Philosophers of Ancient Greece Debating Swedish Aid

Part One

In which Socrates fails to convince Aristippus that the Swedish state has a moral obligation to support people living in poverty, even if in distant countries.

Socrates: Dear Aristippus, please have a seat. I understand you have some objections to my previous remarks on our moral obligation to support people living in poverty, even if in distant countries, as the Swedish state is doing. What made you disagree?

Aristippus: Well, first of all, I do not believe we have such a moral obligation at all. In the Cyerenaic school we hold the highest good to be our own pleasure, with all else being valuable only as a means of securing that. And pleasure is something we enjoy in the present. Now, if helping people far away makes you feel good, or if you do it just to make yourself look good, then that is of course fine with us, as long as you derive pleasure from it. But it is not a moral obligation, and absolutely not something a state should engage in with taxpayers’ money, as the Swedish state is doing.

Socrates: But tell me Aristippus, has it ever happened to you that somebody helped you, without self-interest, because you were in trouble?

Aristippus: Yes, it has happened, with family and friends. I then thank them. They probably felt good about doing it, which is fine with me. But I would never hold them morally responsible for not helping me. They have to look after themselves.

Socrates: I am thinking about what society would look like if your ethical position was elevated to a generalized norm. How would you envisage such a society?

Aristippus: Well, people would freely engage in all sorts of pleasurable activities; activities they are inhibited from fully enjoying now due to all our moralizing bigotry, their worries about the future and their anguish about the past. People would live a full life of enjoyment in the present. That would be a good thing, Socrates.

Socrates: But what about cases when one man’s pursuit of pleasure leads to somebody else suffering disproportionately?

Aristippus: Such cases will occur, yes, I agree. But we should also note that people enjoy being with friends and family, simply out of pleasure. All human action is not about conflict, as you know. But we derive more pleasure from being with, and caring for, people close to us – our family, friends and other free men in the city where we live – that is why the idea of helping people far away, as the Swedish state does, is both unrealistic and unjustified.

Socrates: And what about problems that need shared efforts to be resolved, what they nowadays call collective action problems? Like global warming. Would not all men on earth have to unselfishly cooperate to solve that problem?

Aristippus: I have to concede here that the Cyrenaic school, or ethical egoism as some label us these days, does not provide a simple path for solving such problems. But, by the way, there are a few scientists who disagree with the idea that global warming is due to human activity. At least I heard of one or two such scientists.

Socrates: Dear Aristippus, If you have ten thousands of the worlds’ best scientist advocating for position A, and two or three scientists advocating for position B, and you are not yourself an expert on the matter who can form an independent viewpoint, which position would you take, A or B?

Aristippus: I would choose A, of course. But you see, our position is not motivated by an analysis of consequences. It is a non-negotiable point of departure. As humans we should derive as much pleasure as we can, for ourselves, in the present. That is in our human nature and it should not be denied to us, neither by others nor by ourselves.  

Socrates: So you agree then, that the consequence of elevating ethical egoism to a generalized rule, would lead to the destruction of Planet Earth?

Aristippus: Remains silent

Socrates: You also made me speechless, dear Aristippus. Even the destruction of Planet Earth….Here we disagree on something which is so fundamental that I have no more arguments. I conclude that it is hard for a free and virtuous man to be convinced by your ethical egoism, but it is also hard to make you refute it, as it is your non-negotiable point of departure.

Part Two

In which Aristotle and Socrates agree on the fact that moral action is about reality and not about appearance, while also recognizing mankind’s repeated demand for justifications of the impossibility, or unnecessity, of supporting the poor. And Socrates declares himself a vegetarian.

Aristoteles: Dear Socrates, I listened to your conversation with Aristippus. Do not lose your time on him; you will just go around in circles. Our dear friend Epicurus never went as far in his hedonistic inclinations. No state could be managed based on the principle of generalized egoism.

I agree with you, there is a virtue in supporting more unfortunate fellow humans. But there are other arguments against the position you advocated for, this idea that we have a moral obligation to support people living in poverty, also if in distant countries. My arguments are more practical, or instrumental. But let me start by mentioning another concern. Don’t you agree that people sometimes overlook the real consequences of their actions, confusing them with their intentions, because they either want to make themselves look good or because they want to relieve themselves of guilt. It makes them uncritical of facts; facts that speak against the realism or meaningfulness of actions to assist the poor.

