On Hegel's 'Philosophy of Mind': the self-knowing, actual Idea - part twenty five.

'Ode to my socks'

by Pablo Neruda (1904 – 1973)

Maru Mori brought me

a pair

of socks

which she knitted herself

with her sheepherder’s hands,

two socks as soft

as rabbits.

I slipped my feet

into them

as though into

two

cases

knitted

with threads of

twilight

and goatskin.

Violent socks,

my feet were

two fish made

of wool,

two long sharks

sea-blue, shot

through

by one golden thread,

two immense blackbirds,

two cannons:

my feet

were honored

in this way

by

these

heavenly

socks.

They were

so handsome

for the first time

my feet seemed to me

unacceptable

like two decrepit

firemen, firemen

unworthy

of that woven

fire,

of those glowing

socks.

Nevertheless

I resisted

the sharp temptation

to save them somewhere

as schoolboys

keep

fireflies,

as learned men

collect

sacred texts,

I resisted

the mad impulse

to put them

into a golden

cage

and each day give them

birdseed

and pieces of pink melon.

Like explorers

in the jungle who hand

over the very rare

green deer

to the spit

and eat it

with remorse,

I stretched out

my feet

and pulled on

the magnificent

socks

and then my shoes.

The moral

of my ode is this:

beauty is twice

beauty

and what is good is doubly

good

when it is a matter of two socks

made of wool

in winter.

'Oda a los calcetines'

Me trajo Mara Mori

un par de calcetines,

que tejió con sus manos de pastora,

dos calcetines suaves como liebres.

En ellos metí los pies

como en dos estuches

tejidos con hebras del

crepúsculo y pellejos de ovejas.

Violentos calcetines,

mis pies fueron dos pescados de lana,

dos largos tiburones

de azul ultramarino

atravesados por una trenza de oro,

dos gigantescos mirlos,

dos cañones;

mis pies fueron honrados de este modo

por estos celestiales calcetines.

Eran tan hermosos que por primera vez

mis pies me parecieron inaceptables,

como dos decrépitos bomberos,

bomberos indignos de aquel fuego bordado,

de aquellos luminosos calcetines.

Sin embargo, resistí la tentación

aguda de guardarlos como los colegiales

preservan las luciénagas,

como los eruditos coleccionan

documentos sagrados,

resistí el impulso furioso de ponerlas

en una jaula de oro y darles cada

día alpiste y pulpa de melón rosado.

Como descubridores que en la selva

entregan el rarísimo venado verde

al asador y se lo comen con remordimiento,

estiré los pies y me enfundé

los bellos calcetines, y luego los zapatos.

Y es esta la moral de mi Oda:

Dos veces es belleza la belleza,

y lo que es bueno es doblemente bueno,

cuando se trata de dos calcetines

de lana en el invierno.

___________________________________

'A mended sock is better than a torn one, not so with self-consciousness'.

- Hegel, 'Aphorisms from the Wastebook'.

___________________________________

'The Knitter', 1873, William Bouguereau,

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831). Philosophy of Mind. Subjective Mind.

C. Psychology, The Mind. Theoretical and practical mind.

§443

As consciousness has as its object the preceding stage, the natural soul (§413), s o mind has consciousness as its object or rather makes i t its object; i.e. whereas consciousness is only in itself the identity of the I with its other (§415), the mind posits this identity for itself, so that mind is now aware of it, of this concrete unity. Its productions conform to the determination of reason, that the content be both the content that is in itself, and the mind's own content, in accordance with freedom. Thus, when in its initial stage the mind is determined, this determinacy is twofold, a determinacy of what is and a determinacy of what is its own; by the former, the mind finds within itself something that is, by the latter it posits it only as its own. 1 The way of mind is therefore

{a) to be theoretical, dealing with the rational as its immediate determinacy and now positing it as its own; or to liberate knowledge from presupposition and therefore from its abstractness, and to make the determinacy subjective. When knowledge is thus posited as determined in and for itself within itself, and the determinacy posited as its own determinacy, and thereby knowledge as free intelligence, it is

(b) will, practical mind, which is initially likewise formal, has a content as only its own content, immediately wills it and now liberates the determination of its will from its subjectivity, from the one-sided form of its content, so that it

(c) becomes objective to itself as free mind, in which this double one-sidedness is sublated.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

