Digitalisation of Kimberley Process Certificates under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for the International Trade in Rough Diamonds

by: Ashok Damarupurshad

Abstract

Purpose: This paper investigates the transition from paper-based Kimberley Process Certificates (KPCs) to digital formats under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) for rough diamonds. It aims to identify how digitalisation can enhance certificate security, efficiency, and traceability, addressing current challenges (e.g. forgery, slow verification) in the international rough diamond trade.

Design/Methodology/Approach: We integrate a literature review of KPCS core documents and digital certification technologies with a case study of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) 2024 electronic KPC proof-of-concept. We analyse foundational digitalisation technologies (standardised templates, PDFs with QR codes, unique numbering) and evaluate advanced approaches (blockchain, APIs, AI) through a comparative framework. Policy and governance considerations for global adoption of digital KPCs are also examined.

Findings: The KPCS core requirements for certificates (unique ID, tamper resistance, defined data fields) can be met with secure digital templates and e-signatures. The UAE’s pilot demonstrated a secure platform issuing KPCs as digitally signed PDFs with unique QR-coded identifiers, enabling real-time validation and communication between trading countries. Comparative analysis indicates that while basic PDF-based e-certificates are easiest to implement and cost-effective, technologies like blockchain and distributed ledgers offer higher security and traceability. A hybrid approach (standardised e-certificates combined with API connectivity and selective blockchain features) is identified as a practical balance of security, scalability, and usability.

Research Limitations/Implications: The research is conceptual and case-based, lacking quantitative field data since full-scale implementation is ongoing. Findings rely on the UAE case and may evolve as more participants, like South Africa, pilot digital KPC systems. Further, technical details of proprietary platforms (e.g. UAE’s Verifico) are limited in public documentation.

Practical Implications: Policymakers are provided with a roadmap for updating regulations to recognise electronic KPCs and invest in enabling infrastructure (digital signature authorities, certificate databases, secure QR codes). For technologists, the paper outlines design considerations for implementing digital KPC platforms that interoperate among 86 KPCS participating countries. The recommendations guide how to strengthen the diamond supply chain against fraud via digital tools, without disenfranchising participants with limited IT resources.

Originality/Value: This paper is one of the first comprehensive analyses of digitalising KPCS certificates, linking policy requirements with technology solutions. It offers a balanced assessment of emerging digital tools (blockchain, AI, APIs) in an important real-world context: the conflict-free rough diamond trade. Thus, it bridges the gap between high-level digital transformation concepts and domain-specific implementation in a global certification scheme.

Introduction

Conflict diamonds, defined as rough diamonds used to finance armed conflicts, became a focal issue at the turn of the millennium, prompting the establishment of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) in 2003 (Kimberley Process, 2025). The KPCS is a multilateral trade regime, backed by the United Nations, that requires every shipment of rough diamonds to be accompanied by a government-validated Kimberley Process Certificate (KPC) confirming the diamonds are conflict-free. Each KPC is a forgery-resistant document of a particular format, designed to uniquely identify a shipment and certify compliance with KPCS requirements (Kimberley Process, 2013). The KPCS has successfully reduced the flow of conflict diamonds to <0.2% of world trade by mandating stringent export/import controls among its 60 participants (86 countries - made up of 59 countries and the EU’s 27 Member States).

Traditionally, KPCs have been issued as secure paper documents featuring watermarks, holograms or other anti-tampering elements (Damarupurshad, 2024). While effective for their time, paper certificates present limitations in today’s digital world. Physical documents can be lost, delayed, or forged, and verification often requires manual checks at borders, slowing down trade. Moreover, managing paper records across dozens of countries creates inefficiencies in data collection and reporting. The diamond industry, now a fast-paced global trade with hubs in Dubai, Antwerp, Mumbai, etc., is increasingly digitised in other areas (e.g. trading platforms, blockchain tracing by private companies). In this context, the continued reliance on paper-based KPCs is seen as a gap that could be addressed by digital transformation.

Problem Statement: The current paper-based KPC system faces a gap in efficiency and real-time traceability. There is an unmet need for a more secure, streamlined, and interoperable mechanism to issue and verify KPCs electronically. A digital KPC (which we coined e-KPC) could potentially reduce fraud (through better authentication), expedite customs clearance (through instant online validation), and improve data analytics (by centralising certificate data). However, moving to digital certificates is not trivial. It requires international consensus on standards, changes to national laws that previously assumed paper certificates, and robust technical infrastructure to ensure security is not compromised (Damarupurshad, 2024).

Research Aim and Objectives: This research explores how digital technologies can modernise the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, specifically through the digitalisation of KPCs. Key objectives include:

(1)  Identifying the core requirements and challenges for an electronic KPC system by analysing the KPCS Core Document and current practices.

(2)  Evaluating various digitalisation technologies (standard PDF forms, databases, blockchain, mobile apps, etc.) for issuing and verifying KPCs, in terms of security, scalability, and usability.

(3)  Examining a real-world case study (the UAE’s 2024 Digital KPC proof-of-concept) to derive lessons on implementation and stakeholder adoption.

(4)  Formulating recommendations on policy updates, technical architecture, and governance for rolling out digital KPCs across all KPCS participants.

Research Questions: This study is guided by the following questions:

• RQ1: What are the minimum features and security standards must a digital Kimberley Process Certificate (e-KPC) uphold, and how can these be realised in an electronic format?

• RQ2: Which digital technologies or approaches (e.g. secure PDFs, blockchain ledgers, API-driven systems, AI-enabled analytics) are most suitable for enhancing the KPCS certificate system, and what are their comparative advantages or drawbacks?

• RQ3: What were the outcomes and challenges observed in the UAE’s 2024 pilot of digital KPCs, and how can this inform broader adoption among KPCS participants?

• RQ4: What policy, legal, and governance changes are required to enable global acceptance of electronic KPCs, and how can international coordination be achieved in implementing the digital system?

