Risk Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Since Donald Trump’s Return to the US Presidency
Professor Allan ritton

Risk Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Since Donald Trump’s Return to the US Presidency

Introduction

The resurgence of Donald J. Trump to the US presidency in 2025 has reignited global debate over nuclear proliferation risks, US nuclear policy, and the robustness of international non-proliferation regimes. This paper provides a critical risk assessment of nuclear proliferation in the current geopolitical context, drawing upon recent policies, executive actions, and statements from international regulatory bodies. The analysis focuses on the implications of the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy, the evolving threat landscape, and the international community’s response, with reference to authoritative sources and recent developments.

 1. The Contemporary Nuclear Proliferation Landscape

1.1. Geopolitical Drivers

The global risk environment for nuclear proliferation has become markedly more complex since 2021, shaped by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, increasing tensions with China, persistent challenges from Iran and North Korea, and the rapid emergence of disruptive technologies. These factors have heightened concerns regarding the erosion of established non-proliferation norms and the potential for both state and non-state actors to access nuclear materials and technology.

 1.2. High-Risk States and Emerging Technologies

Recent risk assessments by the UK government and international watchdogs identify North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China as principal proliferation risks. North Korea continues its nuclear weapons development and sanctions evasion. Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain a focal point for international concern, particularly following the breakdown of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Russia’s attempts to circumvent sanctions and its aggressive posture in Ukraine further destabilize the non-proliferation regime. China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal and its role in facilitating sanctions evasion by other states compound these risks.

 The convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and life sciences with nuclear technology presents additional challenges, as advanced dual-use technologies become increasingly accessible and difficult to regulate.

 2. US Nuclear Policy under President Donald J. Trump (2025–)

2.1. Executive Actions and Policy Shifts

President Trump’s recent Executive Order (May 2025) marks a significant shift in US nuclear policy, emphasising rapid deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies for national security, energy independence, and technological supremacy.

Key provisions include:

Accelerated construction of advanced nuclear reactors at military installations.

Designation of AI data centers powered by nuclear reactors as critical defense infrastructure.

Expansion of public-private partnerships to deploy advanced nuclear technologies.

Increased export promotion of US nuclear technology, with expedited diplomatic efforts to secure agreements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Streamlining regulatory processes to facilitate nuclear infrastructure development.

Establishment of a federal fuel bank for high-assay low-enriched uranium to support private sector projects.

These measures are intended to bolster US energy security, reduce reliance on foreign fuel sources, and enhance military readiness, particularly in the context of emerging threats to critical infrastructure.

2.2. Implications for Non-Proliferation

While these policies may strengthen US domestic security and technological competitiveness, they raise complex proliferation risks:

Export Expansion: Aggressive promotion of US nuclear exports, if not tightly regulated, could increase the risk of technology diversion and weaken global export control regimes.

Fuel Cycle Activities: The push for domestic fuel recycling and reprocessing may set precedents that other states could exploit, undermining international efforts to restrict sensitive nuclear activities.

Regulatory Streamlining: Efforts to reduce regulatory barriers may inadvertently lower safeguards, increasing the risk of unauthorised access or misuse of nuclear materials.

 3. International Regulatory and Policy Responses

3.1. United Kingdom and Global Regulatory Architecture

The UK government’s 2025–2026 Counter Proliferation Programme highlights the need to strengthen the global non-proliferation architecture in response to emerging risks. Strategic priorities include:

Strengthening the implementation of non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes.

Supporting international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BTWC ISU).

 Addressing the proliferation challenges posed by emerging technologies and dual-use materials.

 Enhancing domestic controls and enforcement mechanisms, including strict liability for sanctions breaches and expanded risk screening requirements.

 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has also imposed new obligations on member states to assess and mitigate proliferation financing risks, reflecting the growing recognition of the financial dimension of proliferation threats.

3.2. United Nations and Multilateral Efforts

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 remains the cornerstone of the international legal framework for preventing WMD proliferation, requiring all states to adopt effective laws and controls to prevent the acquisition and transfer of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by non-state actors. Recent guidance from international bodies emphasizes the need for comprehensive export controls, end-user verification, and robust penalties for violations.

4. Risk Assessment: Key Findings

4.1. Heightened Proliferation Risks

The current risk assessment indicates a heightened risk of nuclear proliferation due to:

Increased geopolitical instability and the breakdown of arms control agreements.

The accelerated deployment and export of advanced nuclear technologies without commensurate strengthening of international safeguards.

The proliferation of dual-use technologies and the convergence of AI with nuclear infrastructure.

Persistent challenges from high-risk states (North Korea, Iran, Russia, China) and the potential for non-state actor involvement.

 4.2. Gaps in Regulatory Oversight

While the UK and some allies have enhanced regulatory measures, there remain gaps in global oversight, particularly regarding proliferation financing and the regulation of advanced technologies. The US, under President Trump, has primarily focused on sanctions and strengthening domestic capabilities, with less emphasis on new international regulatory initiatives.

4.3. International Coordination and Treaty Resilience

The resilience of the non-proliferation regime depends on sustained international coordination, robust verification mechanisms, and the adaptability of treaties to address new technological and geopolitical realities. The UK’s emphasis on reinforcing multilateral institutions and export controls is critical in this regard.

5. Policy Recommendations

Strengthen Export Controls: Tighten oversight of nuclear exports and fuel cycle activities, with enhanced end-user verification and transparency.

Enhance International Cooperation: Deepen collaboration with international regulatory bodies (IAEA, FATF, OPCW) to address emerging risks and harmonize standards.

Address Proliferation Financing: Implement comprehensive measures to detect and disrupt proliferation financing, leveraging the latest FATF guidance.

Adapt to Technological Change: Develop new frameworks for regulating dual-use and AI-enabled technologies with nuclear applications.

Promote Treaty Universalisation: Support the universalisation and effective implementation of non-proliferation treaties and norms, including UNSCR 1540.

Conclusion

Since Donald Trump’s return to the presidency, the risk landscape for nuclear proliferation has become more volatile, shaped by assertive US nuclear policies, technological advances, and persistent geopolitical tensions. While the US seeks to enhance its own security and technological leadership, these actions have complex implications for the global non-proliferation regime. Sustained international engagement, robust regulatory oversight, and adaptive policy frameworks are essential to mitigate the evolving risks and uphold global security.

 Authoritative Sources Cited:

 UK Government, Counter Proliferation Programme Guidance 2025 to 2026

 Ripjar, Proliferation Financing: Understanding Your Obligations (2025)

The White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Deploys Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security (2025)

Financial Action Task Force, Guidance on Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment and Mitigation

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

To view or add a comment, sign in

Others also viewed

Explore content categories