The natural soul is a simple unity drawing no distinction between subject and object yet merely aware of its sensations, and the natural soul splits into two, into a conscious subject and its object, and the object is constructed from the sensations of the natural soul. In itself the conscious I is identical with its object and yet consciousness is unaware of this identity. The mind develops by successive reflections on itself, by taking its preceding stage as its current object, hence mind does not as may be assumed have the same object as consciousness, and yet takes as its object consciousness as a whole, the conscious I together with its object. This is because the mind is reflective in a way that consciousness is not, consciousness focuses only upon its object. Mind reflects upon its own state or determinacy as well, and on the relationship of its determinacy to the determinacy of the object. Unlike consciousness the mind is now convinced that the I is identical with its object and hence it endeavours to show this identity by bringing together these two determinacies and in this way mind restores, upon a higher level, the unity of natural soul disrupted by consciousness. Hegel plays upon the similarity between des Seienden, of what is, and des Seinigen, of what is its own.

The first way in which the mind brings the two determinacies together is theoretical rather than ‘practical’. Its procedure here is that described in §440. Confronted initially by an external object of sensation or intuition, it transforms this into a representation, and eventually into a thought. The representation, and still more the thought, is its own (das Seinige) in a way that the intuition is not. Knowledge (Wissen) is thus liberated from presupposition, no longer reliant to the same degree on external input, and thus determined in and for itself within itself, developing autonomously: consult §442 on determinedness in and for itself , and §441, on presupposition. The presupposition in §441 is reason itself, whereas here it is an immediate determinacy. But the two presuppositions are connected in that it is ‘he rational that assumes the form of the immediate determinacy.

A difficulty for this interpretation is that ‘its (own)’ plays different roles in §§440 and 443. In §440, sensations and intuitions are ‘its’, i.e. the mind’s, while representations and thoughts are not. In §443, representations and thoughts are ‘its own’, while sensations and intuitions, or their objects, are not. But there is no real conflict here. The sensation or intuition is ‘its’, the mind’s, but it belongs to this particular mind, not to any and every mind. In another sense, the intuition and the intuited object are not the mind’s, not even this particular mind’s: they are not produced by the mind but come from outside. In this sense representations and thoughts do belong to the mind: they are produced by the mind. In another sense they are not the mind’s: they do not belong to any particular mind, but to any and every mind of the appropriate sort. They are thus objective in a way that sensations and intuitions are not.

Will or practical mind proceeds in the reverse direction as it begins not from an external content or determinacy but from its own content. I want for instance to construct a sand castle and the sand castle does not yet exist and the construction has not yet startede. The content is only my own, then I construct the sand castle, and become ‘objective’ (gegenständlich) to myself as free mind, revelling in my own product. From a schematic point of view, theoretical and practical mind are related thus: Theoretical mind starts with an external object or state, a one-sidedness. and then sublates it, so that it becomes only a state of the mind itself, another one-sidedness. Practical mind starts with this one-sided state of the mind and it actualizes this state in the external world, for instance constructs a sand castle, and sublates the double one-sidedness and there is now an actual sand castle conforming to the mind’s will. In this account practical mind resolves a problem left by theoretical mind, its one-sidedness albeit Hegel does not always give preferential treatment to practical mind in this manner. The highest phase of mind, philosophy, is theoretical rather than practical. Theoretical mind is often regarded not (as appears to be the case here) as a retreat into oneself that leaves the external world unredeemed, but as a way of structuring the world so that it conforms to the mind, being governed by laws, and so on: consult §398. Practical mind also structures the world in conformity with mind, only in a different way, by constructing sand castles, setting up governments, and so on. How do these two ways of spiritualizing the world relate to each other? Why do we require both? If theoretical mind has already spiritualized the world, what need is there for practical mind to set about the same task? Such issues lead Hegel to characterise theoretical mind as one-sided and to subordinate it to practical mind. But Hegel we can be sure would concur that in reality the relation between them is much more intricate than this passage implies. It is, for instance, not so readily believable that the ‘content’ that the mind wills is the abstract thoughts with which the present account of theoretical mind is brought to a conclusion. It is not such a necessary requirement for the account of theoretical mind to precede that of practical mind for in life the ride in tandem but in the philosophy of Mind one of them must come first, and then in accordance with Hegel’s general way of proceeding the mind that comes second has to be on top so to speak, sorting out problems that its predecessor left.

