Egypt’s Wasteful Mega Projects and Artificial Water Scarcity: A Barrier to Basin-Wide Water Equity and CFA Ideals

Abstract This paper critically examines Egypt’s expanding desert mega-projects and inter-basin water transfers as central drivers of artificial water scarcity within the Nile Basin. Egypt’s longstanding water crisis narrative, frequently deployed in international forums, is challenged by evidence that its domestic water management policies—particularly its pursuit of water-intensive developments in arid regions—are environmentally unsustainable and politically motivated. Projects such as the Toshka Project, the New Administrative Capital, and the 1.5 million feddan desert reclamation program are examined as case studies of developmental unilateralism. These initiatives consume vast quantities of Nile water with limited socio-economic justification, raising serious questions about Egypt’s commitment to basin-wide water equity and sustainability.

The study further critiques Egypt’s continued reliance on outdated colonial-era agreements, notably the 1929 and 1959 Nile water treaties, which exclude upstream states and contravene modern international water law principles such as equitable and reasonable utilization, no significant harm, and community of interest. Egypt’s refusal to ratify the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) is analyzed as a deliberate strategy to preserve hydro-hegemonic control. Drawing on technical, legal, and political sources—including the widely referenced commentary of former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Tibor Nagy—the paper highlights growing international recognition that upstream nations like Ethiopia, which contributes over 85% of Nile waters, have legitimate development rights. The analysis calls for Egypt to shift from unilateral water consumption patterns toward a cooperative governance model rooted in the CFA’s legally binding framework. By situating Egypt’s actions within comparative global examples of sustainable transboundary water management, the paper provides policy recommendations for achieving equitable, sustainable, and conflict-resilient water allocation across the Nile Basin.

Keywords: Nile, Egypt, GERD, CFA, water governance, international water law, basin-wide cooperation

 1. Introduction

Water governance in the Nile Basin has historically been characterized by asymmetrical power dynamics, where Egypt’s political, diplomatic, and legal posturing has shaped narratives of entitlement and crisis. Egypt often presents itself as the most vulnerable Nile riparian, facing imminent water scarcity and existential threat from upstream developments, particularly Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (Swain, 2011; Tawfik, 2020). This narrative has dominated international forums, influencing perceptions among global policymakers and development partners. However, emerging hydrological data, independent policy assessments, and critical academic scholarship increasingly challenge Egypt’s scarcity discourse as largely self-induced and politically constructed (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016; Horn Review, 2025). Over the past three decades, Egypt has embarked on a series of ambitious, water-intensive mega-projects aimed at desert reclamation, urban expansion, and inter-basin water transfers. Projects such as the Toshka Project, the New Administrative Capital, Al-Galala City, and the 1.5 million feddan desert reclamation scheme are emblematic of Egypt’s development trajectory that prioritizes elite-driven infrastructure expansion over basin-wide water equity and sustainability (International Crisis Group, 2020; World Bank, 2022). These projects require enormous volumes of water drawn from the Nile, thereby exacerbating basin-wide water stress and contradicting the very water-scarcity narrative that Egypt leverages in diplomatic negotiations (Allan, 2013). Egypt’s pursuit of such projects raises fundamental legal, ethical, and geopolitical concerns, especially in light of internationally recognized principles of transboundary water governance.

Egypt continues to assert rights based on outdated colonial-era agreements, primarily the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 bilateral agreement with Sudan (Swain, 2011). These treaties granted Egypt an effective veto power over upstream developments and allocated it a disproportionate share of Nile waters—estimated at 55.5 billion cubic meters annually—while excluding the participation and interests of other riparian states, especially Ethiopia, which contributes more than 85 percent of the Nile’s flow (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016; Mbaku, 2021). The legal and institutional inadequacies of Egypt’s reliance on these colonial-era treaties have become increasingly evident in the 21st century, especially with the emergence of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999 and the adoption of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) in 2010 (NBI, 2025). The CFA represents a major shift towards an inclusive, legally binding, and multilateral governance framework that reflects modern international water law principles such as equitable and reasonable utilization, obligation not to cause significant harm, and prior notification of planned measures (International Water Law Project, 2024). These principles are further underpinned by broader global frameworks like the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) and the Helsinki Rules (1966), which collectively emphasize fairness, sustainability, and inclusivity in international river basin governance.