Contribution: This paper contributes both to academic knowledge and practical policymaking. Academically, it synthesises cross-disciplinary insights, from information systems (digital signatures, distributed ledgers) to international policy, to propose a framework for digitalising a unique global certification scheme. Practically, it provides a timely resource for KPCS policymakers and IT developers, as the Kimberley Process is currently deliberating digital reforms (evidenced by a dedicated working group on certificate digitalisation and the UAE’s pilot) (Kimberley Process, 2024). By presenting comparative analysis and case study findings, we offer evidence-based guidance on choosing appropriate technologies and implementation strategies that maintain the integrity of the KPCS. This is crucial for ensuring that the digital transition, if pursued, strengthens rather than undermines the conflict-free assurances that underpin consumer and industry trust in diamonds.

Literature Review

2.1 The Kimberley Process Certificate: Requirements and Current Practices

The Kimberley Process Core Document defines a KPC as a “forgery resistant document with a particular format” that certifies a rough diamond shipment’s compliance with the Certification Scheme. Annex I of the Core Document stipulates minimum requirements that every KPC must contain. These include: the title “Kimberley Process Certificate” and a specific declaration that “The rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in accordance with the provisions of the KPCS for rough diamonds”; the country of origin (for unmixed shipments); unique certificate numbering incorporating the country ISO code (e.g. ZA-xxxxxx for South Africa); dates of issuance and expiry; the names of the issuing authority and the exporter and importer; the carat weight and US dollar value of the shipment; the number of parcels in the shipment; the Harmonised System (HS) code for rough diamonds; and the signature or validation by the exporting authority (see Figure 1 below). Beyond the minimum standard, Annex I allows participants to add features to their certificates “at their discretion”, such as additional data fields or enhanced security elements, provided the core requirements are met. In practice, this has led to minor design variations: for example, the United States redesigned its KPC form in 2014 to clarify key information, adding features like a 2D barcode and an “AES Confirmation Number” field for export filing (Economy.gov; 2025). However, the essence remains consistent as mandated. To illustrate, the official digital e-KPC template proposed for South Africa (which mirrors Annex I) includes placeholders for all required data and the standard declaration, along with spaces for a digital stamp and a QR code/barcode. This template demonstrates how an electronic form can preserve the content and layout of the paper certificate for familiarity and compliance.

Figure 1: An old version of South Africa’s paper Kimberley Process Certificate (KPC)

Under the KPCS today, each participant country’s Kimberley Process Authority is responsible for issuing KPCs for exports and verifying KPCs for imports. Shipments are physically accompanied by the paper certificate, which customs officials validate upon exit and entry. Importing authorities send back confirmations of receipt to the exporter’s authorities, referencing the certificate number and key details. All these procedures, while robust, rely on physical documentation and manual communication, which can be slow and prone to human error. Notably, the Core Document (Annex II) did anticipate the value of electronic communication: it encourages participants to maintain computerised databases and to “transmit and receive electronic messages to support the Certification Scheme” (Kimberley Process, 2013). In the early 2000s, this likely referred to emailing data and statistics, but it set a precedent for embracing IT solutions.

Challenges of the Current System: Several issues have been identified by observers and participants. First, security/fraud risk: While KPC paper has security features, determined counterfeiters have occasionally forged certificates or reused spent certificate numbers, exploiting gaps in cross-checking between countries. A digital system could reduce this by enabling real-time verification of certificate authenticity against an official database or ledger (something impossible with a piece of paper alone). Second, inefficiency and delays: Paper certificates must be couriered or travel with shipments, and physical validation can delay shipments at customs. If a certificate is lost or damaged, reissuing it causes further delay. Digital certificates delivered electronically could allow faster clearance, because a customs officer could scan a QR code and instantly check validity online, expediting the process. Third, data management: Currently, compiling KPCS trade statistics involves each country submitting data from its certificate logs. Discrepancies sometimes occur between an exporter’s report and an importer’s report. A digital system could automatically log shipments and reconcile data, reducing administrative burden and improving accuracy (Damarupurshad, 2024). Lastly, compliance and audit: Monitoring compliance (e.g. through “review visits”) would be aided by a digital trail that could quickly audit how many certificates were issued, to whom, and track anomalies (like sequentially numbered certificates issued out-of-order or to the same party repeatedly, which patterns that might indicate fraud). These potential benefits drive the interest in digitalising the KPCS.

2.2 Digitalisation in Certification and Supply Chain Traceability

The move to digital certificates is not unique to the diamond industry. Across global trade, there is a trend toward e-certificates and electronic documentation for efficiency and anti-fraud purposes. For instance, electronic Certificates of Origin, sanitary/phytosanitary certificates, and trade finance documents (like bills of lading) are increasingly adopted under frameworks by the World Customs Organisation and UN/CEFACT. These often use secure PDFs with digital signatures or online verification portals. The key technologies enabling such digitalisation include digital signatures (public key -PK cryptography to sign documents so they can be authenticated and untampered with), secure databases or registries accessible via APIs, and sometimes QR codes or barcodes on documents that link to their online record for verification (Damarupurshad, 2024).

Recent work emphasises distributed trust and verifiable credentials in the context of product certification and compliance. A report on digitalising product conformity certificates highlights that with proper data standards, “certificates are issued in digital format (as data exchange) with supporting physical twins… until paper forms are no longer needed” (GS1, 2022). It advocates using global data standards (like ISO/IEC and GS1 identifiers for products, entities, etc.) to ensure interoperability (GS1, 2022). Three key technologies identified are: (1) distributed trust systems, where no single central database is needed, but multiple authorities can issue and attest information; (2) verifiable credentials, digitally signed credentials that any party can independently verify as authentic (often using W3C standard frameworks); and (3) blockchain or distributed ledger technology (DLT), to maintain and share data securely among many stakeholders (GS1, 2022) These approaches can reduce the reliance on one central authority or paper documents, instead enabling a “many-party attestation” (GS1, 2022). In such a model, “certificate authentication through verifiable credentials [code exchange]” becomes possible (GS1, 2022). This is attractive for governments because it avoids creating a giant central registry (with associated costs and complexities) while still preventing fraud through cryptographic means.