'Breton Knitter', 1871, William Bouguereau,

'Zusatz. Whereas one cannot very well say of consciousness that it has an urge, since it has the object immediately, mind, by contrast, must be conceived as urge because it is essentially activity, and is in fact initially:

{a) the activity by which the seemingly alien object acquires- instead of the shape of something given, individualized and contingent-the form of something recollected, subjective, universal, necessary, and rational. By undertaking this alteration of the object, mind reacts against the one-sidedness of consciousness which relates to objects as immediate beings and does not know them as subjective. As such it is theoretical mind. In theoretical mind the urge to know is dominant, the craving for information. Of the content of this information I know that it is, has objectivity, and at the same time that it is in me and thus subjective. Here, therefore, the object no longer has, as at the standpoint of consciousness, the determination of a negative towards the I.

(b) Practical mind sets out from the opposite end. Unlike theoretical mind, it does not start from the seemingly independent object, but from its own aims and interests, thus from subjective determinations, and first proceeds to make these into something objective. In doing this it reacts against the one-sided subjectivity of self-consciousness enclosed within itself, just as theoretical mind reacts against consciousness that is dependent on a given object'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

On ‘urge’ or drive (Trieb), consult §§425, 426. Consciousness lacks urge, it merely accepts whatever objects present themselves. The objects change yet consciousness is unaware of its own part in this while mind knowingly makes immediate objects ‘subjective’ since they now involve a larger contribution from the mind itself while retaining, even enhancing, their ‘objectivity' since they no longer reflect only the mind’s chance encounters with external things and since the mind now discerns the essence of things rather than their superficial exterior. ‘Recollected’ translates Erinnerten, the perfect participle of erinnern, which Hegel interprets as ‘internalized’: consult §401. ‘Information’ translates the plural of Kenntnis (‘cognizance’), Kenntnisse, which implies detailed knowledge (that is to say pieces, items of knowledge) of first any specified matter, whether of ordinary matters or in a branch of learning, and second unspecified general knowledge. Two contentions are forwarded regarding the mind, it actively seeks detailed knowledge about for instance the motions of planets, and it transforms these objects by discovering the laws and forces that govern their behaviour. In both respects the object is no longer ‘negative’ towards the I, it is actively sought rather than just encountered and it becomes thought-laden rather than alien.

Theoretical mind puts rights object-oriented consciousness while practical mind puts right subject-oriented self-consciousness, a point that did not emerge clearly in the passage. In the account of theoretical mind, ‘subjective’ meant (roughly) ‘thought-laden’. Subjectivity in this sense does not exclude objectivity; the two go together. If one opposite, e.g. subjectivity, is pushed to its extreme, it veers over into the other opposite, e.g. objectivity. In this account of practical mind, ‘subjective’ means (roughly) ‘only in the mind’, also with the suggestion of ‘belonging to a particular individual’. What is subjective in this sense cannot be at the same time objective, though it can be made objective.

Practical mind starts out from its own determinations, for instance the wish for a plum duff. Theoretical mind does not start out from its own determinations and yet it does deal with them eventually and imposes them on or discerns them in external objects in something akin to the way that practical mind realizes its plans in the world. But thoughts are implicit in all humans as well as the objective world, not ‘something pertaining to the particular subject’, while my wish for an plum duff is idiosyncratic. And yet the ‘aims of the rational will’ are not idiosyncratic, and yet are, like thoughts, something ‘in and for itself ’, something justified independently of the wishes of any particular individual, such as payment of fines, a law against stealing, or a government of a particular persuasion. When such an aim is realized the product is a ‘unity of the subjective and objective’, an objective entity conforming to the ‘rational will’: consult §435. So also is the product of theoretical mind, for instance planets conforming to the laws imposed upon them by the mind. Hence theoretical and practical mind approach the same goal from different directions and so ‘complement each other’ (integrieren sich).