Despite its transformative potential, Egypt has categorically rejected the CFA, refusing to ratify the agreement and opposing its entry into force. This decision reflects Egypt’s entrenched hydro-hegemonic posture—a strategy of leveraging legal, diplomatic, and geopolitical tools to sustain its historical control over the Nile waters (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). The country’s rejection of the CFA’s core principles, particularly the doctrine of equitable utilization, has stalled basin-wide cooperation, fueled diplomatic tensions, and contributed to regional insecurity (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The situation has been further complicated by Egypt’s diplomatic campaign to frame GERD and other upstream development projects as existential threats. International diplomatic pressure, lobbying at the United Nations Security Council, and appeals to external mediators like the United States and the African Union have all been central components of Egypt’s approach (AP News, 2024). However, this strategy neglects the fact that upstream states—particularly Ethiopia—are acting within their sovereign right to harness their natural resources to address widespread poverty, energy deficits, and development challenges (Mbaku, 2021; Mohammed, 2024).

Egypt’s resistance to the CFA also stands in stark contrast to global trends in transboundary water governance. Other major river basins—such as the Mekong, Danube, and Orange-Senqu—have moved towards cooperative, legally binding frameworks that prioritize shared benefits, data sharing, and joint institutional management (MRC, 2020; ORASECOM, 2021; ICPDR, 2020). These international cases demonstrate that multilateral cooperation, rather than unilateralism or bilateral dominance, is essential for sustainable, equitable, and conflict-resilient water governance. From a legal perspective, Egypt’s stance undermines established international water law norms, including those articulated in the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997). Egypt’s insistence on maintaining exclusive rights derived from outdated treaties runs counter to universally accepted principles of equitable utilization and community of interest (International Water Law Project, 2024). Furthermore, by refusing to ratify the CFA, Egypt forfeits institutional influence within the newly activated Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC)—a critical interstate platform for cooperative decision-making and technical coordination (NBI, 2025).

Recent geopolitical analyses also highlight how Egypt’s water management decisions—rooted in domestic elite interests and geopolitical leverage—fail to align with the socio-economic and developmental needs of other Nile Basin states (Horn Review, 2025; Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016). For example, while Ethiopia’s GERD project seeks to address electricity access for more than 60% of its population still living without grid power, Egypt continues to divert water for luxury real estate developments, golf courses, and desert agriculture with questionable economic viability (World Bank, 2022; Allan, 2013).

Tibor Nagy, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, encapsulated the core inequity at the heart of Nile politics when he stated: “A country which does not contribute one drop of water… cannot demand 100% of the right to decide how the waters should be used by all. The world has changed.” (Nagy, 2021) This statement resonates as both a diplomatic critique and a legal principle: upstream nations, particularly Ethiopia, have both the moral and legal right to utilize their natural water resources within frameworks of sustainability and regional equity. This paper seeks to explore these dynamics in depth. It aims to unpack the political economy behind Egypt’s self-induced water crisis, analyze the legal shortcomings of Egypt’s treaty-based claims, and demonstrate how Egypt’s mega-project-driven water consumption patterns conflict with both CFA provisions and broader principles of international water law. Furthermore, the paper draws on comparative international case studies—such as the Mekong and Danube basins—to show that sustainable, inclusive, and legally binding basin-wide governance is both possible and necessary. The study concludes by advocating for Egypt’s full engagement in the CFA framework, an essential step towards establishing long-term water security, equity, and peace within the Nile Basin. 2. Egypt’s Desert Mega Projects: Water-Intensive and Environmentally Risky

Egypt’s pursuit of large-scale desert mega-projects over the past two decades illustrates a clear pattern of unilateral water-intensive development that undermines basin-wide water equity and sustainability principles enshrined in the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). These projects, while often marketed domestically as national development milestones, raise significant hydrological, environmental, and legal concerns for the entire Nile Basin community. By diverting massive volumes of Nile water to environmentally fragile and low-productivity desert zones, Egypt’s current development trajectory stands in direct conflict with the CFA’s principles of equitable utilization, sustainability, and prevention of significant harm (NBI, 2025; Yihdego & Rieu-Clarke, 2016).

The Toshka Project, also known as the New Valley Project, remains one of Egypt’s most controversial water development schemes. Initiated in the late 1990s and revived with increased funding in recent years, the project aims to cultivate over 500,000 acres of desert land in Egypt’s Western Desert by pumping large quantities of water from Lake Nasser through the Sheikh Zayed Canal (Swain, 2011). Hydrologists and international water governance experts have repeatedly criticized the project for its poor water-use efficiency, high evaporation losses, and marginal economic returns relative to the volume of water diverted (Allan, 2013). The Toshka Project not only represents a questionable allocation of scarce water resources but also stands as a visible symbol of Egypt’s unwillingness to prioritize equitable water sharing with upstream nations. Another set of highly water-consuming initiatives includes Egypt’s New Administrative Capital and Al-Galala City. These urban mega-projects, situated in arid zones east of Cairo, rely heavily on Nile water for non-essential purposes such as luxury landscaping, artificial lakes, cooling systems, and green space development (International Crisis Group, 2020).

