally best. If we want to design better systems for engaging design teams and procuring buildings, we need to step back and think from first principles.

One of the most effective ways to do this is by studying failure. I have always learned more about how things work by examining how they break down rather than by looking at polished success stories that may speak more to survivor bias than to successful, adaptive strategies. Failure reveals the hidden forces at play in any system: misaligned incentives, weak feedback loops, and blind spots in decision-making.

If we treat the process of designing and delivering buildings as a complex system, composed of moving parts, people, teams, and information flows, we can apply this lens to procurement and see where the system fails by design.

By understanding how failures happen, we can start designing systems that naturally lead to better outcomes:

  • Aligning incentives properly so that every party is motivated to deliver their best work

  • Providing the right level of flexibility while avoiding chaos

  • Recognising that failure is not an anomaly but a natural part of the system’s operation

  • Encouraging resilience rather than rigid control

  • Ensuring that compensation structures reflect the real value delivered

Lessons from complex systems theory provide a strong foundation for understanding how to compose design teams and procure buildings effectively. Richard Cook’s How Complex Systems Fail offers a fresh perspective on where these processes go wrong and how we might think differently about improving them. If these ideas resonate with you, I would love to hear your thoughts.


Engaging a design team and procuring a construction project are both complex systems, filled with uncertainties, interdependencies, and risks that cannot be eliminated, only managed. The following adaptation of Cook’s 18 points highlights how failure emerges in both processes and how employers can build resilience into their approach.

1. Complex systems are intrinsically hazardous systems

Both engaging a design team and procuring a project are inherently risky. No contractual framework, selection process, or due diligence can eliminate uncertainty. Design risk stems from evolving client needs, site constraints, and regulatory approvals, while procurement risk arises from cost fluctuations, contractor performance, and supply chain instability. Attempting to remove all risk often leads to inflexible, overly defensive agreements that introduce new vulnerabilities.

2. Complex systems are heavily and successfully defended against failure

Contracts, fee agreements, warranties, performance bonds, and procurement regulations all serve as layers of defence against failure. However, these safeguards are not foolproof; they only redistribute risk. Rigidly structured contracts may prevent early collaboration, discourage innovative problem-solving, and result in disputes rather than preventing project failures.

3. Catastrophe is always just around the corner

A design error, planning rejection, or an underpriced tender may not seem catastrophic in isolation, but any of these issues can trigger a chain reaction of delays, cost overruns, and contractual disputes. Even well-prepared teams operate in a state where a single unforeseen factor, such as a material shortage, can turn a stable project into a crisis.

4. Complex systems contain changing mixtures of failures latent within them

Most failures are embedded in the system long before they become visible. A poorly scoped design brief, an incomplete survey, an optimistic cost plan, or a hastily assembled procurement route may seem fine in the early stages but become major liabilities as the project progresses. The longer these latent failures go unnoticed, the harder they are to correct.

5. Complex systems run in degraded mode

Rarely do design and procurement processes operate under perfect conditions. Projects are often fast-tracked, with incomplete information, evolving requirements, and budget constraints. Teams rely on workarounds, designing with provisional assumptions and contractors pricing with incomplete drawings, creating hidden risks that only surface later.

6. Catastrophe is the result of multiple failures, each necessary but only jointly sufficient

A single issue rarely causes complete project failure. A planning delay, a misaligned contract, and an untested contractor may seem manageable on their own, but together they can lead to project collapse. Failure occurs when multiple small weaknesses intersect in unpredictable ways.

7. Post-accident attribution to a ‘root cause’ is fundamentally wrong

When projects fail, stakeholders often seek a single cause: “The architect got it wrong” or “The contractor was incompetent.” In reality, failure stems from system-wide interactions: misaligned expectations, conflicting incentives, and unforeseen external pressures. Blaming one party oversimplifies a complex failure.

8. Hindsight bias leads to oversimplification

After a project failure, the mistakes seem obvious: “We should have allocated risk differently” or “We should have foreseen inflation.” But at the time, decisions were made with incomplete information and competing pressures. Overconfidence in hindsight leads to learning the wrong lessons.

9. Change introduces new forms of failure

Innovation in design and procurement, such as BIM workflows, offsite manufacturing, and digital contract management, brings efficiency but also new risks. Design errors may be amplified by digital tools, contractual ambiguities may be harder to interpret in automated systems, and supply chain disruptions may expose vulnerabilities in procurement models.

10. Knowledge of the system is often limited

No single party, whether employer, architect, project manager, or contractor, fully understands all aspects of the project. Architects lack full cost visibility, contractors work from imperfect drawings, and employers struggle to interpret technical requirements. Fragmented knowledge leads to gaps, miscommunication, and poor decision-making.

11. Actions at one level of the system can have unintended consequences at another

A cost-driven decision to limit design fees may result in incomplete or generic solutions, leading to expensive change orders later. A procurement strategy that prioritises lowest-price bidding may attract contractors who cut corners, increasing long-term maintenance costs. Every decision alters project dynamics in ways that may not be immediately apparent.

12. Human operators are both a source of resilience and a source of failure

The expertise and adaptability of professionals, such as designers solving unexpected site conditions and procurement teams adjusting to economic shifts, keep projects running. However, human limitations, including cognitive biases, miscommunication, and fatigue, also contribute to project failures. Success depends on how well individuals and teams navigate these challenges.

13. All practitioner actions are gambles

Every major design and procurement decision, from structural approach to procurement route to contractor selection, is a bet on an uncertain future. Even with careful risk assessment, unforeseen factors like interest rate hikes, regulatory changes, or material shortages can undermine well-intentioned decisions.

14. Safety is a characteristic of systems, not their components

No single element of a project, whether a robust contract, a skilled architect, or a well-funded contractor, can ensure success. The resilience of a project depends on how all components interact, adapt, and absorb shocks. A procurement model that works well for one project may fail in another due to different constraints and team dynamics.

15. People continuously create safety within complex systems

Construction projects succeed not because of rigid rules but because experienced professionals anticipate problems and solve them in real time. Design teams adjust to unforeseen site constraints, procurement teams renegotiate contracts to manage risk, and contractors find creative workarounds. The human ability to adapt prevents most failures from escalating.

16. Failure-free operations require experience with failure

Employers who succeed in engaging design teams and managing procurement have often learned from past failures. Case studies of failed projects, whether due to poor risk allocation, misaligned contracts, or weak leadership, should inform procurement and design strategies. However, many organizations fail to embed these lessons, leading to recurring mistakes.

17. The system’s defensive layers can create new failure modes

Overly rigid design or procurement controls can backfire. Excessive design approvals may slow progress, resulting in rushed detailing. A risk-averse procurement strategy may drive away competent contractors, leaving only those willing to accept unrealistic terms. The safeguards meant to prevent failure can create new types of failure.

18. Failure can be prevented but never fully eliminated

A well-managed procurement strategy and a well-structured design engagement can reduce risks, but no system is failure-proof. Instead of seeking absolute certainty, employers should focus on resilience: early risk detection, adaptability in design and procurement, and the capacity to absorb minor failures before they escalate into major crises.

Deborah Sims Paul Sheehan Alex Soles EngTech MICE MInstRE

Abre Etteh

Architect & Strategic Leader | Delivering £40M in projects | Commercial, Hospitality, Residential & Urban Design

7mo

My plan is to expand on all 18 points if there is enough engagement. There are many useful analogically relationships to draw between complex systems and procuring building projects. The original article by Cook is well worth the read.

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