Hard Power Moves: US Action, Regional Fallout, and the Global Response

This update cuts through the noise on recent US strikes in Iran, minerals diplomacy in Africa, tensions in the Asia-Pacific, and NATO’s shifting posture. For senior executives, the message is clear: geopolitical risk isn’t background noise - it’s a boardroom issue. At Strategia, we help leadership teams turn this complexity into strategic clarity.

1. Implications of US Strikes Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Although accounts differ widely on the extent to which the US GBU-57 and TLAM cruise missile strikes on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan degraded Iranian nuclear facilities, President Trump’s initiative has highlighted Russia’s and China’s extremely limited ability to influence developments in the region. Russia’s access to its Syrian bases has been heavily curtailed since the fall of Bashar al-Assad and many military assets have been transferred elsewhere in northern Africa. China’s immediate concern will be the risk to its supply of Iranian oil - both from damaged facilities and potential disruption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian oil comprised nearly 14% of China’s total oil imports in 2024 (some 1.5 m barrels per day). Xi may also be reconsidering Trump’s potential response to any Taiwan adventurism.

2. From Resources to Restraint: US-Brokered Deal in Central Africa

The 27 June signature by the DRC and Rwandan Foreign Ministers of a US/Qatari-mediated “Critical Minerals for Security and Peace” agreement should bring a short-term reduction in violence in eastern DRC. The agreement commits both nations to cease hostilities, withdraw troops, and to end support for armed groups operating in eastern DRC within 90 days. The deal also includes a critical minerals partnership with the United States, granting it privileged access to the region’s vast cobalt, lithium, tantalum, and coltan reserves. It enables US companies to invest in Congolese mining and processing with transparent production and export governance under a joint arrangement with Rwanda. However, the deal lacks enforcement and oversight measures. There are significant challenges ahead. M23 was not party to the agreement, and has rejected its terms. And neither Congolese President Tshisekedi nor Rwandan President Kagame were present at the signing ceremony - the two leaders will reportedly meet later with Trump. Qatar has pledged to continue diplomatic efforts in the region, including with M23 and other insurgent groups.

3. Asia-Pacific: Tensions Simmer Across Strategic Flashpoints

• Taiwan: Recall petitions in the Legislative Yuan (LY) continue to heavily favour the ruling DPP who need to flip 6 seats to restore a controlling majority. Recall votes will be held between 10 July and 14 August – significant electoral hurdles remain for the DPP. A DPP-controlled LY would reverse KMT-inspired budget cuts targeting key government departments, including defence expenditure, and restore functionality to the Constitutional Court. A Japanese and a British warship transited the Taiwan Strait in FONOPS on, respectively, 12 and 18 June. In response the PLA sent 74 warplanes over the Strait median line on 19/20 June.
• Japan: In early- to mid-June PLA-N fighter aircraft launched from the aircraft carrier Shandong manoeuvred dangerously close to a Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force aircraft monitoring the Carrier Strike Group’s activity near Japan’s Okinotori Island in the Western Pacific. The PLA-N aircraft carrier Liaoning was also deployed with its CSG in the area during the period, but not involved in the incident. The two CSGs have since returned to their home ports.
• Philippines: Following the joint US-Philippines Balikatan exercise, which saw the first use of the US’s Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and Marine Air Defence Integrated System (MADIS), the Philippines are planning to deploy an army unit to support existing navy and coast guard presence in the Spratly Island group. The Philippines also plan to acquire the Typhoon (or similar) land-based medium-range missile system from the US. The Chinese response has been predictably hostile.
• Thailand: As backdrop to ongoing border tensions between the two countries, public Thai reaction to a leaked telephone conversation between Thai PM Shinawatra and former Cambodian leader Hun Sen in which Shinawatra was disparaging about Thai Armed Forces and deferential to Hun Sen has led to her suspension by the Thai Constitutional Court, the collapse of her coalition and her personal approval rating dropping to single figures. Nationalist sentiment is running high in both countries.

4. Middle East: Fragile Ceasefires, Shifting Alliances

• Israel: Jewish settler violence against the IDF in the West Bank in late June has further exacerbated tensions within Netanyahu’s Cabinet. Defence Minister Katz has re-instated a joint Police/IDF/Shin Bet task force to coordinate enforcement measures against violent settlers. Netanyahu will meet Trump on 7 July, expected to discuss Iran, Gaza, Syria and other regional issues. Although Trump has posted on Truth Social a claim that Israel have accepted the terms of a 60 day ceasefire in Gaza, it remains to be seen whether Hamas will do so. And bear in mind that Israel broke the last ceasefire, claiming Hamas violations in justification.
• Syria: Trump has signed an Executive Order lifting sanctions on the current Syrian regime, offering relief to “entities critical to Syria’s development, the operation of its government, and the rebuilding of the country’s social fabric” according to the US Department of Treasury. Sanctions remain on Bashar al-Assad, his associates, human rights abusers, drug traffickers, people linked to chemical weapons activities, the Islamic State and ISIS affiliates and proxies for Iran.

5. NATO: A Tense Unity Masking Deeper Divides

The communique following the June NATO summit, at just five short paragraphs, told us as much about Trump’s limited attention span as it did about NATO’s desperate attempts to ‘keep the Americans in’ and avoid Trump wrecking NATO’s annual set piece event. It repeated NATO’s ‘iron clad commitment to collective defence’ and announced members’ agreement to increase defence spending to 5%.

So, on the face of it, all might appear well. NATO Secretary General Rutte and European leaders are breathing a sigh of relief and congratulating each other on a historic summit. But is it? The muted recognition of the threat posed by Russia and need to support Ukraine is significantly dialled down from the message in preceding summits and the question of Ukraine’s membership of NATO was also avoided. As for the 5% of GDP on defence for all nations, the small print specifies 3.5% on defence spending and 1.5% on ‘defence and security related spending’ in ten years - by 2035, despite Rutte stating that Russia could attack NATO in 5-7 years. To add perspective, NATO’s summit in Wales in 2014 agreed 2% of GDP which a number of allies have yet to reach. So, stand by for more foot dragging from allies. Indeed, it has already started with Spain claiming an ‘opt out’.

Finally, opinion is divided on Rutte’s obsequious approach to dealing with Trump. Whatever you think, look at it from Putin’s perspective. Does this show weakness or strength? Meanwhile, Putin’s targeting of Ukrainian civilians goes on.