According to recent environmental impact assessments, these projects divert hundreds of millions of cubic meters of water annually, primarily for aesthetic and elite-driven urbanization goals (World Bank, 2022). The irony is striking: while Egypt continues to voice alarmist narratives about its vulnerability to upstream water projects, it simultaneously reallocates significant portions of its Nile quota for urban luxury consumption.

Egypt’s 1.5 Million Feddan Desert Reclamation Project further exemplifies this trend of water-intensive, ecologically unsound development. Launched in 2015 with the goal of reclaiming and irrigating vast tracts of desert land, the project focuses on regions with poor soil quality and high water demand (World Bank, 2022). Critics argue that the project not only risks accelerating groundwater depletion but also imposes heavy ecological costs on already fragile desert ecosystems (Tawfik, 2020). Agricultural experts have questioned the economic rationality of using Nile water for low-yield desert farming when more water-efficient alternatives, such as virtual water trade or modern irrigation technologies in already fertile areas, remain underutilized (Allan, 2013). Moreover, this policy directly violates Article 4 and Article 8 of the CFA, which call for sustainable utilization and the prevention of significant harm to other riparian states (NBI, 2025). From a legal perspective, Egypt’s desert mega-projects illustrate what scholars term “developmental unilateralism”—the practice of pursuing large-scale resource use projects without consulting or securing the consent of other affected riparian states (Yihdego & Rieu-Clarke, 2016). Under the CFA framework and broader international water law, riparian states are obligated to engage in prior notification, joint planning, and environmental impact assessment procedures before undertaking projects that may have transboundary impacts (International Water Law Project, 2024). Egypt’s failure to adhere to these procedural safeguards sets a dangerous precedent for unilateralism in the Nile Basin.

Furthermore, these projects contradict international water sustainability norms such as the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) and the Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004), both of which emphasize equitable and reasonable utilization of shared watercourses (Salman, 2007). Egypt’s allocation of billions of cubic meters of Nile water for elite-driven urban development and marginal desert agriculture stands in stark contrast to the pressing water needs of upstream populations in countries like Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya, where millions still lack basic access to potable water and irrigation infrastructure (World Bank, 2022; Mbaku, 2021).

The environmental costs of these projects are equally alarming. Increased water abstraction from Lake Nasser to supply desert cities and farmlands exacerbates the risk of reduced water availability downstream, particularly during low-flow years or periods of drought (Swain, 2011). Moreover, many of these projects are associated with significant energy consumption, high greenhouse gas emissions due to water pumping over long distances, and adverse impacts on biodiversity in fragile desert ecosystems (Allan, 2013).

Politically, Egypt’s continued investment in these water-intensive projects undermines its credibility in ongoing Nile Basin negotiations. The country’s alarmist diplomacy, centered on portraying Ethiopia’s GERD as a unilateral threat to downstream water security, appears inconsistent when juxtaposed with Egypt’s own disregard for basin-wide sustainability principles (International Crisis Group, 2020). This contradiction has not gone unnoticed by upstream states and international observers, many of whom increasingly view Egypt’s scarcity narrative as a geopolitical tool designed to extract diplomatic concessions rather than reflect genuine hydrological vulnerability (Horn Review, 2025).

Moreover, Egypt’s approach has important geopolitical ramifications. By unilaterally diverting Nile water for non-strategic desert developments, Egypt undermines trust among Nile Basin states and diminishes the prospects for cooperative governance under the CFA. The CFA—now entered into force as of 2024—provides a legally binding, multilateral framework designed precisely to prevent such unilateral actions that impose significant harm on co-riparian states (NBI, 2025). Egypt’s ongoing rejection of this framework, coupled with its disregard for CFA environmental and equity provisions, further isolates it diplomatically within the basin (International Water Law Project, 2024).

3. Artificially Manufactured Water Insecurity

Egypt’s diplomatic rhetoric surrounding the Nile Basin often hinges on a narrative of existential water scarcity. At virtually every international negotiation, Egypt portrays itself as a vulnerable downstream nation at risk of catastrophic drought and economic collapse should any upstream development projects, particularly Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), alter Nile flows (Swain, 2011; Tawfik, 2020). While water scarcity is a genuine and complex challenge for many arid regions globally, a closer examination of Egypt’s water resource management reveals that much of this scarcity is politically constructed, technically avoidable, and in large part manufactured through unsustainable domestic policies.