The diamond industry has also seen private-sector innovations in traceability. Notably, major companies have explored blockchain to track diamonds from mine to retail. For example, De Beers developed Tracr, a blockchain-based provenance system assigning each diamond a unique ID and record on a tamper-proof digital ledger (De Beers, 2024). While Tracr and similar initiatives (e.g. Everledger) operate outside the KPCS, they demonstrate that distributed ledgers can handle high-value, granular data (individual stones) securely. These industry solutions often run in parallel with KPCS. However, a digital KPC system could potentially interface with them in the future to cross-verify a diamond’s certification status with its provenance record.

Academic and technical literature underscores that blockchain offers immutability and decentralisation, but also comes with challenges of scalability and regulatory uncertainty. Public blockchains (like Ethereum) might ensure global transparency but could be slow or expose trade data publicly, whereas private/consortium blockchains can restrict access but require governance structures. Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), on the other hand, are a more traditional approach: an API-based system could allow each country’s KPCS authority to plug into a central certificate database, issuing and querying certificates in real time. This is akin to how e-visa systems work for travel documents, for example. APIs can be efficient but rely on centralisation (the “single source of truth” database) and robust security controls on access (Damarupurshad, 2024).

Another emerging angle is the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in document security and fraud detection. AI can be leveraged to analyse patterns in certificate issuance or trade flows to flag anomalies (e.g. an unusual spike in certificates from a region, or duplicate entries). Machine learning models could continuously learn from historical KPCS data to improve anomaly detection, serving as a “smart watchdog” for the certification system. Additionally, AI could assist in reading and processing documents (optical character recognition for any remaining paper certificates, or auto-filling forms from standard data), thereby reducing manual errors. However, implementing AI requires a large data pool and careful calibration to avoid false positives, and it introduces concerns about transparency (the “black box” problem) and trust in AI decisions (Damarupurshad, 2024).

2.3 Efforts Toward Digital KPCS: Policy and Pilot Initiatives

Digitalisation has gained momentum in recent years within the Kimberley Process forum. A dedicated sub-group under the Working Group of Diamond Experts has been discussing certificate digitalisation (access to detailed proceedings is restricted to members) (Kimberley Process, 2024). The impetus significantly increased during the UAE’s chairmanship of KPCS in 2024. In 2024, the UAE prioritised modernisation and introduced a proof-of-concept (PoC) for digital KP certificates (Kimberley Process, 2024). This PoC, delivered by the UAE’s Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), aimed to transition from paper-based to blockchain-based certificates, thereby enhancing security and traceability (Kimberley Process, 2024).  According to the KP Plenary report, the blockchain element would make it “easier and more secure to track and verify diamond origins and prevent forgeries” (Kimberley Process, 2024). By late 2024, a pilot platform had been developed, and at the November 2024 KP Plenary in Dubai, the concept was demonstrated, with plans for further refinement.

Building on that, in May 2025, during the KP Intersessional Meeting in Dubai, the UAE unveiled Verifico, a full-fledged digital platform derived from the PoC (Mining.com, 2025). Verifico is offered to all KP Participants as a tool to issue and manage digital KPCs. While the technical specifics of Verifico are limited in public sources, it is described as enhancing certificate security and traceability and being made available for adoption across countries (Mining.com, 2025). This indicates a likely centralised or consortium system where participants either use a common application or interlinked national applications.

Some individual participants have also taken steps toward digital processes. For example, Hong Kong’s Trade and Industry Department provides an e-service portal for traders to apply for KP certificates online (tid.gov, 2025). Similarly, the European Union and other countries often use electronic systems for application and pre-validation of KPCs (entering data into an IT system). However, the output is still a physical certificate. These can be considered interim digitalisation, digitising the application workflow but not the final certificate artefact. The actual shift is when the certificate itself becomes a digital credential recognised across borders without paper. That requires mutual trust in digital signatures or digital platforms, which is why the international nature of KPCS makes it complex. It is not enough for one country to go paperless; all trading partners must accept an electronic certificate in lieu of paper.

Policy and Legal Considerations: Adopting e-KPCs entails legal amendments in many jurisdictions. As Damarupurshad (2024) notes, if a country’s law explicitly required a “paper” certificate to physically accompany exports, an amendment is needed to allow an electronic certificate to serve the same legal function. For instance, South Africa updated its Diamonds Act regulations (Regulation 6A) to permit digital certificates, as evidenced by the South African e-KPC template referencing issuance under that regulation. The amendment language provided in a proposed framework states that the shipment is “electronically and uniquely identified” in the e-KPC issued, and that this fulfils the requirement of a certificate without a physical document (Damarupurshad, 2024).  Such changes set a legal foundation for customs and law enforcement to treat digital certificates with the same validity as paper ones.

Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This research employs a qualitative, exploratory design with two main components: document analysis and case study. First, we conducted document analysis of key texts, including the KPCS Core Document (to extract requirements and guidelines related to certification) and relevant technical literature on digital certificates and supply chain technologies. This provided the criteria and context for evaluation. Second, we used the UAE 2024 Digital KPC Proof-of-Concept as an instrumental case study to examine how a digital KPC system can be implemented in practice and what challenges and outcomes emerge. The case was chosen because it is a recent and pioneering example within the Kimberley Process community, thus offering contemporary insights.

Our approach is akin to a design science research perspective: we gather requirements (from KPCS documentation), review solution options (from literature and technology domains), observe a real implementation (the UAE case), and then analyse and propose an improved design/framework for a digital KPC system. Rather than a statistical generalisation, the goal is analytical generalisation, deriving principles that can inform other countries and the overall KPCS in adopting e-certificates.

3.2 Data Collection

Primary sources were the official documents and announcements:

• KPCS Core Document (including Annexes) - obtained from the KPCS website.

• UAE Plenary and Intersessional reports (2024–2025)

• UAE Proof-of-Concept description - an internal document (data classified as Open) outlining the technical aspects of the PoC.

• Sample e-KPC Template – a template for an electronic certificate form (for South Africa) showing field arrangement and placeholders.

Secondary sources included:

• LinkedIn articles and whitepapers by experts

• General reports on digital product certification – e.g. the report on “Certificates, Claims and Credentials Exchange,” which provided future-state scenarios for digital certificates in regulatory systems.

• Academic literature on blockchain and digital identity (cited mostly for foundational knowledge on cryptography and decentralised systems.