Mind is not a substance, a being (ein Seiendes), but essentially the activity of sublating a presupposition (consult §§381, 441), the subjective–objective opposition. This presupposition is made most immediately by the bifurcation of the soul into subject and object: consult §416,

'Theoretical and practical mind reciprocally complement each other precisely because they are distinct from one another in the manner indicated. This distinction is, however, not absolute; for theoretical mind, too, deals with its own determinations, with thoughts, and, conversely, the aims of the rational will are not something pertaining to the particular subject but something that is in and for itself Both modes of mind are forms of reason; for both in theoretical and in practical mind what is produced, albeit by different routes, is that in which reason consists: a unity of the subjective and objective. At the same time, however, these twin forms of subjective mind have this defect in common: in both of them the starting-point is the seeming separateness of the subjective and objective, and the unity of these opposed determinations is supposed to be first produced. This is a defect lying in the nature of mind, since mind is not a being, immediately complete, but is rather that which produces its own self, the pure activity, sublation of the presupposition of the opposition of the subjective and objective, a presupposition which, in itself, was made by the mind itself'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

'Knitting for Soldiers', Julian Alden Weir (1852 – 1919)

§444

Both the theoretical and the practical mind are still in the sphere of the subjective mind in general. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. Subjective mind is productive; but its productions are formal. Inwards, the theoretical mind's production is only its ideal world and the attainment of abstract self-determination within itself. Practical mind deals, it is true, only with self-determinations, with its own material, but a material that is likewise still formal, and thus with a restricted content, for which it gains the form of universality. Outwards, since the subjective mind is a unity of soul and consciousness, and is thus also a reality in being, a reality at once anthropological and conformable to consciousness, its products, in the theoretical mind, are the word, and in the practical mind (not yet deed and action, but) enjoyment.

[Remark] Psychology, like logic, is one of those sciences which in recent times have still derived least profit from the more general cultivation of the mind and the deeper concept of reason. It is still in an extremely poor condition. The turn effected by Kantian philosophy has indeed attached greater importance to it, even claiming that it should (and that in its empirical condition) constitute the foundation of metaphysics, a science which is to consist of nothing but the empirical apprehension and analysis of the facts of human consciousness, merely as facts, just as they are given. Assigning psychology this position, in which it is mixed with forms from the standpoint of consciousness and with anthropology, has not altered its own condition at all, but it has added one new factor: the abandonment, both for the mind as such, and for metaphysics and philosophy generally, of knowledge of the necessity of that which is in and for itself, the abandonment of the concept and the truth.

Zusatz. Only soul is passive, the free mind is essentially active, productive. It is therefore a mistake when theoretical mind is sometimes distinguished from practical mind by describing the former as the passive and the latter as the active. In appearance this distinction is of course right enough. Theoretical mind seems only to accept what is present, whereas practical mind is supposed to produce something not yet externally present. In truth, however, as we already indicated in the Zusatz to §442, theoretical mind is not a merely passive acceptance of an Other, of a given object, but shows itself as active by raising the implicitly rational content of the object out of the form of externality and individuality into the form of reason. But, conversely, practical mind too has a passive side, since initially its content is given to it, though it is given internally, not from outside, and so it is an immediate content, not posited by the activity of the rational will and it first has to be made such a posited content by means of thinking knowledge, thus by means of theoretical mind.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

On the activity of both theoretical and practical mind, consult §§442Z. and 443Z. Now it is the subjective mind, which includes the soul and consciousness, that is said to be productive (hervorbringend, literally bringing forth), and yet in §444 it is the free mind, as opposed to the soul, that is productive (produzierend, the Latin-derived equivalent of hervorbringend). From whence the seeming discrepancy? There are two distinct contrasts drawn, first, the free mind (productive) and soul/consciousness (relatively unproductive), and second. subjective mind (with merely formal productions) and objective mind (with fulfilled productions: consult §444). Subjective mind includes soul and consciousness as well as free mind and that the mind’s productions (Produktionen) are formal (formell) means that they are not filled or fulfilled (erfüllt) with appropriate content, and we can interpret this in two different ways. First, the mind’s internal production or determination lacks a content appropriate to it within the mind itself. And second, the mind’s internal production lacks an appropriate external content or embodiment. When the mind intuits an object, it is formal in the first sense: consult §442. When its production is only its ideal world, and so on, there is a problem in that it is formal only in the second sense, that the mind is concerned only with its own thoughts, albeit before it reaches this stage it is formal in the first sense as well. By contrast practical mind determines itself from the outset but its content (for instance the plum duff I crave) is restricted (beschränkten), it lacks the universality appropriate to the mind and so so its productions are formal in the first sense. Theoretical and practical mind differ further than is accounted for here however, for theoretical mind attains an internal content appropriate to itself without any obvious external embodiment, because it can think about its own thoughts, live in its own ideal world, while practical mind cannot do this, for so long as it remains internal it has only a restricted content. It attains universality for its content only by realizing its productions in the external world and so inwards practical mind remains formal in the first sense while theoretical mind does not.