One of the most poignant international critiques of Egypt’s Nile posture came from Tibor Nagy, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who remarked in 2021: “A country which does not contribute one drop of water… cannot demand 100% of the right to decide how the waters should be used by all. The world has changed.” (Nagy, 2021) This statement captures a fundamental truth of Nile Basin hydrology. Over 85% of the Nile waters reaching Egypt originate from upstream states, most significantly from the Ethiopian Highlands via the Blue Nile and Atbara rivers (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016; Mbaku, 2021). Despite this hydrological reality, Egypt maintains a rigid negotiating stance rooted in historical entitlements codified in the colonial-era 1929 and 1959 Nile water treaties—agreements that excluded upstream states from any decision-making processes (Swain, 2011).

Several independent studies have highlighted that Egypt’s proclaimed water crisis is, in large measure, a policy-induced scarcity rather than an unavoidable natural shortage (Horn Review, 2025). Egypt continues to engage in highly water-intensive activities such as desert agriculture, luxury urban landscaping, and industrial cooling, all of which consume significant proportions of the country’s Nile water quota (Allan, 2013). For example, water-intensive crops like rice and sugarcane, both dominant in Egypt’s agricultural portfolio, require large volumes of irrigation water, yet reforms toward crop diversification and water-efficient farming remain slow and politically unpopular (World Bank, 2022).

The country’s per capita water consumption further challenges the narrative of scarcity. According to FAO AQUASTAT (2023), Egypt’s annual per capita freshwater withdrawal remains significantly higher than most upstream Nile Basin states, including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. This disparity raises ethical and legal questions about Egypt’s calls for upstream development restrictions while maintaining high domestic consumption levels and continuing to waste water on non-essential sectors.

Egypt’s national water policy also reveals contradictions between discourse and practice. While government officials frequently highlight the risk of existential droughts and regional destabilization, national development plans continue to prioritize water-intensive mega-projects like the Toshka Project and the 1.5 million feddan desert reclamation scheme (International Crisis Group, 2020). Both projects siphon billions of cubic meters of water annually, which could otherwise be allocated toward more water-efficient and socially beneficial uses. Such development pathways not only violate the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization outlined in the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) but also contradict Article 8 of the CFA, which requires states to prevent significant harm to other riparian nations (NBI, 2025). Beyond domestic overuse, Egypt’s water management strategy relies heavily on supply-side interventions rather than demand-side management reforms. Large-scale engineering solutions such as inter-basin transfers and high-capacity pumping stations dominate Egypt’s infrastructure investments, with limited focus on water conservation, irrigation efficiency, or wastewater recycling (Allan, 2013). This approach deepens the cycle of artificial scarcity, justifying external diplomatic pressure on upstream countries like Ethiopia, while ignoring internal inefficiencies. Egypt’s resistance to adopting basin-wide institutional governance structures like the Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC) further reinforces its unilateral policy trajectory (International Water Law Project, 2024). By refusing to ratify the CFA, Egypt remains outside the most authoritative legal framework currently governing Nile Basin cooperation, thereby sidelining itself from technical assessments, environmental monitoring, and collaborative water management initiatives mandated under the NRBC.

The geopolitical implications of this manufactured scarcity are profound. Egypt’s international lobbying campaigns often frame GERD and other upstream projects as violations of international law, invoking the narrative of “historical rights” (Mbaku, 2021). However, international legal scholars increasingly view Egypt’s position as outdated and incompatible with the evolution of customary international water law, which emphasizes equitable utilization and no significant harm, as codified in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention and reflected in the CFA (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016).

4. Inter-Basin Water Transfers: Exporting Scarcity

Another critical, yet often overlooked, dimension of Egypt’s water management strategy involves large-scale inter-basin water transfers—projects that physically divert Nile water from the basin to non-basin regions. Chief among these projects are the El-Salam Canal Project and the North Sinai Development Project, both of which redirect substantial Nile water volumes into the Sinai Peninsula, a hydrologically distinct and ecologically sensitive region (Swain, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2020).

The El-Salam Canal, completed in stages since the early 2000s, is designed to transfer approximately 2 billion cubic meters of Nile water annually to support agricultural and urban development in North Sinai (World Bank, 2022). This project aims to irrigate over 220,000 hectares of land and supply water to newly established urban centers. However, multiple environmental assessments have warned that the project’s water diversion risks exacerbating downstream water shortages and altering the delicate ecological balance of the Nile Delta and Mediterranean coastal zones (FAO AQUASTAT, 2023).