Through these sources, we extracted both qualitative descriptions and any quantitative or technical data available (such as the number of carats tracked, if any, or system performance notes). For example, from the UAE’s materials, we noted features like real-time data sharing, mobile-friendly design, and absence of blockchain in the initial rollout.

3.3 Data Analysis

We performed a content analysis of the documents to identify recurring themes and criteria relevant to digital certification. Five key evaluation criteria were derived from both KPCS goals and IT best practices:

1. Security: ability to prevent forgery or unauthorised alteration of certificates.

2. Scalability: capacity to handle the volume of certificates and trade transactions in the global diamond industry (about 50,000 KPCs issued annually worldwide).

3. Ease of Implementation: the complexity, time, and cost to build and deploy the system for all participants.

4. User Accessibility: The ease with which end-users (issuing authorities, customs officers, traders) can adopt and use the system, including interface and connectivity considerations.

5. Cost: both initial development and ongoing operational costs, considering the diverse economic contexts of KPCS participants.

Using these criteria, we analysed each digitalisation approach identified (standard PDF forms, blockchain ledger, web forms, etc.) in a comparative manner. We tabulated the assessment (see Section 4.2) to visualise which approaches excel on which criteria.

For the case study, we treated the UAE’s pilot as a real-world “experiment” and examined it against the same criteria, as well as noting any unique findings:

• Did the digital KPC system improve security (e.g. no known forgeries reported, or improved verification)?

• Was it scalable or demonstrated potential for scaling to all shipments?

• What was reported about ease of use (training required, user feedback)?

• How did it handle cost, i.e., was it developed in-house by one country and offered freely, or would others need to invest?

We also examined policy/governance factors, such as how the UAE engaged stakeholders, what agreements were needed (if any) to accept digital certificates from the pilot, and plans for governance (like who would host the system long-term).

Data triangulation was done by cross-verifying information. For instance, if the UAE press release claimed “tamper-proof blockchain-based certificates,” we cross-checked the technical document to see if blockchain was implemented or just planned (it turns out it was planned as a next step, not in the PoC (Diamond World, 2025; Mining.com, 2025). This helped ensure the accuracy of our understanding of the case.

3.4 Conceptual Framework (Analytical Model)

While this study does not test a theoretical model, we developed a simple conceptual framework to guide the analysis (Figure 2). The framework posits that KPCS Outcomes (security of the supply chain, efficiency of trade, compliance rates) are influenced by the Certificate System Design (paper-based vs various digital designs), which in turn is constrained by Policy/Governance Context and Technological Infrastructure. In essence:

• Policy and governance (laws, international agreements, KP directives) enable or hinder certain designs (e.g. without legal acceptance, a digital certificate has no authority).

• The chosen certificate system design (with attributes like being blockchain-backed, or a centralised database, etc.) directly affects outcomes like fraud reduction and speed.

• The available technology infrastructure (internet access, capacity of authorities, funding) also affects which design is feasible for all participants.

Figure 2: Simplified Conceptual Framework to Guide the Analysis

This conceptual view helped ensure we discussed the technology and the required enabling environment. It guided our recommendations to address all three domains: technical solution, policy changes, and governance model.

3.5 Limitations of Methodology

It should be noted that our methodology relies heavily on qualitative analysis and a single case study. The UAE’s experience might not capture all challenges that could appear elsewhere (for example, a less technologically advanced country might face issues not encountered by the UAE). Also, some information (primarily technical details of the pilot system or internal KP deliberations) is not publicly available, limiting the analysis to what could be gathered from published sources. We mitigated this by using expert commentary and related domain literature to fill gaps, but a degree of uncertainty remains. Despite these limitations, the approach is suitable for an exploratory study at this nascent stage of KPCS digitalisation, laying the groundwork for future empirical research once more pilots or implementations occur.

Results

4.1 Case Study: UAE’s 2024 Digital KPC Proof-of-Concept

The UAE’s proof-of-concept (PoC) for digitalising Kimberley Process Certificates provides an insight into how an e-KPC system might function across the KPCS network. Unveiled in late 2024 during the KP Plenary in Dubai, the PoC was developed under the UAE’s KP Chairmanship (Kimberley Process, 2024). The overarching aim was to transition from paper-based to electronic, blockchain-supported certificates, thereby enhancing security and traceability in the rough diamond supply chain (Kimberley Process, 2024).

System Architecture & Features: According to an overview document circulated to KP participants, the UAE’s system is built on a secure digital platform that centralises certificate issuance and data sharing while maintaining strict confidentiality controls (Kimberley Process, 2024). Key features of the PoC platform include:

(1)   Real-time data sharing: Participants (issuing and importing authorities) can access and update certificate information in real time, improving coordination and follow-up on shipments. For example, once an e-KPC is issued in the exporting country, that data is immediately (and securely) visible to the intended importing country’s authority, which can prepare to verify and acknowledge receipt digitally.

(2)   Standardised digital templates: The system uses a uniform electronic KPC format for all participants, ensuring consistency in the data fields and layout. Certificates are generated as secured PDFs that replicate the required content of a KPC (issuer, carats, etc.), but with digital enhancements.

(3)   Unique ID & QR code: Each digital KPC carries a unique identification number (per KPCS requirement) and a QR code. The QR code can be scanned to retrieve the certificate’s record from the system for authentication. The QR code is embedded with secure info accessible only to KP participants (likely meaning that scanning it with the official system will show details, but unauthorised scanning would not reveal or alter data).

(4)   Digital signatures and security: Certificates are digitally signed by the issuing authority’s private key, making them tamper-evident; thus, any modification would invalidate the signature. The platform likely uses encryption for data in transit and storage, given the emphasis on security and confidentiality.

(5)   Notifications and dashboards: The PoC introduced the ability to send automatic notifications between trading partners. For example, as soon as an e-KPC is issued for an export, a notification is sent to the importing country’s KP authority. This alerts them to an incoming shipment with its details. Additionally, each authorised user has a personal dashboard where they can view all KPCs they have issued or received, including drafts in progress.

(6)   Reporting tools: The system can perform on-demand data extraction to simplify quarterly statistical reporting. It promises that each participant could generate their required KP statistical reports “with just three clicks,” given that the data of all certificates is stored and structured in the system. This indicates a built-in analytics or export function for the certificate database, which would significantly reduce manual data compilation.