Socrates: I absolutely agree with you on one thing here: the supreme object of a man’s efforts must be the reality rather than the appearance of goodness, as I concluded in Gorgias year 380 BC. We should be on our guard against such tendencies. We should also be on our guard when not so virtuous acts are relabeled virtuous, as for example when the integrity of the concept of aid is undermined.

Aristoteles: Do you refer to present debates in Sweden, and in Europe?

Socrates: Yes indeed, I do. It appears to be a very effective way of confusing people about moral obligations and about what aid is. Like when actions in the fields of trade, migration and security are labeled aid, in the name of coherence and synergies. We Greek invented the concept of synergy, meaning “working together”, but it is a challenging concepts to use when claims of efficiency gains are made; more challenging than most people seem to recognize.

But let us come back to your argument then, that facts and consequences are overlooked to get rid of guilt or to make ourselves look good. On that note, do you not also agree that over the history of mankind, we have seen a repeated tendency to justify that helping the poor is counterproductive, unnecessary or impossible?

Aristoteles: Yes, I may have witnessed some of these tendencies over the past millennia.

Socrates: There are even some highly questionable, but influential, theories that have been advanced. Let me list a few of them:

-Alpha, it has been said that there is no point in helping the poor because as poor they will anyway end up in heaven, or be reincarnated into a better position in the next life; claims that are clearly disputable.

-Beta, it has been said, as in Malthus’ iron law of the 19th century AD, that there is no point in helping the poor because then they will have more children and remain as poor as ever. However, this is a claim that we have seen rejected by facts. Everything indicates that in the world of today the opposite claim is true, so that it is poverty that generates the birth of more children.

-Gamma, it has been said that we shall not help the poor because it makes them lazy, which also has been refuted on empirical grounds, at least in very poor countries, established in these randomized controlled trials that modern scientists master so well. A related argument against international aid is that it is counterproductive because it perpetuates dependency, a claim that is clearly at odds with the development we have witnessed in Swedish partner countries.  

-Delta, it has been said that free trade is better than aid, and that aid hence should be abandoned. But reflect on the following: If a man sits at a table set for dinner and expresses the view that we should use salt rather than pepper, while both are readily available in front of us, would you not regard that statement as incoherent? 

Aristoteles: I would. If both salt and pepper are sufficiently provided at that table, then one action does not exclude the other. And likewise then, it is a coherent position to advocate for both free trade and aid simultaneously, as the one does not exclude the other, nor do they compete for the same resources. 

Socrates: Let me continue, I was at Delta.

-Epsilon, it has also been said that poverty and misery somehow is a given by nature. I even think here of your justification of slavery, dear Aristoteles, which was made along these lines, right? Your position on slavery is seriously questioned nowadays, have you noticed?  

Aristoteles: If I have noticed? Yes! It appears to be the only thing people remember me for these days. But I hope they understand that I was in a delicate position. You took poison to remain true to your beliefs and your right to express them, but remember that I was made the tutor of Alexander the Great. My actions and writings did not just concern me, but could have consequences for people of an entire empire. I simply had to be pragmatic. And please, as you bring this topic up, when you now hear people ridicule me about my remarks on natural slavery [Book I of the Politics], you should remind them of how pigs are treated today. A common peasant in Athens would not even come close to the ill treatment of these poor animals that goes on in pig factories, where the true nature of the pig is completely disrespected. I have by now given up my previous position on natural slavery, and also on women by the way, but I also hold the view that the people of today should treat their animals better. Don´t you agree?

Socrates: Agreed. “Slavery is not OK”, as a modern Swede would state it. Furthermore, I also agree that animals should be treated well. I have even stopped eating meat!

Aristoteles: You have stopped eating meat! Sorry for making an ironic remark, but is this to make yourself look good?

Socrates: Absolutely not, you know me well enough to understand that. Furthermore, not eating meat is an action without moral relevance in my case, as our life here is disconnected from reality. I do it simply because it makes me feel better.

Aristoteles: Dear Socrates, you are indeed a man full of surprises.