Similarly, the North Sinai Development Project, which relies heavily on the El-Salam Canal’s supply, represents a massive inter-basin engineering intervention that violates key CFA provisions, notably Article 5 on equitable and reasonable utilization and Article 6 on the obligation not to cause significant harm to co-riparian states (NBI, 2025). Under international water law, inter-basin transfers of this scale and ecological impact require prior notification, joint technical assessments, and multilateral approval—a procedural obligation Egypt has repeatedly failed to meet (International Water Law Project, 2024).

From a hydrological standpoint, the inter-basin transfer projects not only reduce the Nile water available for downstream and upstream riparian nations but also create artificial demand pressures that strain Egypt’s already over-committed water resources (Allan, 2013). By transferring Nile water to regions historically outside the Nile Basin hydrological system, Egypt has effectively extended its water footprint beyond its natural hydrological boundaries, increasing regional tensions and heightening diplomatic disputes with upstream countries.

These projects further illustrate Egypt’s selective interpretation of international water law. While Egypt demands that Ethiopia provide detailed environmental impact assessments for the GERD and insists on binding operational guarantees to protect downstream flows, it undertakes its own large-scale water diversion projects without offering similar transparency or consultation to affected riparian states (Tawfik, 2020). This double standard undermines Egypt’s legal credibility in international forums and further isolates it within Nile Basin negotiations.

From a regional governance perspective, Egypt’s inter-basin water transfers run counter to the CFA’s vision of cooperative, transparent, and equitable basin-wide water management. The CFA explicitly mandates that all planned measures with possible transboundary impacts undergo joint review and multilateral consent procedures (NBI, 2025). Egypt’s failure to comply with these provisions has strengthened upstream nations’ resolve to proceed with their own development projects under the CFA’s legally recognized framework.

Environmental sustainability concerns also loom large. Diverting freshwater to arid, non-basin regions like North Sinai has led to issues such as soil salinization, aquifer depletion, and biodiversity loss (World Bank, 2022). Furthermore, the energy costs associated with pumping and transporting water over long distances impose an additional environmental and economic burden, further questioning the projects’ long-term viability.

5. Egypt’s Historic Claims and the Legacy of Hydro-Hegemony

Egypt’s dominant claims over Nile waters are deeply rooted in colonial-era treaties and a broader history of regional hydro-hegemony. Central to Egypt’s legal and diplomatic posture are the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Egypt-Sudan Agreement—two agreements negotiated without the involvement, consent, or representation of upstream riparian states such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania (Swain, 2011; Tawfik, 2020). The 1929 treaty, brokered by Britain as the colonial administrator of much of the Nile Basin, granted Egypt veto power over upstream water projects and guaranteed the country a significant share of Nile waters. This treaty was later reinforced by the 1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of annual Nile flow to Egypt and 18.5 bcm to Sudan, leaving no formal allocation for the remaining upstream states (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Legal scholars have extensively critiqued this framework as the epitome of “hydro-hegemony”—a condition where one or a few states control shared water resources through legal, political, economic, and sometimes military power (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Egypt’s continued reliance on these outdated treaties stands in stark contradiction to modern international water law, particularly the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention) and the 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) of the Nile Basin Initiative (International Water Law Project, 2024). Both instruments emphasize principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, no significant harm, and prior notification, none of which align with Egypt’s historical treaty claims.

The legitimacy of the 1929 and 1959 treaties has been widely contested in academic and legal forums. Upstream states argue that these treaties reflect outdated colonial power structures and fail to meet the standards of equitable resource distribution now codified in international customary water law (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016). Moreover, the absence of upstream voices during the formulation of these treaties renders them legally suspect under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which underscores the importance of consent and participation among affected parties in the creation of binding international agreements.

Egypt’s persistent invocation of “historic rights” over the Nile is increasingly seen as an attempt to perpetuate a status quo that inherently disadvantages upstream nations. This posture has placed Egypt at odds with the majority of Nile Basin states, who have coalesced around the CFA as the first basin-wide, legally binding multilateral water governance framework. The CFA, now entered into force as of 2024 following South Sudan’s ratification, explicitly rejects the notion of acquired rights or fixed allocations based on historic use without equitable consideration of all riparians’ needs and contributions (NBI, 2025).

In practice, Egypt’s continued adherence to the 1929 and 1959 treaties not only hinders cooperative management of the Nile but also fuels regional mistrust and diplomatic polarization. The upstream states’ collective demand for renegotiation of Nile water governance under the CFA signals a growing consensus that hydro-hegemonic frameworks must yield to more equitable, scientifically informed, and legally robust arrangements (Mbaku, 2021).

