From Reflection to Reform: Fire Engineers Must Do Better, and We Will!

Over the weekend, many of us in the fire sector will have watched, or struggled to watch, the Netflix: Grenfell Uncovered documentary released on Friday 20th June 2025.

It was powerful, it was painful. It should be.

It reminds us that seventy-two people lost their lives in one of the most devastating and avoidable tragedies in modern Britain. It resurfaces deep grief for the families, survivors, and community who continue to live with that loss every day. It casts a long, hard light on the systems, decisions, and culture that allowed such a failure to happen. We must not look away. As fire engineers, we cannot look away.

At BB7 we watched the inquiry unfold not as distant observers, but with growing resolve. We did not work on Grenfell, but we are part of the fire safety profession and property / construction sector that is being scrutinised and rightly so. Our role, our judgement, and our voice must count for something more than compliance. It must be rooted in service, in moral courage, and in protection of life. What happened at Grenfell changed everything. It must change us.

That is why we have not waited to be told what to do next. We are choosing to lead. To reflect honestly. To reform deeply. And to work with others who share that urgency. Fire engineering is evolving. As a profession it must evolve, not incrementally, but radically, so that something like Grenfell never happens again. This is not merely a professional commitment. It is a human one.

The Grenfell Tower tragedy was a watershed moment. It revealed systemic failures in the construction industry and the way in which we control building work.  Multi-fatality fires consistently show that a number of failings often result in a tragedy greater than the sum of the parts.  This was sadly the case here and as was highlighted in the documentary, but it is evident that the primary issue was that the building envelope, i.e. cladding, contributed to rapid extensive fire spread.

Legislation and Guidance

The functional requirement required designers to restrict fire spread over the building with respect to height, use and position.  That works, but it was the ‘how’ in the form of the Approved Document that was not well understood or observed.  At the time there was a widespread view that the document titled ‘Approved’, written by the Secretary of State was considered to satisfy the functional requirements.  One could see why this was a common assumption.

The national guidance contained in Approved Document B, issued by Government for the purpose of providing practical guidance with respect to the requirements of Part B Fire Safety of the Building Regulations, stated that, unless the performance criteria given in BR135 was achieved, in a building with a storey 18m or more above ground level any insulation product or filler material (with limited exclusions) used in the external wall construction should be of limited combustibility.

Classification to the performance criteria in BR135 required full scale test data from BS8414 tests, although there were flaws in the process. Further confusion was added by the alternative routes to compliance and guidance contained in BCA Technical Guidance Note 18, published by an Approving Authority, which was widely followed then subsequently withdrawn.  The surface spread of flame recommendations in AD(B) for external walls have also subsequently been considered not fit for purpose. High performing insulation materials have become increasingly popular in external wall constructions and improvement schemes for existing external walls, as was the case with Grenfell Tower.  These high performing insulants, such as polyethylene (PE) or polyisocyanurate (PIR) typically have a high heat of combustion, which was significantly in excess of the value associated historically with a material of limited combustibility. 

Whilst a full scale test to BS8414 and classification to BR135 would have been required for an external wall system incorporating such materials, there was a misunderstanding in industry that these materials were suitable for use on tall buildings without mitigation or control which was a key factor in the cladding crisis.

Subsequent analysis of the applicability of BS8414 testing further eroded confidence in this as a means of demonstrating compliance with Requirement B4(1) resulting in its removal as a means of demonstrating compliance for relevant buildings post 2018.

In my personal view, Section B4 has often been interpreted in an overly simplistic manner. The prevailing assumption seemed to be that fires rarely originate on the exterior of buildings due to limited ignition sources. Additionally, there was a belief that fire services could effectively tackle external wall fires below 18m from fire appliances, which led to materials of limited combustibility in external walls only being required on buildings above that height.  Had the design and construction of Grenfell Tower followed the national guidance in place at the time, specifically by using materials of limited combustibility in the external walls, the tragedy would likely have been prevented, as the key pathway for rapid fire spread would not have existed. 

Based on experience in the UK, even in cases of poor compartmentation, the anticipated internal spread of fire would typically be confined to the flat where the fire originated.  Fire engineers needed to dial up our competency when it comes to external walls and the implications of calorific values. We understood that, in accordance with established guidance for buildings exceeding 18 meters in height, only materials of limited combustibility or non-combustible classification were deemed appropriate for use in external wall systems, unless the wall system had been tested to BS8414 and classified to BR135. It should have been more widely understood that the built construction must fully reflect the tested system. Sadly, Fire Engineers were not usually appointed through detailed design or construction to assess proposed variations and even today, some do not want to pay for fire strategy implementation.

Fire strategy implementation: fire assurance through construction.

Fire engineers gained their place in the industry by solving problems of design feasibility and spatial coordination and were typically appointed during the early RIBA stages - generally from Stage 2 through to Stage 4 – either to solve a particular design problem or, optimistically, to develop the fire strategy in advance of construction and occupation.  We would have had very limited input regarding suitability or compatibility of products, materials or systems. The average duration of our engagement to deliver this scope would have been between 12 and 18 months. The appointment did not ordinarily extend to overseeing the implementation of the fire strategy during construction. In retrospect, it is concerning that responsibility for implementing the fire strategy was left primarily to the contractor, checked only sporadically by Building Control, while the professionals who authored the strategy were not involved on site during construction, at occupation or completion.

In the early days an Architect would draft a fire strategy, from 1984 onwards into the early 90’s the appointment of a Fire Engineer was often an afterthought.  I remember my soap box issue was educating clients to engage with us earlier in the process and not last minute when all the design decisions had been made and occasionally discussions with Approving Authorities been had without us.  Now that has all changed with earlier and more integrated involvement of fire engineering professionals now becoming standard.