(7)   Mobile accessibility: Recognising that some KP offices (particularly in diamond-producing regions of Africa) may have limited infrastructure, the platform was optimised to work on mobile devices with minimal data usage. This design consideration ensures that a laptop or even a smartphone with basic internet could be used to issue or verify certificates, making the solution more inclusive.

(8)   Blockchain-ready design: Interestingly, the PoC did not initially integrate blockchain for the pilot, stating that features like blockchain ledger integration, automated import/export matching, and automatic stats reporting were “not in scope for the PoC” and would be reviewed afterwards if additional budget allowed (Diamond World, 2025; Mining.com, 2025). This suggests the pilot focused on getting the core digital platform running, using a traditional database, with a plan to potentially incorporate a blockchain layer later. However, the design included QR codes that “can be integrated with blockchain to authenticate certificates”, showing that the architecture anticipates a future upgrade where the QR code might link to a blockchain record for each certificate (Diamond World, 2025; Mining.com, 2025).

Performance in Pilot: During the pilot phase (late 2024 into 2025), the system was tested in the UAE and possibly with select partner countries. By the Intersessional meeting in mid-2025, the platform (now named Verifico) was launched and ready to offer to all participants (Mning.com, 2025). While specific metrics (like number of certificates issued digitally in the pilot, time saved, etc.) have not been publicly disclosed, the KP Chair highlighted improved security (“tamper-proof certificates”) and traceability as major achievements (Kimberley Process, 2025). The reception among participants was cautiously positive. The initiative was lauded for modernising practices and was set to be expanded under the UAE’s continued role as Custodian Chair in 2025 (Kimberley Process, 2025). However, critics of the UAE’s Proof of Concept for digital Kimberley Process Certificates expressed concern that the initiative was driven by national rather than multilateral interests, raising apprehensions that the UAE’s technological leadership might be leveraged to advance its commercial position within the global diamond trade

Challenges noted: The PoC documentation and subsequent discussions acknowledge a few challenges:

Data confidentiality: Ensuring that sensitive data (e.g., value of shipments, which can indicate company trade volumes) is protected. The system presumably restricts data visibility such that only relevant parties (exporter country, importer country, perhaps the KP Secretariat for oversight) see each certificate’s details (Diamond World, 2025; Mining.com, 2025). Achieving this while still sharing data in real-time requires careful access control and possibly data encryption. The pilot’s success in this regard is not detailed, but it was a design priority.

No blockchain initially: Some participants or observers might have expected blockchain from the outset, but the UAE team consciously scoped it out initially (Diamond World, 2025; Mining.com, 2025). This might have been to reduce complexity for the pilot. It indicates a pragmatic approach. Demonstrate value with a simpler system first, then layer on more advanced tech. However, it also shows that blockchain is considered an enhancement, not a prerequisite. A centralised system can deliver most benefits except for the distributed trust aspect.

Legal recognition: While the UAE as an exporter could issue digital KPCs, other countries must accept them upon import. During the pilot, presumably, arrangements were made with any receiving countries to honour the digital certificate (possibly by also sending a copy of the certificate via email to them, or printing a hard copy as backup). Broad adoption will require formal mutual recognition agreements or an amendment to the KPCS Core Document to explicitly allow digital certificates as equivalent to paper. At the time of writing, such policy updates were under discussion but not yet ratified.

User training: The pilot involved training customs officers and officials on using the new system. Given that it was designed to be user-friendly (with mobile access and simple interfaces), training was likely straightforward, but it underscores the need for capacity building. The document mentions training as part of the implementation steps outside the system design.

4.2 Comparative Analysis of Digitalisation Approaches

Drawing from the case insights and the literature, we compare the various approaches to digitalising KPCs across the criteria of security, scalability, ease of implementation, user accessibility, and cost. The main approaches considered are:

1. Standardised Digital Template (PDF) with Dynamic Fields - essentially a direct digital analogue of the paper certificate, generated as a PDF form with fillable fields, issued and possibly emailed or uploaded for access.

2. Blockchain-Linked Certificates - certificates that are recorded on a blockchain or have a hash on a blockchain, accessible via a QR code.

3. Interactive Web-Based Forms (with security features) - a secure web portal where certificates are issued and verified online (database-backed, not necessarily blockchain).

4. Digital PDFs with Integrated E-Signatures - similar to (1) but emphasising the use of cryptographic digital signatures on the PDF itself.

5. API-Driven System: A system in which machine-to-machine communication handles issuance and verification, potentially without human-facing forms except for input (suitable for automation).

6. Mobile App Interface – issuing and verifying via a smartphone app, possibly offline-capable.

7. AI-Augmented Smart Templates – using AI to detect anomalies or assist in filling/validating certificates.

8. Distributed Ledger (Consortium Blockchain) System – a fully decentralised network of nodes (each major participant runs a node) to validate and store KPC records.

Table 1 summarises the comparison across criteria (based on analysis of sources and expert reasoning).

Interpretation: From the above comparison, we see clear trade-offs:

(1)   Simpler approaches (standard PDF forms, basic e-signatures) are easiest and cheapest to implement, and very scalable, but offer only basic security. They largely digitise the format but do not fundamentally change the process or add robust protections beyond what a paper with a hologram would have. There is still reliance on the authority’s trustworthiness and on manual verification of signatures or reference numbers.

(2)   More complex approaches (blockchain, distributed ledger) maximise security and trust, potentially even removing the need to trust a single authority by distributing verification. However, they come with high complexity and cost and require significant capacity building. They may also face regulatory hurdles (e.g., some countries have restrictions or uncertainties regarding blockchain use).

(3)   Middle-ground solutions (interactive web system with APIs, perhaps augmented with some blockchain elements for audit) appear to strike a balance. They improve security by centralising data (making it easier to spot duplicates, etc.), use encryption and login controls, and can incorporate features like automated notification and logs, which paper lacks. They are moderately costly but within reason, and easier for users to adopt than full-on blockchain. The UAE’s Verifico is essentially in this category, as it is a centralised web platform with the potential to integrate blockchain in future.