 International commentary, such as that by Tibor Nagy, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, has further spotlighted the inequities of Egypt’s position. Nagy famously stated: “A country which does not contribute one drop of water… cannot demand 100% of the right to decide how the waters should be used by all. The world has changed.” (Nagy, 2021) Such statements reflect a growing international recognition that Egypt’s historic claims are neither morally defensible nor legally sustainable in the 21st-century context of shared natural resource management. 6. Domestic Contradictions: Luxury Development vs. Claimed Water Crisis

Egypt’s internal water management practices reveal a sharp contradiction between its declared international water crisis narrative and its domestic water consumption patterns. While Egyptian diplomats continue to warn of an impending national catastrophe due to upstream water developments, the country simultaneously channels billions of cubic meters of Nile water into luxury desert cities, golf courses, artificial lakes, and water-intensive agricultural projects (Allan, 2013; World Bank, 2022).

The Horn Review (2025) offers a particularly scathing critique of this disconnect, arguing: “Egypt’s ‘water crisis’ is at least partly of its own making.” (Horn Review, 2025) This observation is supported by data from FAO AQUASTAT (2023), which highlights that Egypt’s per capita water consumption remains among the highest in the Nile Basin, far exceeding that of upstream nations such as Ethiopia and Uganda. Furthermore, Egypt continues to cultivate water-intensive crops such as rice and sugarcane, despite repeated calls from water management experts to shift toward less water-demanding agricultural models (Tawfik, 2020). In addition to agricultural overuse, Egypt’s urban planning strategy over the past decade has prioritized desert reclamation and high-end real estate development. Projects such as the New Administrative Capital, Al-Galala City, and the 1.5 Million Feddan Reclamation Project represent significant diversions of Nile water for purposes that largely serve elite urban populations rather than addressing national water security for vulnerable communities (International Crisis Group, 2020). These projects have been criticized for their poor water-use efficiency, high evaporation losses, and negligible contributions to national food security.

The contradiction between Egypt’s water diplomacy and domestic water governance further erodes its negotiating credibility. While Egypt demands that upstream countries forgo hydropower and irrigation development to preserve downstream flows, it simultaneously fails to implement domestic water conservation strategies, modernize irrigation infrastructure, or adopt integrated water resource management frameworks (Allan, 2013; World Bank, 2022).

Moreover, Egypt’s significant inter-basin water transfer projects, particularly the El-Salam Canal and North Sinai Development Project, intensify this contradiction. These projects divert Nile water outside the basin to fuel non-essential developments in the Sinai Peninsula, raising further questions about Egypt’s true commitment to water conservation (Swain, 2011).

Legal analyses underscore that Egypt’s domestic overuse and water-intensive development projects violate both the spirit and letter of the CFA, particularly Article 4 (equitable and reasonable utilization) and Article 8 (obligation not to cause significant harm) (NBI, 2025). By failing to align its national water policy with international legal norms and sustainable development principles, Egypt perpetuates a governance model fundamentally at odds with basin-wide cooperation.

7. Calls for Reform: From Unilateralism to Cooperative Governance

Given these historic, legal, and policy contradictions, upstream Nile states have collectively advocated for a reformed, equitable, and multilateral governance system under the Cooperative Framework Agreement. Ethiopia, whose highlands supply more than 85% of the Nile’s annual flow, has been particularly vocal in demanding water governance reform based on fairness, science, and international legal standards (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016).

As Mbaku (2021) notes: “Ethiopia… has long argued that it has the right to utilize its natural resources to address widespread poverty.” (Mbaku, 2021) This position resonates with other upstream nations like Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, all of whom have signed the CFA. South Sudan’s 2024 ratification, which triggered the CFA’s formal entry into force, marks a significant milestone in shifting Nile governance away from bilateral, Egypt-dominated arrangements toward a basin-wide, inclusive legal regime (NBI, 2025).

The CFA represents a paradigm shift from hydro-hegemony to cooperative governance. Its legally binding provisions emphasize key water law principles: equitable utilization, no significant harm, prior notification, information exchange, and joint development planning (International Water Law Project, 2024). The anticipated operationalization of the Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC) as the institutional arm of the CFA further cements this shift.

However, Egypt and Sudan continue to reject the CFA, clinging to their historic privileges under the colonial-era treaties. This refusal poses a barrier to comprehensive basin-wide cooperation and undermines ongoing technical and environmental collaboration efforts. Egypt’s insistence on external mediation mechanisms, such as United Nations Security Council intervention or reliance on non-riparian third parties, reflects a continued preference for unilateralism and power-based negotiation frameworks (International Crisis Group, 2020).