Socrates: I believe we have slightly departed from the main path of our inquiry here. So, let me summarize our points of agreement. First of all, the object of our efforts must be reality, not appearance. We should also be aware of two strong forces that tend to pull us away from viewing the reality as it is. The first force is our desire to look good and to avoid our inner sense of guilt, which may mislead us to mistake our intentions of being the true consequences of our actions. The second force is the one that pulls us towards making premature conclusions about the unnecessity or impossibility of helping the poor. Such theories have been in constant demand over the centuries and I assume it is so because they rid us of guilt and obligation to act. This as one cannot be guilty of inaction if there is no valid action one could take, due to the fact that there is no “ought” without a “can”.

These forces are like two strong horses on the main square of Athens, pulling a rope in opposite directions. To avoid being drawn away by either one of them we have to be open to facts and evidence on what is both possible and impossible to do for the poor. And sometimes we then need to resort to the method of scientific inquiry, the empirical methods you more than anybody else excel in, Aristoteles.

Aristoteles: Thank you so much for that remark, dear Socrates. However, it was just for one and a half millennia that I was the leading scholar of the empirical sciences of the Western and Arab worlds. By now the scientist have reached levels well above the humble contributions that I possibly may have made.      

Part Three

In which Aristotle claims that your moral obligation – for practical reasons –  is primarily directed towards those who are close to you, which Socrates recognizes as a valid argument but of less relevance in a hyperconnected world.

Aristoteles: Forgive me Socrates, but we are not yet done. There is another argument I would like to raise against the idea that the Swedish state has a moral obligation to provide aid to distant people living in poverty. We heard Aristippus say that we should give priority to people that are close to us as we derive more pleasure from helping family, friends and fellow citizens, while we cannot derive the same pleasure from helping people far away who we do not even know or see. I disagree with his motivation but agree with the practical implication. My argument is that we are simply better placed, even sometimes uniquely placed, to help people who are closer to us. The father has a role vis-à-vis his son that no other man will or can replace. The city council has a role vis-à-vis its familiar citizens that no other city will or can replace. We have a moral obligation towards the people we are best positioned to support, while we do not have it in relation to people that others are better positioned to help. This is simply an efficient division of labor between our moral obligations, of benefit to the whole.

Socrates: I agree that a father has a unique role vis-à-vis his son that is irreplaceable. You have a point there. You may also think of it in this way: There is a man on the beach on an island in the Greek archipelago. He hears screams for help from another island not so far away and then similar screams from another more distant island. That man is right in dedicating his efforts to assist those in need on the closest island, hoping that somebody closer to the more distant island may come to their rescue.

Aristoteles: Exactly.

Socrates: But now imagine the same man listening closer to the screams from the two islands, and then realizes that the screams from the closest island is about not having enough grapes to prepare a nice dessert after their abundant dinner, while the screams from the more distant island tells him that people there are starving to death. Is he still right to dedicate his efforts to the closest island?

Aristoteles: No, if he is a virtuous man he should dedicate his efforts to assist the starving people on the more distant island first. I also know that in the world of today such absolutely cruel inequalities in life conditions exist between different geographies, so the analogy has some practical relevance, I must confess.

But I have a related concern here. Can we really live a practical life with moral obligations that are without limits? Is it not unrealistic to expect a man, or a state, to do everything to support people living in poverty, if that becomes an endless task?  

Socrates: Dear Aristoteles, you are a master of logic. Would you then say that “not everything” implies “not something”?

Aristoteles: No, “not everything” does not imply “not something”. If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal. But if not all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then we have no clue as to whether Socrates is mortal or not.

Socrates: So maybe we can agree then, that a free and virtuos man, who is unable, for whatever reason, to do “everything”, may still have a moral obligation to do “something”? That something then is better than nothing? And more is better than less?

Aristoteles: I am inclined to agree with you on that.

Socrates: There is another counterargument I would like to raise here, and you will like this one because it is an empirical observation. Nowadays people living in poverty in distant locations can be seen and heard, even befriended, through electronic means that travel with the speed of light. And physically humans can now travel to distant locations with the speed of sound. No longer can people say that those living far away are so distant that their wellbeing is morally irrelevant to our actions. The world of today is interrelated and hyperconnected. Not even Alexander the Great was, in his wildest dreams, even close to establishing a global society of the kind that exists today. This has moral implications.    