To visualise some of these differences: Standard PDF + e-signature (Method 4) and API system (Method 5) both rate highly on scalability and cost, but the API system provides more automation (less human intervention needed in verifying each certificate) at the expense of requiring a central infrastructure. Blockchain (Method 2 or 8) scores top on security, but low on ease and cost. Interactive forms (Method 3) and mobile app (Method 6) focus on user-friendliness, which is crucial to encouraging adoption by officials and traders.

These findings reiterate trends in other sectors. The recommended approach is often a hybrid: use a centralised system for efficiency but incorporate decentralised features for integrity. For example, a central database can hash each record to a blockchain to get immutability without using the blockchain for all data storage (limiting cost and speed issues). An e-signature PDF can also be combined with an online API verification (so users can either manually check the signature or scan a code to verify via the system).

In the Kimberley Process scenario, a likely optimal path is to start with a centralised digital platform (web portal + API) that issues standardised e-certificates (PDFs with QR codes and digital signatures). This covers ease of use and immediate efficiency gains. Then, progressively, add distributed verification layers: e.g., weekly or daily logs of issued certificates could be written to a blockchain accessible to all participants, providing an immutable audit trail without requiring every transaction to be blockchain-based in real time. Meanwhile, an AI module can run on the collected data in the central system to flag anomalies (like if the same diamond shipment is attempted to be certified twice under different IDs, etc.), adding a proactive security net.

The comparative analysis table (Table 1) provides a decision-making tool for KPCS officials. Depending on priorities (e.g. some may prioritise low cost and simplicity due to limited budgets, while others may prioritise highest security due to risk of fraud in their region), different methods or combinations can be chosen. Section 5 will further discuss how these options can be integrated and governed in the KPCS context.

Discussion

5.1 Balancing Security, Efficiency, and Inclusivity

The results highlight a central tension: the most secure solutions (like a fully decentralised ledger) are not the most practical for immediate adoption by all KPCS participants, some of whom may lack advanced IT capacity or resources. Conversely, the easiest solutions (like simple PDFs via email) offer only marginal improvement over the status quo. Therefore, the Kimberley Process must strike a balance that meaningfully improves security and efficiency without overburdening participants.

The case study of the UAE PoC indicates that a pragmatic hybrid approach is viable: a centralised system to handle certificate issuance and data exchange, augmented by features like digital signatures and QR codes for verification. This approach delivered tangible improvements (real-time data sharing, reduced paperwork, faster communication) with technology that users found accessible (web and mobile interface).  At the same time, it kept the door open for future integration of blockchain, essentially future-proofing the design. This layered approach resonates with what digitalisation literature suggests: introduce change in manageable phases (to ensure adoption and get quick wins), then iterate to add more sophisticated features once the user community is ready and the base system is stable.

From a theoretical perspective, we can view this as aligning with the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and innovation diffusion. Users (in this case, KP authorities worldwide) will readily adopt a new system if it has high perceived usefulness (faster, more secure than paper) and perceived ease of use. The UAE’s emphasis on mobile compatibility and low data requirements addressed ease-of-use (Mining.com, 2025), especially for developing countries, which is crucial for broad adoption. The perceived usefulness is evident in improved traceability and fraud prevention. As more participants observe successful use (social proof), diffusion will likely increase. This mirrors how other e-government innovations spread internationally when a champion country demonstrates success.

5.2 Policy and Governance Implications

Implementing a digital KPC system is not merely a technical upgrade; it requires careful attention to policy and governance structures:

Legal recognition: As discussed, many countries will need to update regulations or legislation to formally recognise an electronic certificate as equivalent to a paper one (Damarupurshad, 2024). A coordinated effort is needed to avoid a patchwork where some countries accept e-KPCs and others do not (which would force exporters to still produce paper for those). The KP Plenary could consider an Administrative Decision or amendment to the Core Document explicitly permitting digital certificates that meet certain standards (digital signature, tamper-evidence, etc.). This would provide top-down legal clarity, supporting national law changes.

Mutual trust framework: The KPCS operates on mutual recognition of each other’s certificates. A digital system potentially centralises some aspects (if using a shared platform), which raises the question: who will operate the system? One model is a central platform managed by the KP Secretariat (which, from 2022, is a permanent institution in Botswana) (Kimberley Process, 2023). This would ensure neutrality and continuity. The Secretariat or a contracted third-party could host the central database or blockchain, with oversight by the KP Participants. Another model is a federated system: each country runs a node or instance of the software, and they interconnect (like a distributed ledger or at least interlinked databases). Federated models distribute costs and control, but require interoperability agreements and standards (for data formats, APIs, etc.). Given KP’s consensus-driven nature, a governance committee for the digital system should be established, possibly under the Working Group of Diamond Experts, to maintain the technical standards and address issues (like cybersecurity incidents, software updates, etc.).

Data governance and privacy: The certificate data includes information about companies (exporter/importer names), values, and movements, which might be commercially sensitive. A digital system must have clear rules on data access: e.g., perhaps only the exporting country, importing country, and the Secretariat can see full details of a given certificate. Other participants might only see anonymised statistics or not have access unless needed. The system’s design should comply with any data protection regulations (for instance, if personal data of individuals is included, though KPCs mostly involve company data). The mutual trust here is twofold: trust in the certificates and trust in how data will be used and protected. Early on, it might be necessary to restrict data sharing to what is already shared today (which is aggregated trade stats and confirmations) to get participants on board, then gradually increase transparency if beneficial.

Funding and support: Not all KPCS participants can afford to develop or even maintain a sophisticated IT system. One advantage of a central platform like Verifico is that it can be offered “at very low cost” (Kimberley Process, 2024). Possibly the UAE or a coalition might subsidise the roll-out. In the long term, contributions might be needed (e.g. via the KP’s budget or donor support) to ensure sustainability. Training programs and technical support will also be essential so that countries with less IT capacity (or unstable internet) are not left behind. This might involve providing hardware (scanners, computers) or offline options (like a system where an offline certificate can be printed with a QR code that can later be scanned to sync data when the internet is available).