To break this diplomatic deadlock, upstream states and international mediators have increasingly advocated for Egypt’s full accession to the CFA and its participation in the NRBC (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016). Doing so would offer Egypt a formal platform to voice its concerns while aligning its national policies with basin-wide sustainability objectives.

Egypt’s domestic water policies must also undergo urgent reform. Scholars recommend the adoption of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) strategies, crop diversification away from water-intensive agriculture, modern irrigation technologies, and investments in wastewater recycling and desalination (Allan, 2013; World Bank, 2022). Such reforms would reduce Egypt’s dependency on upstream flows while demonstrating goodwill and responsibility in international water negotiations.

The GERD project has emerged as a focal point of this broader governance struggle. While Egypt views the dam as an existential threat, Ethiopia and many international observers see it as a legitimate development project fully in line with CFA principles and international water law. Technical reviews by the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) and the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) have repeatedly found GERD to be hydrologically sound and compliant with internationally recognized dam safety standards (International Water Law Project, 2024).

8. Legal and Policy Imperatives: The Cooperative Framework Agreement as the New Governance Standard

The entry into force of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) in 2024 marks a watershed moment in the history of Nile Basin water governance. After decades of negotiations and upstream frustration with colonial-era water allocation regimes, the CFA now stands as the most credible, inclusive, and legally binding instrument governing transboundary water use across the Nile Basin. With ratification by South Sudan in 2024, the required threshold of six riparian state ratifications was met, formally triggering the agreement’s entry into force and laying the foundation for the operationalization of the Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC) (International Water Law Project, 2024). At its core, the CFA embodies internationally recognized principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, obligation not to cause significant harm, and prior notification of planned measures, reflecting key tenets of the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016). Additionally, the CFA institutionalizes obligations for joint monitoring, data exchange, and environmental protection, providing a platform for coordinated, science-driven, and equitable water resource management across all Nile Basin states (NBI, 2025).

Egypt’s continued refusal to ratify the CFA poses significant legal and policy challenges to basin-wide governance. While Egypt remains an influential regional actor, its persistent adherence to outdated treaties—the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Egypt-Sudan Agreement—runs counter to both modern international water law and evolving basin-level governance norms (Swain, 2011; Tawfik, 2020). The CFA explicitly rejects unilateral historic allocations that exclude upstream states, emphasizing instead a community-of-interest approach that recognizes the rights and needs of all riparians (NBI, 2025).

By remaining outside the CFA framework, Egypt effectively excludes itself from key decision-making processes under the NRBC, including project planning, joint hydrological assessments, drought response mechanisms, and basin-wide investment programs (International Crisis Group, 2020). This self-imposed marginalization undermines Egypt’s ability to influence future water governance decisions, including those related to hydropower scheduling, seasonal flow management, and climate adaptation measures.

From a policy perspective, Egypt’s non-participation perpetuates regional tensions and inhibits the development of coordinated solutions to shared water challenges. As upstream countries proceed with infrastructure projects, irrigation expansions, and climate resilience programs, Egypt’s absence from technical discussions leaves it increasingly reactive rather than proactive in managing shared water risks (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016).

Furthermore, Egypt’s legal argument that the CFA undermines its “historic rights” is increasingly untenable under contemporary international legal doctrines. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) have consistently affirmed the primacy of equitable and reasonable use over historic allocations, particularly when such allocations were forged without full participation of affected states (McCaffrey, 2007). International pressure on Egypt to align its water governance approach with modern legal standards is growing. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Tibor Nagy, captured this sentiment when he stated: “A country which does not contribute one drop of water… cannot demand 100% of the right to decide how the waters should be used by all. The world has changed.” (Nagy, 2021) This statement reflects a broader geopolitical reality: the global community increasingly supports multilateral, participatory, and science-based water governance mechanisms, as opposed to unilateralism and historically entrenched hegemony.

Egypt also faces growing diplomatic isolation within the Nile Basin. The increasing alignment among upstream states, coupled with their shared commitment to the CFA, diminishes Egypt’s ability to block upstream water development projects through diplomatic pressure or threat of international litigation (Mbaku, 2021).

Legal scholars and water policy analysts alike advocate that Egypt must urgently reform its negotiation posture. Rather than remaining entrenched in outdated treaty interpretations, Egypt’s long-term water security would be better served by constructive engagement within the CFA framework, participation in NRBC operations, and alignment of its domestic water policies with regional sustainability principles (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016).