Part Four

In which Socrates and Aristotle agree that merit has to be taken into account in the distribution of wealth, also in a global society, but only so to a moderate degree.

Aristoteles: Dear Socrates, I am sorry to take up so much of your valuable time, but I have a final argument, which is my strongest one, and it is about merit as a fair principle for the distribution of wealth in any society. It is an argument which I have developed elsewhere [Nichomachean Ethics]. Would you agree that a free man always should be entitled to some of the fruit that results from his efforts?

Socrates: I agree that you have a point here. If absolutely all fruit of a free man’s work is taken away from him, then he will stop his efforts and there will be nothing to distribute. Agreed. And maybe the same argument applies to nations.

But look down on Planet Earth and you will see these men - like Gates, Bezos, Buffet, Musk, Kamprad, Persson and others - can you really, on empirical grounds, claim that they would stop working if taxed just a little bit more, to the benefit of people living in poverty in distant countries?

Aristoteles: I agree, such an empirical claim would not hold up to scrutiny.

Socrates: And is it not the case that our dear friend Plato once stated that for a given society to hold together, the richest man cannot have more than four times the poorest [The Republic]. But on Planet Earth, during the past decade, the richest one per cent of men captured around half of all new wealth created on the planet [Oxfam], so how can the global society hold together under such circumstances? The idea that all taxation is theft, advocated by some libertarian extremists, is an absurd position, is it not?

Aristoteles: I agree in principle, although I think that Plato’s idea of the proportion being precisely four times could be questioned. But I conclude then that we agree that merit is a valid basis for establishing what a fair distribution should be. It applies to free men but also to free nations, so that some fruit of one’s effort should always stay with its producer, whether a man or a nation.

Socrates: I agree. But all this with moderation. Maybe Plato’s idea of not letting the richest have more than four times what the poorest have cannot be directly transferred to the global society made up of nations. But for sure, the global distribution as it is now leaves ample room for redistribution, which implies transfer of resources between distant geographies, or “aid”. Maybe at least one per cent of the income of the richest countries, which is what Sweden has provided over previous years?

Aristoteles: Or could it be 0,7 per cent maybe?

Socrates: Let us leave it to the assembly of the Swedish people to determine the exact proportion that defines the limit of their international solidarity. 

Part Five

In which Socrates concludes

Socrates: So, let me conclude our rich discussion on this beautiful day in the Elysium.

No free and virtuous man can be convinced by the argument that our foremost obligation is to ourselves and to what we derive pleasure from, and that for this reason the Swedish state has no moral obligation to provide aid to people living in poverty in distant countries. However, an ethical egoist can never be convinced if egoism is made a non-negotiable point of departure for his reasoning.

The claim that it is impossible or unnecessary to help the poor needs justification, just as we have to make sure that our virtuous actions lead to intended consequences in reality. We have two inner forces – emanating from guilt and complacency – that pulls us in both directions, away from a disciplined viewing of reality as it is. 

The argument that you are better, or even uniquely, positioned to help those close to you is morally relevant. However, from this it does not follow that what you can do for those further away is morally irrelevant. A virtuous man, or a nation, has to face this dilemma and find the right balance. Furthermore, in a hyperconnected society, distance no longer has the same moral relevance as it used to. We also concluded that if you cannot do everything you ideally should, for whatever reason, then that does not imply not doing something. Something is better than nothing and more is better than less.

Furthermore, it would be a mistake to disregard merit when establishing a fair distribution of wealth. But it would also be a mistake to regard a fair distribution as only determined by merit. Merit has an instrumental value if we want to establish a functioning society, but its value is not intrinsic, and no society can hold together if excessive inequality is allowed. This is also true when thinking of a global society.

So I conclude by stating that I stand firm on the position that the affluent Swedish state indeed has a moral obligation to support people living in poverty in distant countries, although it is neither an obligation without limitations nor an obligation that can be fulfilled while disregarding some of the practical considerations that my dear friend Aristoteles has raised so eloquently here today.