Enjoyment is, as opposed to deed and action, is somewhat unfitting content for the practical mind: consult §469. The word also, it is suggested, is an unfitting content for theoretical mind, an uttered word is fleeting. And yet the parallel limps as it is hard to think of a more appropriate expression for theoretical mind than words, while practical mind can go on to express itself in deeds. Hegel has in mind here of John. 1: 1, ‘In the beginning was the Word’, and Goethe’s response, in Faust I: ‘In the beginning was the deed’. In the Zusatz theoretical mind’s production of the word is considered to be an advantage over practical mind and enjoyment is not brought up. Words and enjoyment have something in common for neither is fully external to the mind, in the way that deeds and actions are, and yet neither is fully internal and this might well be the reason why their production is explained by the fact that subjective mind is a ‘unity of soul and consciousness’ for they are both internal, like the soul’s determinations, and external, like the object of consciousness.

On the ‘facts of consciousness’, consult §441, and for a similar assault upon psychology, consult §442.

My desire for a plum duff is simply given. I did not choose or decide to want it and there is no rational justification for my wanting it and if my desire is to be posited by the rational will, thoughtful or thinking knowledge must intervene, for instance by demonstrating that my health or life depends upon some constituent of plum duff or that it is none to shabby to satiate one’s harmless whims.

'No less than the distinction just discussed between the theoretical and practical, the distinction must be pronounced untrue, according to which intelligence is supposed to be the limited, and the will, by contrast, the unlimited. Quite the reverse: the will can be declared to be the more limited, since it engages in struggle with external, recalcitrant matter, with the exclusive individuality of the actual, and at the same time is confronted by other human wills; whereas intelligence as such only advances, in its expression, as far as the word, this fleeting, vanishing, wholly ideal realization emerging in an unresisting element, so that in its expression intelligence remains completely together with itself, satisfies itself within itself, proves to be an end in itself, the divine, and, in the form of conceptual cognition, brings about the unlimited freedom and reconciliation of mind with itself'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

The theory criticized is to be found in Descartes' 'Principles of Philosophy':

'35. The will has wider scope than the intellect does, and that is why errors occur. The perception of the intellect extends only to the few things that come before it, and they are very few. The will, on the other hand, can be called 'infinite' in a certain sense. That is because we realize that we could will anything that anyone could will, even God with his immeasurable will. So we have plenty of scope for willing where we don't vividly perceive - no wonder we go wrong!

- 'Principles of Philosophy'.

Descartes’s point about the will is generally speaking that I can will anything, that the sun should revolve around the earth, that I should believe that the sun revolves around the earth, that I am a gift from God to women, that I should believe that OI am a gift from God to women, and so on. But, as Hel says about the will, I cannot do whatever I will, owing to the resistance of matter, not to mention the resistance of women. Descartes’ observation regarding the intellect is that it cannot perceive things about remote objects not presented to it, and it cannot perceive obvious falsehoods such as that the sun revolves around the earth, or that I am not a gift from God to women, because it does not have a clear and distinct idea of this. Furthermore, we might add the objection that Descartes is without justification discriminating between intellect and will, and that he places rational constraints upon the intellect from which the will is exempted. I might indeed believe or imagine unlikely things about remote objects and obvious falsehoods about objects presented to me, and I cannot rationally will that the sun should revolve around the earth. This issue is not addressed, Hegel instead remarks that while matter and women can stop me doing what I will they cannot stop me thinking what I do and expressing my thoughts in spoken words. Intelligence goes further ‘in its expression’ than spoken words, because it is involved in the rational will, and yet this is not intelligence as such. But of course Hegel disregards Descartes’s point about intellect because he operates with a different notion of infinity from Descartes’, as doe Descartes the intellect is ‘limited’ or finite, since it cannot perceive anything and everything without end or limit but for Hegel it is infinite since it circles back upon itself, in particular in ‘conceptual cognition’, where it entirely permeates its objects, whether these be its own thoughts or external objects. On conceptual cognition, consult §§445 and 465. However, Hegel himself distinguishes (unjustifiably?) between intellect and will since he here applies to it Descartes’ notion of infinity and does not as elsewhere: consult §§415, 480, 482, take account of whether it also circles back upon itself. Hegel as we know does not share Descartes’s concern to avoid error for he believes that error is an essential step on the path to truth.

