Mapping Infiltration Routes and Terrorist Movement in Jammu and Kashmir: An Intelligence Report

There is growing evidence of infiltration through the Hiranagar, Gurdaspur, and Samba sectors of the International Border (IB). This movement is supported by strong Overground Worker (OGW) networks in the Jammu plains and the Ravi catchment area. These networks reportedly include Gujjar tribal connections and even Khalistani elements (BKI).

The terrain in these regions is mostly flat up to the Jammu-Pathankot highway, beyond which the Shiwalik foothills begin. These foothills are covered in dense forests, temperate vegetation, and many seasonal streams (locally called nallahs or khads). Karst features in this landscape help militants avoid detection by drones and traditional patrols. Typically, infiltrators move from these IB sectors up to the Billawar hills, and then toward Basantgarh or the Billawar-Manchedi-Bani belt. These areas act as safe sanctuaries or relay nodes for terrorists, functioning much like transit hubs where they rest, reorganise, and rotate their presence.

Although this region falls under the jurisdiction of the Western Command headquartered in Yol, Himachal Pradesh, there is no dedicated counter-insurgency or counter-terror (CI/CT) deployment of paramilitary or army units here. While elite forces such as 1 PARA and 6 PARA have operated in the area in the past, there is no permanent Rashtriya Rifles (RR) presence, giving militants relative freedom of movement. As a result, encounters in these regions remain rare.

Once they are resupplied, militants head toward the Chenab Valley through mountain passes like Seoj Dhar, Chatergala, and the Sudhmahadev Gap. According to satellite imagery (Landsat 8-9), these passes remain snowbound for about eight months of the year, leaving only a narrow window of movement between May and September.

After crossing these passes into Doda district, they navigate dense forests in Bhaderwah and Bhalesa to reach areas like Kither and Bounjwah in Kishtwar district. They sometimes set up temporary bases along this transit route. For example, last year on June 26, three Pakistani terrorists (Umar Afjal, Usman and Roh Ullah alias Bakra) from the Gandoh cell of Kashmir Tigers (KT), a proxy of Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad were killed by the 4RR (Bihar) in Gandoh, Doda.

A major geographic boundary in this region is the Chenab River, which divides the Kashmir Valley side of the Chenab region from the Jammu side. The Chenab enters Jammu from Himachal Pradesh through the Paddar area, and crossing points are limited to road bridges, wooden footbridges for livestock and people, and ropeways used for mining and human transport. In Doda district, the river is wide with limited crossings concentrated in urban areas. However, in Kishtwar district the river is narrower, allowing multiple informal crossings in remote areas with sparse population and limited security presence. Terrorists typically use the Nagseni-Paddar stretch to cross and then move toward Singhpora, Chatroo, Keshwan, Kuntwara, and further into Doda (Kastigarh, Bharat).

Their ultimate goal is to reach South Kashmir via routes through Kaprin in Doda, Margan Top, Sinthan Top, and Inderwal in Kishtwar. Historically, Jammu was never a primary objective for these groups. Their main aim has always been destabilising Kashmir. However, after 2019, there was a major crackdown on OGW networks and a significant drop in recruitment. Operating, infiltrating, and arranging logistics in Kashmir has become much more difficult than in Jammu.

In addition, many RR units previously posted in Jammu were redeployed to Ladakh following the Galwan standoff. After the 2010s, Jammu's hills were largely cleared of terrorists except for sporadic violence and brief revival attempts. This long period of inactivity led to organizational complacency and a shortage of local human intelligence (HUMINT). Terrorists have exploited these shortcomings. While infiltration through North Kashmir sectors such as Gurez, Tangdhar, Trehgam, Machil, Bangus, and Uri has been heavily disrupted, they have managed to establish alternative infiltration routes through Rajouri and Poonch toward North Kashmir via Sawjian and Peer ki Gali. In the same way, they appear desperate to revive a southern infiltration arc through Doda and Kishtwar toward South Kashmir.

A related point is the activity of the KT group in Kokernag. While the NIA ruled out involvement of the wanted LeT group (Hashim Musa, Ali Bhai (alias Talha), and Adil Hussain Thoker) in the recent Baisaran (Pahalgam) attack, temporal and spatial analysis suggests KT could have been involved. About two months after the Pahalgam incident, there was an encounter near the Kishtwar-Anantnag border at Singhpora. It is plausible that these terrorists had moved from Baisaran after hiding for months in safehouses.

Understanding these dynamics is crucial for anticipating threats, improving counter-terrorism planning, and securing these vulnerable corridors.

Note: This assessment is based on open-source data and the spatial and temporal analysis of reported events. Techniques like clustering, agent-based modeling (ABM), kernel density estimation (KDE), and various covariates were used to map these routes and assign areas of responsibility to militant groups. This assessment forms a component of a broader project focused on identifying terror camps and handlers operating across the border, mapping infiltration and transit routes throughout Jammu & Kashmir, and tracking emerging proxy groups affiliated with Pakistan-based terrorist organisations.

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