9. Conclusion: Toward a Shared Nile Future

Egypt’s current stance on Nile water governance—characterized by reliance on historic treaties, pursuit of water-intensive desert mega-projects, and an enduring narrative of water scarcity—stands in fundamental contradiction to evolving international water law and regional cooperation imperatives. As the CFA comes into full operational effect, Egypt finds itself at a strategic and moral crossroads: whether to continue its hydro-hegemonic approach or embrace a new era of basin-wide cooperative governance (International Water Law Project, 2024).

 The legal, technical, and ethical dimensions of Nile governance now converge toward one conclusion: sustainable and equitable water management across the Nile Basin cannot coexist with unilateralism and outdated treaty dominance. Egypt’s policy of sidelining upstream states, rejecting multilateral governance mechanisms, and investing in non-essential luxury developments has not only undermined its negotiating credibility but has also weakened regional trust (Horn Review, 2025; World Bank, 2022).

Egypt’s refusal to ratify the CFA and its continued exclusion from the NRBC has left it isolated at a time when regional cooperation is urgently needed to address shared challenges such as climate variability, drought risk, water quality deterioration, and population-driven demand growth (NBI, 2025). As the GERD enters advanced stages of filling and operation, Egypt’s legal and technical detachment from basin-wide dialogue mechanisms further reduces its influence over operational decisions that directly affect its water security (International Crisis Group, 2020).

To move toward a shared Nile future, Egypt must undertake a fundamental policy recalibration. First and foremost, ratifying the CFA would reintegrate Egypt into the institutional decision-making processes that will shape the Nile Basin’s water future for decades to come. Such a step would allow Egypt to participate constructively within the NRBC, influence basin-wide policies, and regain diplomatic goodwill among upstream states (Yihdego and Rieu-Clarke, 2016).

Second, Egypt must implement a comprehensive reform of its domestic water governance framework. This includes adopting Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles, shifting away from water-intensive agricultural and urban development models, investing in water-saving technologies, and expanding non-conventional water sources such as desalination and wastewater reuse (Allan, 2013; World Bank, 2022).

Third, Egypt should engage in confidence-building measures, including joint data-sharing initiatives, transboundary environmental monitoring, and cooperative drought management planning under the NRBC umbrella. Such steps would help rebuild regional trust and position Egypt as a responsible and forward-looking actor within the Nile Basin (NBI, 2025).

Finally, Egypt must abandon unilateral water development strategies—particularly large-scale desert reclamation projects and inter-basin diversions—that undermine CFA principles and exacerbate downstream water stress. By doing so, Egypt can demonstrate its commitment to sustainability, equity, and long-term regional stability (International Water Law Project, 2024).

As Tibor Nagy’s commentary reminds us: “The world has changed.” The global water governance paradigm has shifted toward inclusivity, legal equity, and basin-wide cooperation. For the Nile Basin to avoid conflict and realize its full socio-economic and environmental potential, Egypt’s alignment with the CFA and regional cooperation frameworks is no longer optional—it is an imperative. A failure to engage will only further marginalize Egypt in future Nile Basin negotiations and infrastructure development planning. Conversely, proactive CFA ratification, NRBC participation, and meaningful water governance reform could secure Egypt’s water future while contributing to broader regional peace and prosperity.

References

    • Allan, J.A. (2013) Virtual Water: Tackling the Threat to Our Planet’s Most Precious Resource, I.B. Tauris.

 • FAO AQUASTAT (2023) Egypt Country Profile, Food and Agriculture Organization.  • Horn Review (2025) Egypt’s Manufactured Water Crisis: A Geopolitical Harassment of Ethiopia, Horn Review.

 • International Crisis Group (2020) Bridging the Gap in the Nile Dam Talks, Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 162.

 • International Water Law Project (2024) The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Enters into Force, International Water Law Blog.

• Mbaku, J.M. (2021) Governance and Economic Development in Africa, Springer.  • Mohammed, Y.A. (2024) ‘A new era for the Nile Basin’, Daily Sabah.

• Muhumuza, R. (2024) ‘Nile basin nations say water-sharing accord has come into force without Egypt’s backing’, AP News.

 • NBI (2025) Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Overview, Nile Basin Initiative.  • Swain, A. (2011) ‘Challenges for Water Sharing in the Nile Basin: Changing Geo-politics and Changing Climate’, Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56(4), pp. 687–702.

 • Tawfik, R. (2020) Egypt and the Nile Basin, Palgrave Macmillan.  • World Bank (2022) Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank Publications.

 • Yihdego, Z. and Rieu-Clarke, A. (2016) ‘An Exploration of Fairness in International Law through the Blue Nile and GERD Negotiations’, Water International, 41(4), pp. 528–549.  • Tibor Nagy (2021) Personal Statement via Twitter, 15 July 2021.