Governance model: If a blockchain or distributed ledger is used, governance becomes even more complex because all participants effectively co-own the system. Clear rules must be set on who can write data, how consensus is achieved (e.g., would each KP Participant have a node and equal vote on the ledger, akin to one-node-per-country consensus?), how to handle errors or disputes (e.g., a certificate issued in error, which on a blockchain cannot be deleted, but maybe flagged as revoked). A consortium blockchain could be permissioned by the KP, but someone must maintain the infrastructure (perhaps a group of key participants or a contracted entity for the tech side). The KP may need a technical advisory group to oversee upgrades and security audits.

There is also a political dimension: The KP is tripartite (governments, industry, civil society). Industry and civil society observers will likely welcome digitalisation (the World Diamond Council has advocated for strengthened traceability, and NGOs want better assurance against smuggling). However, any central system might raise concerns of surveillance or misuse of data. Participants will want assurances that, for example, trade data will not be misused by competitors or lead to unintended consequences like revealing business secrets. Governance rules can limit the use of data to KPCS compliance purposes only.

5.3 Technical Implications and Integration

On the technical front, adopting a digital KPC system implies some broader changes:

Integration with Customs Systems: Ideally, the e-KPC platform would interface with national customs or border control IT systems. For instance, when an exporting authority generates an e-KPC, a reference could automatically go to their customs declaration system (to link the physical export with the certificate). Likewise, import customs systems could ping the e-KPC database via API to verify a certificate’s validity and log the import confirmation digitally. This kind of integration streamlines the process end-to-end. It requires technical coordination with each country’s existing systems (many use ASYCUDA, CSW-CERTEX or similar systems for customs).

Use of Standards: The mention of global data standards in the literature (GS1, 2022) is relevant. The KPCS certificate fields could be mapped to an international data standard (perhaps an XML or JSON schema under UN/CEFACT). If a standard format is agreed upon, it ensures interoperability. It also means that if a country chooses to use its own software rather than a common platform, as long as they output the certificate data in the standard format (and perhaps register it on the network), it will be acceptable. Work on such standards might take inspiration from systems like the ePhyto (electronic phytosanitary certificates), which uses a harmonised XML schema globally.

Blockchain utilisation: If blockchain is introduced, a critical decision is whether to use a public chain (like Ethereum or a custom public network) or a private consortium chain. Public chains offer decentralisation but come with issues like transaction fees (and who pays them), open visibility (which might not be desired for commercial data), and reliance on an external network’s governance (miners, etc.). A consortium chain (permissioned blockchain) like Hyperledger Fabric or Quorum could be set up among KP members, giving more control and privacy. However, running such a chain needs ongoing technical governance (consensus algorithm, node maintenance). Some participants may question the necessity of blockchain if a central database works. The answer is usually resilience and trust. For example, in a centralised system, if the central server goes down or is compromised, the whole scheme halts; in a distributed ledger, many nodes would need to be compromised to stop the system, and no single party can manipulate data unilaterally (Damarupurshad, 2024).

AI for compliance: Implementing the AI-enhanced features could significantly strengthen oversight. For instance, AI could cross-reference certificate data with other databases (like production data or known geological info) to flag anomalies, such as a country exporting more diamonds than it legally produces, which latter is a sign of possible smuggling. It can also detect if certificate details are reused or if fake entries might have been injected. However, these capabilities also raise the stakes on data accuracy and the need for domain expertise to program the AI with the right rules. Over time, as digital records accumulate, machine learning could provide insights (e.g., patterns of trade that precede a conflict diamond incident, etc.), effectively turning the KPCS database into an intelligence tool for policymakers. This aligns with the original intention of KPCS to continuously improve monitoring (Kimberley Process, 2025).

5.4 Comparison with Literature and Other Domains

Our findings align with broader literature on the digital transformation of certification systems. Similar efforts in other sectors often conclude that a gradual enhancement approach yields the best immediate returns. For example, in supply chain finance, the adoption of electronic bills of lading moved first to digitised PDFs and central registries before exploring blockchain, due to legal and acceptance issues, which mirror the KPCS trajectory. Likewise, government digital identity projects often use centralised databases initially and only now experiment with decentralised models (self-sovereign identity) once stakeholders are comfortable.

The notion of verifiable credentials from the product conformity literature (GS1, 2022) can be directly applied. Each KPC could effectively be a verifiable credential issued by a country’s KP authority, which any other authority can verify using that issuer’s public key. This does not require a blockchain, just a public key infrastructure (PKI) or a directory of trusted issuers. Our results show strong support for digital signatures, which aligns with this, so it is essentially a PKI approach. The benefit is that even offline or without a central database, a digital certificate file could be verified as authentic and unaltered if the verifier has the issuer’s public key and the issuer is trusted. In KPCS, all participants know each other (list of participants is maintained), so establishing a PKI trust chain is feasible (e.g. under the KP Secretariat as a root certificate authority, issuing certificates to each national authority).

Resilience and continuity: An interesting point raised in the product certificate future-state is the idea of “supporting physical twins… until legacy laws updated” (GS1, 2022). The KPCS may also adopt a transition period where both paper and digital are used. For example, during a pilot phase, a country might issue a digital certificate and print a copy marked as “copy of e-KPC” to physically accompany the shipment, just in case border agents in the receiving country are not yet on the digital system. Over time, as confidence builds and legal backing is secured, the paper can be phased out. This dual approach ensures business continuity, so shipments will not be stuck because of an IT glitch or an unprepared checkpoint. It is essentially a risk mitigation while rolling out the new system.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The digitalisation of Kimberley Process Certificates (KPCs) under the KPCS marks a long-overdue innovation for the conflict-free diamond trade. This study has examined how moving from paper to electronic certificates can advance the scheme’s ability to prevent conflict diamonds from entering legitimate markets while streamlining trade. Our analysis, grounded in the KPCS’s foundational requirements and informed by a recent real-world pilot, leads to several key conclusions and recommendations:

Summary of Findings: Digital KPCs (e-KPCs) can fulfil all minimum requirements of the existing scheme, including unique numbering, prescribed attestations, and security features, and in many respects can exceed the security of paper. A properly implemented e-KPC system can eliminate certain fraud tactics (e.g., photocopying a certificate and reusing it) through cryptographic validation (Damarupurshad, 2024). It can also speed up certificate issuance and border procedures from days to real-time, and considerably enhance data collection for compliance oversight (Damarupurshad, 2024). The UAE’s case demonstrated the feasibility and benefits, showing that significant improvements are achievable even without full blockchain deployment.