Theoretical and practical mind both start off with a content that does not correspond to or fulfil the form, which is infinite not in the sense that it circles back upon itself but rather in the sense that it transcends any particular and definite content, for instance the object I apprehend by way of intuition intuit has qualities that are simply given and cannot be rationally accounted for, my desire for a plum duff pertains to the ‘singularity of the individual’ (Einzelheit des Individuums: consult §377). Within subjective mind, this defect is overcome, by theoretical mind in §§465–8, and by practical mind in §§481–2. The Idea, the unity of concept (the subjective) and reality (the objective), is reached within subjective mind and at this point subjective mind passes over to objective mind, that is to say to put it simply social and political institutions: consult §482. That is to say, the subjective union of subjectivity and objectivity passes over into the objective union of subjectivity and objectivity, or rather since we must regard objective mind as somewhat one-sided and hence in need of absolute mind to supplement it, into objective objectivity. The general idea is that only when the mind has perfected itself internally can it proceed to secure its occupation of the external world, transforming it, both theoretically and practically, into an abode in which it is at home and free, that is to say. relatively unconstrained by non-mental things and events.

'Both modes of subjective mind, intelligence as well as will, initially have, however, only formal truth. For in both the content does not immediately correspond to the infinite form of knowledge, so that this form is thus still not genuinely fulfilled. In the theoretical sphere the object does become, on the one hand, subjective but, on the other hand, a content of the object initially still remains behind outside the unity with subjectivity. And so the subjective here constitutes only a form that does not absolutely pervade the object and the object is, therefore, not something posited through and through by mind. In the practical sphere, by contrast, the subjective does not yet have immediately any genuine objectivity, since in its immediacy the subjective is not something absolutely universal, a being in and for itself, but something pertaining to the singularity of the individual. When mind has overcome the defect just described, thus when its content no longer stands in conflict with its form, when the certainty of reason, of the unity of the subjective and objective, is no longer formal but rather fulfilled, when, therefore, the Idea forms the sole content of mind, then subjective mind has reached its goal and passes over into objective mind. Objective mind knows its freedom, recognizes that its subjectivity, in its truth, constitutes absolute objectivity itself, and it apprehends itself not merely within itself as Idea but brings itself forth as an externally present world of freedom'.

- 'Philosophy of Mind'

'In the living room with woodcutter and girl knitting', 1889, Hugo Kauffman

Dedicated to my muse 💞

The deft, agile fingers in firelight flicker

Skin laced in wrinkles that made needles sing

There, love is concreted with quietened breathing

Simple entwining of intimate string

It's a beautiful thing

At stockinged knees sitting, I watching, her knitting

Intent on her fixing my little hands' mess

She's sure she can save it, even with hands shaking

She had such a patience that I don't possess

I was such a small pest

Let us sit so quietly

In firеlight, I know you'd die for me

How gentlе can our violence be

'Tween finger and thumb

I'm sorry I'm repetitive

Don't mind, I keep forgetting it

So long as it's my thread, not the depths of our love

[Two girls in their twenties, slowed down getting ready

As one said, "Please help me, for it's cold tonight"

In our undergarments, she passed me the scarf and

Said, "I never learned how to cast off right"

For a moment, I swore that the light that I saw as

She handed the wool with a smile in the gloom

Was the firelight form from the glow I was taught in

On grandmother's hands in the cottage sitting room

Of course I'll cast off for you

Let us sit so quietly

In firelight, I hope you'd die for me

How gentle can our violence be

'Tween finger and thumb

I'm sorry I'm repetitive

Don't mind, you keep forgetting it

So long as it's your thread, not the depths of my love

Paris Paloma - 'Knitting Song'

Coming up next:

Theoretical mind.

It may stop but it never ends ...