Are Haiti’s Problems Unsolvable? Observations from a Solomon Islands Experience Suggest There Might be Hope & Brutal Catalyst eBook $0.99 until 11/7

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Photo caption: World War II LVT on Guadalcanal island overgrown by vegetation (photograph by author, November 2005)

And now to another one-off post. We'll get to number twelve in our Ukrainian cities series on Tuesday this week.

Having recently (and, admittedly, belatedly) come across Jon Lee Anderson’s “Haiti Held Hostage” (The New Yorker, July 24, 2023), the reading brought to mind the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) undertaking initiated in 2003. There are significant differences in scale between the two contingencies, not least of which is the Solomon Islands’ population numbering approximately 727,000 while Haiti’s is some 11.75 million. Far more telling: the countries are virtually identical in geographic land size (Haiti: 27,560 sq km, Solomon Islands: 27,986 sq km, both slightly smaller than the US state of Maryland).[1] Haiti’s population density is therefore sixteen times that of Solomon Islands, a relative closeness the effects of which are surely felt given that the Solomons Islands population is spread across 147 of the nation’s 992 islands while that of Haiti is primarily concentrated on its “mainland,” the western third of Hispaniola.[2] Yet the number of similarities with what RAMSI confronted is so great as to suggest the Australian-led southern Pacific endeavor might offer lessons to anyone contemplating taking on the seemingly intractable challenges posed by Haitian instability and chronically failed governments. Those similarities include both Haiti and Solomon Islands suffering (or having suffered) acute police and political corruption, ubiquitous gang criminality, those groups’ penetration of government political systems, a related loss of the official government’s control, and these governments eventually requesting international assistance. The commonalities do not end there. A legacy of failed foreign involvement during previous periods of unrest exacerbates the task for any seeking to lend Haiti assistance just as was the case in Solomon Islands prior to RAMSI’s arrival. Anderson concludes that Haiti’s “army is effectively nonexistent.” Solomon Islands has no army, relying on its police force for both internal and external security. Anderson further notes, “what spending the government can afford often goes to patronage,” a condition similar to the wontok system in which Solomon Island leaders distribute benefits in support of traditional expectations that a leader shares wealth with those less well-to-do. It is a form of support that obviously can also serve as a form of political suasion or coercion.

RAMSI achieved considerable success in addressing gang control via a well-designed campaign involving participation by ten regional nations. Participation totaled only some two thousand personnel at its peak, 90 percent of whom were military with the remainder being police, diplomatic, logistic, or other functional area experts. The military contingent was not in charge despite its providing the preponderance of personnel. That was left to Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade special coordinator Nick Warner with the Australian Federal Police’s Ben McDevitt and Australian Army’s Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen’s multinational forces serving in supporting roles at every echelon. RAMSI member countries included several that shared cultural norms with the host nation. This mitigated accusations of colonial reassertion while at the same time providing a depth of social insight invaluable when interacting with members of the local population. Wisely, responsibility for patrolling areas in Solomon Islands was not assigned to separate national military contingents. Instead, soldiers from various nations worked together throughout the islands, thereby capitalizing on the combined multinational capabilities of RAMSI’s force.

What might lessons from Solomon Islands those two decades ago offer Haitian leaders and others seeking to render assistance? RAMSI intimates that an alternative to military primacy both internally and in terms of outside support merits consideration. Previous US efforts in Haiti suffer their being historically tainted by transient success or outright failure (as do those of the UN for that matter, as made clear by Anderson). An externally-led initiative could perhaps succeed given inspired leadership and an appropriately restrained but sufficiently liberal approach to the application of force. [Force may well be necessary given the potential for one or more gang’s (or other party’s) intransigence. Fortunately, while RAMSI unquestionably dealt with the threat of violence, its perpetration was extremely limited.]. A vital component of RAMSI’s success was the mandated disarming of gang members and the population at large. Certainly no less important was participating nations’ long-term commitment to Solomon Islands security and the welfare of its population, a commitment lasting fourteen years (albeit not at the undertaking’s original manning levels).

Viewing an earlier draft of this short article, a respected colleague questioned whether Haiti was already a lost cause. History and the country’s current turmoil make his a valid concern. The aforementioned extraordinary leadership and commitment will be essential for even initial progress. Mine is not the place to suggest the composition of any coalition that might assume responsibility for what would undoubtedly be one of the 21st-century’s most onerous missions. Desirable characteristics are immediately evident in viewing the RAMSI experience, however. French and Haitian Creole being the country’s official languages complicates the situation somewhat given both are less common regional tongues. Yet there are other Caribbean nations with populations familiar with these languages, populations that also include citizens sharing Haitian cultural norms to a greater or lesser extent. So too do a considerable number of individuals in other nations, the United States, Canada, and France among them.

The above-noted dramatic differences in population size and density combined with the current exceptional levels of violence suggest any undertaking to restore a semblance of peace will require much larger manpower and other resource commitments than proved successful in the southern Pacific. Winning Solomon Islands’ citizens’ popular support was a key—was arguably the key—ingredient in RAMSI’s success. Those citizens’ support, in turn, was fundamental to disarmament via often willing participation and pressures applied to hesitant gang members.

Regardless of such a campaign’s national leadership and broader composition, reaching out to Australia and other RAMSI participants holds potential for drawing further on its lessons both positive and otherwise. That the US should take a substantial supporting role in terms of funding and logistical support in Haiti seems a given. And there is another vital element those leading any such courageous enterprise would be wise to keep in mind given RAMSI’s experiences: Neutralizing gangs is just an initial step. Government corruption plagued Solomon Islands citizens prior to its gang struggles. Backsliding demonstrates that ridding the country of gangs’ worst trepidations proved the easier challenge to overcome. Denying resurgence of political corruption, establishing a foundation for effective government, and then maintaining it has proved more elusive. It is a potential similarity between the two countries best avoided.

For those who might be interested, my more detailed analysis of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’ earlier years can be found free of charge at https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG551.html

[1] Statistics on Haiti and Solomon Islands are from the US Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook pages: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/haiti/ and https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/solomon-islands/.

[2] From “About Solomon Islands,” Solomon Islands Government, (2024), https://solomons.gov.sb/about-solomon-islands/#:~:text=Centred%20at%20longitude%20160%20degrees,of%20which%20147%20are%20inhabited.