However, we also learned that technology must be matched with policy adjustments. Digital certificates require legal acceptance and a cooperative governance model among participants. They also require bridging digital divides, because not every participant is equally equipped, so the solution must be inclusive by design (e.g., low bandwidth operation, mobile access).

Recommendations:

1. Phased Implementation Plan: The Kimberley Process should adopt a phased approach: Phase 1 (Pilot & Rollout): Expand the current UAE-developed platform (Verifico or similar) to volunteer participants for extended pilot use over the next year. During this phase, allow both electronic and paper certificates in parallel. Collect feedback on usability and make iterative improvements. Phase 2 (Official Adoption): Once a core group has tested successfully, table a decision at the KP Plenary (e.g., 2025 or 2026) to formally recognise e-KPCs. Establish a timeline (perhaps 2-3 years) for all Participants to upgrade their systems or join the common platform. Provide toolkits for those who want to integrate the system with national single window or customs IT. Phase 3 (Enhancements): After core adoption, progressively introduce enhancements: e.g., enable the blockchain component to create an immutable audit ledger of all certificates (perhaps in cooperation with an industry blockchain for synergies), and introduce AI analytics for the Working Group on Monitoring to get alerts on irregular trade patterns. Phase 4 (Paper Phase-out): Once comfort and legal frameworks are in place, mandate that KPCs be electronic by default and discontinue printed certificates except as backup. This could be tied to an update of the Core Document or an Administrative Decision that, after a certain date, only e-KPCs are valid (with emergency provisions if systems are down).

2. Standardisation and Interoperability: Develop a standard data schema for the KPC (perhaps an XML/JSON schema aligned with Annex I fields) and standard web service specifications for certificate exchange. This ensures that the data can flow seamlessly, whether countries use the central platform or their own software. It also allows interoperability if multiple systems emerge. Leveraging existing standards (ISO country codes are already used, but ISO standards for digital docs and W3C verifiable credentials structure may also be used) will ease integration (GS1, 2022).

3. Legal and Policy Update: The KP Plenary should issue a resolution encouraging participants to update national legislation to accommodate e-KPCs. Sharing template legislative language (like the example from South Africa’s Diamonds Act Regulation) will help unify the approach. Additionally, consider an amendment to Annex II recommendations explicitly endorsing electronic data exchange for certification (building on point 4 of Annex II, which already encourages computerisation). Also, clarify mutual recognition: an e-KPC issued by one Participant, if compliant with the agreed standard, must be accepted by all others (no unilateral rejection due to form, as sometimes happened with minor paper form differences historically).

4. Capacity Building and Inclusivity: Create a capacity-building program under KP (possibly with donor support from WDC or developed Participant states) to help less-resourced Participants. This could fund secure laptops, scanners, or satellite internet links for remote mining areas. Conduct training sessions regionally (Africa, South America, etc.) to ensure each Participant has IT personnel who understand the system. Provide 24/7 technical support, especially during the transition period. Emphasise that the system is designed for low bandwidth and offline use. For example, an offline mode where a certificate can be pre-loaded on a device in case of border posts with no connectivity, which then syncs later. By addressing infrastructure and knowledge gaps, the KP avoids creating a two-tier system of digital “haves and have-nots.”

5. Governance Structure: Form a Digital KPC Steering Committee with representatives from a diverse set of Participants (developed, developing, small, large trading hubs) plus industry and civil society observers. This committee will oversee the implementation, resolve issues, and continuously update technical protocols. It would also handle questions of data access. For example, it can define that the KP Secretariat will maintain a master list of certificate IDs to prevent duplicates, or that any participant can query the system to check if a certificate number has been used (without seeing others’ full data). If a blockchain is used, this group would manage node governance (who runs them, what consensus model, etc.). Essentially, the committee ensures transparency and collective buy-in for the system’s operation.

6. Security Measures: Commission professional security audits of the digital system. Since this platform becomes critical infrastructure for the diamond trade, it might be a target for hackers (e.g., to create fake certificates or disrupt the trade). Penetration testing, code audits, and robust cybersecurity measures (encryption, multi-factor authentication for users, secure hosting environment, regular backups) are mandatory. Also have contingency plans: e.g., if the system goes down, what is the fallback? Perhaps allow paper in emergencies, or have redundant servers. Defining an incident response plan under the governance committee is recommended.

7. Future Integration: Explore integration with other traceability initiatives. For instance, if a diamond is tracked on a blockchain like Tracr, the e-KPC’s unique ID or QR could be linked to that record such that a customs officer or buyer could see both the KPCS certification and the stone’s journey on one interface. While beyond KPCS’s immediate scope, in the long run, such integration could further assure consumers and support responsible sourcing beyond conflict-free (e.g., proving origin and ethical supply chain). Also, consider extending the digital certification concept to other minerals. The experience here could inform efforts for a “KP-like” scheme for coloured gemstones or gold (Damarupurshad, 2024).

Concluding Remarks: Digitalising the Kimberley Process Certificate is a natural evolution in an era of digital transformation. The KP can significantly enhance its effectiveness and credibility by leveraging technologies like secure digital documents, blockchain, and AI within a well-governed framework. The ultimate vision is a more transparent, efficient system where every rough diamond’s certification can be instantly verified at any point from mine to market. This not only thwarts conflict diamonds but also reduces friction for legitimate trade, benefiting the industry and regulators.

The Digital Transformation Journey will require collaboration among policymakers and technologists. The evidence and analysis presented in this paper strongly suggest that, provided a thoughtful implementation, the opportunities of e-KPCs outweigh the challenges.

Source:

1. Damarupurshad, A. K. (2024). Digitalisation of Kimberley Process Certificates: Enhancing Security through Template Consistency and Advanced Technologies. Unpublished Manuscript.

© Ashok Damarupurshad. All Rights Reserved. 12 June 2025.