Noob Take: Is Deterrence by Denial Established? Do We Need to Punish Now?

Operation Sindoor and Pakistan’s defensive measures that caused India losses have demonstrated that we can deny India military objectives hence we should be able to deter. The losses signify what India should be willing to lose – and more – if it chooses to reattempt such a military adventure in the future. This could mean significant losses in terms of economy, military hardware, and in its regional and global image. Despite quantitative differences, our conventional forces are well equipped and qualitatively superior in their preparedness and execution.

India can, however, work to lower these costs by investment in domestic, and international perception management tools. All that maths done, if India believes the net costs to be acceptable, it will do so in future no matter the tactical outcomes of this operation. It is for Pakistan to now determine whether the costs have been too inhibitive for India to not repeat. Meanwhile, it will also need to determine the costs it has paid in terms of loss of human life, infrastructure, and disruption at home. Wholesome review of these costs will enable an assessment of whether next steps are required. If we believe that we have caused enough iteration (losses caused to India as it attempted operation Sindoor) to make the enemy think twice before reattempting, no further steps may be warranted.

The problem with relying on deterrence by denial in this case is the fact that it will always be relative. It is entirely dependent on how military objectives are presented before the domestic audience. If India is able to present that it killed x ‘number of terrorists,’ and destroyed ‘terrorist infrastructure,’ we’ll lose more Irtiza’s and India will present losing certain military hardware as an ‘acceptable cost’ at home.

If we believe that the costs that we have incurred are too high compared to what India has suffered, we will need to move towards establishing deterrence by punishment. We haven’t incurred any military losses. To establish deterrence by punishment, we’ll need to hurt India where the pain may be comparable. We’ll need to decide if that’s civilian population (including those just like our own children), infrastructure (the Neelum Jehlum project), or places of worship (like our mosques). If we select military targets again, we won’t be deterring India, only punishing its military component for complying with political instructions.

The choices for target selection can now have moral and ethical costs besides the strategic consequences!