Fixing the Fixer: Why Unsafe Supervisors Destroy Strong Systems

In every robust safety management system, there lies a paradox that often goes unnoticed. An organization can possess world-class safety protocols, polished procedures, certified systems, and advanced technological tools, yet still be brought to its knees by one persistent and corrosive element, the unsafe supervisor. These individuals, often placed in positions of authority due to tenure or technical skill rather than leadership aptitude, can silently unravel the integrity of even the most sophisticated safety frameworks. This phenomenon is not about bad systems. It is about bad supervision. The presence of a safety management system is not a guarantee of safety outcomes. It is the people who implement, interpret, and enforce these systems who determine whether they succeed or fail. At the heart of this lies the supervisor, the critical link between policy and practice.

Supervisors wield enormous influence. They are the ones who set the tone for safety culture on the ground. While senior management develops strategies and safety professionals design systems, it is the frontline supervisor who either reinforces or undermines the safety message. Research by Zohar (2002) found that employees’ perceptions of their supervisor’s safety behavior were more predictive of safety performance than the company’s overall policies. This means that an organization may promote safety from the top, but if the supervisor is dismissive, careless, or results-driven at the expense of safety, the workforce will follow suit.

Unsafe supervisors typically manifest in one of several forms. Some are enforcers who focus purely on productivity and treat safety as a barrier to output. Others are appeasers who turn a blind eye to violations to maintain popularity or avoid conflict. There are also the ignorants who lack adequate training or understanding of the systems they are supposed to enforce. Each of these types damages the system in a unique way. They create informal rules that contradict formal expectations. They reward unsafe shortcuts through silence or even praise. They breed resentment toward genuine safety efforts and destroy the trust required for open communication.

It is often said that culture eats strategy for breakfast. Nowhere is this truer than in safety leadership. Supervisors who do not model safe behaviors, who do not stop work when they observe risk, or who dismiss worker concerns as overreactions are not just negligent, they are culture killers. They foster climates of fear, silence, and non-compliance. According to Reason (1997), latent conditions in systems, such as poor supervision, create the environment where active failures occur. These are the holes in the organizational Swiss Cheese model, invisible until an accident threads its way through.

The consequences are devastating. Organizations report drops in hazard reporting, increases in near misses, and rising injury rates. Investigations often reveal that warning signs were present and ignored. Workers frequently confess that they did not feel safe reporting issues or that their supervisor discouraged them from doing so. A study by Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) demonstrated that supportive supervision had a direct impact on safety compliance and participation. Without this support, systems collapse.

Moreover, unsafe supervisors create a shadow system. This is the system that workers actually follow a set of unwritten rules based on what will please or displease the supervisor. When supervisors ignore lockout tagout procedures, workers get the message that speed is more important than safety. When supervisors mock those who use personal protective equipment, they send a signal that caution is weakness. When they fail to investigate near misses, they indicate that learning from incidents is not valued. In effect, they replace the official safety system with their own distorted version.

Fixing the fixer requires more than policy revisions. It demands a complete realignment of what is valued in supervisory roles. Organizations must stop promoting people based solely on technical competence and begin assessing emotional intelligence, communication skills, and leadership behavior. Supervisors must be held accountable not just for production metrics, but for safety leadership. They must be trained, coached, and mentored continuously. One-time safety inductions are insufficient. Leadership development must be a living process.

Performance appraisals must include safety leadership indicators. For instance, the number of hazard reports encouraged and resolved, the quality of toolbox talks delivered, and the feedback received from team members on safety responsiveness. Supervisors should be measured not just by the absence of accidents, but by the presence of proactive engagement. According to the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH), supervisor involvement in safety conversations significantly improves workforce engagement and compliance.

Technology can also help illuminate supervision blind spots. Digital audits, anonymous reporting apps, and supervisor performance dashboards can reveal where gaps exist. However, technology must serve as a tool, not a crutch. The real transformation lies in values. Supervisors must understand that they are culture carriers. Their attitude, tone, and daily decisions are forming the next generation of workers' safety habits. This is a sacred responsibility.

In some cases, difficult decisions must be made. Chronic unsafe supervision should not be tolerated. When an individual consistently violates or undermines safety systems, they are not simply failing to perform,

they are endangering lives. The cost of retaining such individuals, even if they are productive, far outweighs their value. Organizations must demonstrate that safety is non-negotiable, even when it requires restructuring teams or replacing popular but toxic leaders.

Case studies offer compelling evidence. In the Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010, one of the root causes was a failure in leadership communication and the inability of supervisors to challenge unsafe decisions (National Commission, 2011). On the other hand, organizations such as DuPont have shown how embedding safety leadership at all levels, especially among supervisors, can lead to sustained performance and a deeply embedded safety culture (Geller, 2001).

Fixing the fixer is about restoring integrity to the point of execution. It is about ensuring that supervisors embody the values that the organization claims to uphold. It is about aligning practice with principle. The strongest systems in the world are still vulnerable to the weakest links in leadership. True safety is not built in the boardroom. It is built on the shop floor, in the trenches, in the everyday decisions made by those with boots on the ground and influence in their voice.

In conclusion, unsafe supervisors do not just destroy systems. They destroy morale, trust, and the psychological safety necessary for people to thrive. Fixing them is not optional. It is critical. A great safety system without great supervisors is like a ship with no rudder. It might be built to withstand storms, but it will never sail in the right direction. Organizations must therefore invest in building a new generation of supervisors who do not just enforce safety rules, but who inspire safety values, who live what they lead, and who turn strong systems into strong realities.

Reference

Geller, E. S. (2001) The Psychology of Safety Handbook. Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Hofmann, D. A. and Morgeson, F. P. (1999) ‘Safety-related behavior as a social exchange: The role of perceived organizational support and leader-member exchange’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(2), pp. 286–296.

Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH) (2018) Supervising for Safety: Practical Tools for Line Managers. Leicester: IOSH.

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011) Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Reason, J. (1997) Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Farnham: Ashgate.

Zohar, D. (2002) ‘Modifying supervisory practices to improve subunit safety: A leadership-based intervention model’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(1), pp. 156–163.