Europe Has Relevant Experience (Series: European Fighting Force Ukraine)

Introduction

This article builds on the first installment in this series, which examines the feasibility and the necessary steps for Europe to establish an independent combat force for Ukraine. The goal of this series is to move beyond theoretical discussions and provide a more concrete roadmap for European military autonomy in a conflict where it has direct strategic stakes.

In this second article, I analyze two historical precedents: the European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), deployed in Bosnia in 1995, and the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), which demonstrate that Europe has successfully led and executed military operations within a NATO framework. However, these are not the only examples; operations such as KFOR in Kosovo further highlight Europe’s ability to deploy and sustain multinational forces.

The challenge today is not a lack of experience but the persistent institutionalized fear of failure and a learned helplessness that continues to paralyze European decision-making. Recognizing these precedents is essential to overcoming self-imposed limitations and moving toward a credible European Fighting Force for Ukraine.

I am fully aware that I do not possess all relevant information and that many uncertainties remain. However, that does not deter me from making an effort to contribute to this discussion and to stimulate a much-needed debate. Time and again, Europe has displayed a lack of urgency, preferring to generate new obstacles rather than solutions.

If Europe is to stand on its own feet, it must not only develop the necessary military structures but also adopt a new way of thinking; one that prioritizes strategic initiative over bureaucratic inertia and political paralysis.

The Rapid Reaction Force: Europe’s ad hoc brigade that proved its military credibility

The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was an ad hoc formed brigade, created in June 1995 by France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands in response to the failure of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. UNPROFOR had proven incapable of enforcing its mandate, particularly in protecting designated safe zones, leading to mounting frustrations among European governments. The RRF was intended to provide the decisive military capability that UNPROFOR lacked and to restore credibility to international efforts in Bosnia.

Unlike previous multinational forces in the conflict, the RRF was established outside the constraints of UNPROFOR, operating under a UN mandate but with direct NATO operational integration. This allowed it to act faster and more decisively, avoiding the bureaucratic paralysis that plagued earlier UN peacekeeping efforts. The force was composed of approximately 4,000 troops, with a strong emphasis on artillery and fire support, including French 155mm howitzers, British 105mm cannons, and Dutch 120mm mortars.

The RRF’s primary mission was to exert direct military pressure on Bosnian Serb forces, particularly around Sarajevo, in order to facilitate progress toward a peace agreement. It was fully integrated into NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force, a coordinated air-ground campaign that combined RRF artillery strikes with precision NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb military positions. This seamless cooperation between European ground forces and NATO air power marked a turning point in the conflict. The intensity and coordination of these attacks forced the Bosnian Serb leadership to reconsider its position, contributing directly to the negotiation of the Dayton Agreement later that year.

The successful formation and deployment of the RRF provided an important lesson in European military cooperation and rapid force generation. It demonstrated that, when political will exists, European nations can assemble, deploy, and operate an effective multinational combat force in a complex environment. More importantly, the RRF showed that European forces could integrate seamlessly into NATO-led operations, disproving concerns about interoperability and command structure conflicts. This model remains highly relevant today as Europe considers the possibility of establishing a European Fighting Force for Ukraine.

The Success of IFOR: Europe’s Role in Implementing Peace

Following the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995, the Implementation Force (IFOR) was established to oversee and enforce the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although a NATO-led operation, IFOR relied heavily on European troops, with forces from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and other European nations making up the majority of the 60,000-strong contingent.

Unlike the RRF, which engaged in combat operations, IFOR’s role was to implement and secure the peace agreement by enforcing a ceasefire, separating warring factions, and ensuring the withdrawal of military forces. Despite operating on a much larger scale than the RRF, IFOR maintained high levels of coordination and effectiveness, illustrating Europe’s capacity to sustain long-term, complex peacekeeping and stabilization missions.

The IFOR mission benefited from a robust mandate and clear rules of engagement (ROE), which granted commanders the necessary authority to take decisive action in maintaining order and responding to violations of the peace agreement. The political and military coordination between NATO, the UN, and the EU provided a framework that ensured clarity in decision-making and operational control.

Implications for a European-led mission in Ukraine

The experiences of RRF and IFOR highlight critical lessons for a potential European fighting force in Ukraine. While the scale and complexity of a mission in Ukraine would differ significantly, certain fundamental principles remain applicable.

Firstly, European military forces have proven their ability to integrate effectively within NATO operations, demonstrating a level of operational cohesion that would be necessary in Ukraine. The success of Operation Deliberate Force and the seamless cooperation between RRF and NATO air forces show that Europe is capable of executing high-intensity military campaigns with well-coordinated joint force elements.

Secondly, the European contribution to IFOR underscores the fact that Europe can lead a large-scale mission. IFOR's ability to enforce the Dayton Agreement through military presence, troop deployment, and strategic coordination serves as a relevant precedent for a potential force responsible for implementing a Ukraine-Russia peace deal.

However, a mission in Ukraine would likely require more direct European leadership with minimal U.S. support. Given shifting geopolitical dynamics and Washington’s evolving foreign policy priorities, Europe must prepare for a scenario in which it assumes greater responsibility for security on its own continent.

Recent NATO exercises in Eastern Europe, designed to test European rapid deployment capabilities without significant U.S. involvement, further highlight the necessity of European military self-sufficiency.

Moreover, the prospect of a European-led force in Ukraine is not only a strategic necessity but also a historic opportunity for Europe to demonstrate its capability as a security provider. For too long, Europe has suffered from institutionalized self-doubt and an ingrained reliance on U.S. military backing. The lessons from RRF and IFOR prove that when the political will exists, European nations can mobilize, integrate, and sustain military operations effectively.

Conclusion: Europe’s Moment of Responsibility

The deployments of RRF and IFOR - and other missions like KFOR - stand as testament to Europe’s capacity to field and coordinate multinational military forces within NATO frameworks. The lessons from these missions offer a crucial foundation for the planning and execution of a European-led security operation in Ukraine. While the strategic environment is different, the fundamental challenge remains the same: Europe must move beyond its entrenched reluctance and demonstrate that it is capable of ensuring security and stability in its own neighborhood.

This moment presents a pivotal opportunity for Europe to step forward as a serious geopolitical actor. The question is not whether Europe can take on this responsibility; it has already proven that it can. The real question is whether Europe is willing to do so.

Ingo Piepers

Global4Cast.org