These days we are appointed by the developer at the same time as an Architect and we have a seat at the table.  Our appointments now can run 5+ years on larger schemes and our profession has been rapidly dialing up our construction technology and building pathology knowledge since 2016.  More recently, fire engineers can spend substantial parts of their working day checking detailed technical design for compliance with their fire strategy, including review of test details and extended field of application reports. Fire Engineering has changed. The fire engineer’s role has expanded to include a mix of skills between facades, construction technology, building surveying, building pathology, forensic investigator and architectural technologist. It's now evolved into a multidisciplinary specialism. That sounds like an oxymoron but is not. Fire Engineering is now a specialised field of practice that draws on expertise from multiple disciplines requiring a broader range of competencies than ever before. Many leading firms have already moved quickly to embrace this through graduate development programmes, CPD and in career structures.

Fire Engineering has changed, but more change is needed.

The failures of the construction sector and broader fire safety industry have been highlighted extensively in the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, academic analysis, and industry reflection. These failures are not isolated to individual practitioners but point to systemic issues in professional conduct, industry culture, and regulatory oversight within the fire sector and construction industry.

The fire sector is fragmented comprising of the trade i.e. manufacturers, installers and maintenance companies, and the professions i.e. Fire Engineers, Fire Risk Assessors and related professions i.e. Building Control, Architects, Project Managers, Quantity Surveyors etc.  This siloed approach to fire strategy implementation has failed. It needs a much more collaborative and integrated approach from concept through detailed design and completion. The fire engineer plays a key role in this:  as the glue to help co-ordinate and oversee implementation of the fire strategy they have designed.  The recent Tri-Fire scandal was closer to home for consulting Fire Engineers.  The firm did not have the pedigree or reputation comparable to many of the mid-market or leading firms but it’s founder was a member of our professional institution and whilst not Chartered, the owner was registered with the Engineering Council Division, first suspended and then expelled from the Institution. A lack of distinction between the good, bad and ugly in the fire sector has led to blanket distrust, and that impacts the good and the great too. We need a means of differentiation.

We cannot change the past, but we can and must, change the future.

We have taken time to reflect deeply.  We recognise that as fire engineers, as consultants, and as part of a wider built environment ecosystem, we have not always lived up to the responsibility society places in our hands: to serve and protect human life, property, mission continuity and the environment.

While we did not work on Grenfell, it would be dishonest to pretend we have nothing to learn from it. The failures it exposed from unclear accountability, inconsistent competence, a loss of moral courage in the face of commercial pressure are not isolated.  We are associated with broader industry failings, whether we directly contributed or not. They are systemic and they implicate us all.

We understand our first and foremost duty beyond all others is to the public good.  We understand that when there is a leadership deficit we must show leadership and step up. Yes, fire engineers are tarnished by association with wider fire sector and construction industry failures. But, to win back trust, we must go beyond distancing ourselves, we must lead the transformation.  We must own past failures, learn from them and lead change.  Not reluctantly, but with urgency and purpose.

The drive for improved competence and higher standards.

A Fire Engineers Advisory Panel was established in April 2025 to provide advice to government on the fire engineering profession.  The panel will consider what should be expected of a competent fire engineer, and in addition, support and advise on the implementation of other Grenfell Inquiry recommendations in respect of fire engineers. 

To support and contribute to this panel, we will bring a cohort of Fire Engineering practices together, to discuss how competence is developing in the built environment and what expectations there might be going forward, and how we might deal with some of the new/future expectations on the profession. We have an appetite for change, for the better.  This coalition of the willing will consider exactly how the public differentiate the great from the good, bad and ugly in the fire sector. 

The fire engineering profession stands at a crossroads. We can either retreat into defensiveness, drawing lines around what wasn’t “our responsibility,” or we can step forward with humility and resolve to shape what is our responsibility, now and into the future. We must choose the latter.

We believe that trust must be earned through action, not words. Through transparency, not obfuscation. Through leadership, not silence. The journey from reflection to reform requires courage: to acknowledge the systemic failures of the past, to reimagine how we practice our craft, share our expertise, and to place public safety above all else always.

We are ready to listen, to learn, and to lead. We are here to serve and protect. And we call on our peers to join us, not just in rebuilding trust, but in becoming the kind of profession the public deserves to trust. This is not about reputational recovery it’s not time for protectionism either. It is about moral responsibility and it’s about time we lean in and push even harder towards a safer future.

Ben Bradford

Founder and Chief Executive Officer for and on behalf of BB7

Seven Important Questions

1. Observing BS EN ISO/IEC 17065:2012 Conformity assessment. Requirements for bodies certifying products, processes and services. What are the core competencies and capabilities a Registered Fire Engineering Company must demonstrate?

2. Observing ISO/IEC 17024:2012 Conformity assessment — General requirements for bodies operating certification of persons. How do we assess organisational competence in a way that is proportionate, fair, and scalable?

3. Thinking about BS EN ISO 9001:2015 Quality Management Systems — Requirements What other standards (technical, ethical, QA) should such companies be held to, and how should compliance be monitored?

4. How do we distinguish between design-led, advisory, and inspection-focused fire engineering and fire surveying roles or indeed niches like fire modelling or structural fire engineering?

5. How can we ensure consistency in quality across a diverse range of companies, from micro consultancies to major firms?

6. What mechanisms are needed to ensure the registers remain relevant, updated, and respected over time?

7. Thinking about Registered Fire Engineering Companies (RFEC), Registered Fire Engineers and Registered Fire Surveyors. How do we build public, industry, and regulatory trust in these roles and titles?