Robert Fico’s sanctions brinkmanship confirms Slovakia’s slide into EU obstructionism

When Slovakia’s prime minister Robert Fico hijacked the EU’s sanctions machinery for six weeks to bargain for gas guarantees, he confirmed Slovakia’s place alongside Hungary as one of Europe’s problem twins, creating an axis from Budapest to Bratislava of illiberal disruptors exploiting Brussels’ need for consensus. 

But the standoff also exposed again a deeper weakness for the EU: the unanimity rule, which requires all 27 member states to approve foreign policy measures like sanctions. 

Fico’s calculated stubbornness exposed just how easily this unwieldy rule can be exploited by governments that reject the very idea of European solidarity while using EU membership as leverage for narrow political gain.

Fico’s veto strategy

For six weeks, Slovakia blocked the European Union’s 18th sanctions package against Russia, delaying measures that lowered the oil price cap, banned transactions with Nord Stream pipelines, and expanded banking restrictions. 

Robert Fico’s government claimed to oppose the sanctions but in fact used the veto to secure leverage on an unrelated issue: the European Commission’s separate plan to phase out Russian fuel imports to the EU entirely by 2028. 

That phase-out proposal, unlike sanctions, required only a qualified majority vote, leaving Slovakia unable to stop it directly.

Martin Sklenár explained the tactic while talking to TVP World: "The motivation behind not agreeing to the sanctions package is actually not in the sanctions package itself but in the concerns that the Slovak government has with the phase-out of Russian fuels being imported into the EU by the end of 2027."

Fico’s demands reflected Slovakia’s precarious energy position. Slovakia remains dependent on Russian gas for a majority of its domestic consumption, with imports tied to a long-term contract with Gazprom running until 2034. 

Slovakia remains one of the most dependent EU states on Russian gas, with Russian supplies still accounting for more than 60% of its imports, despite the EU-wide drive to diversify away from Moscow.

That contract, Fico warned, exposed Slovakia to billions of euros in damages if it was forced to breach terms early. 

The country also faces a financial hit from lost revenue as transit volumes through the country collapse. Slovakia long profited from fees on Russian gas shipped west, but that trade has dwindled since Germany and others stopped buying from Moscow.

Brussels’ response was a carefully worded "comfort letter" from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, assuring Slovakia that its specific concerns would be addressed. 

The letter promised that if Slovakia faced an "unbearable" situation, whether severe price increases or lack of alternative supply, a crisis procedure could be triggered to grant exemptions from EU policy. 

It also confirmed that EU legislation forcing an end to Russian gas imports would be considered a "force majeure" event, relieving Slovakia of liability in potential disputes with Gazprom.

This tactical confrontation allowed Fico to claim victory at home, even though the "comfort letter" fell short of a formal exemption. 

Ficos’ hardballing demonstrated how one of the EU’s smallest members can wield its veto like a crowbar, prying open negotiations to extract concessions, and in the process weakening Europe’s united stance against Russia.

Fico’s illiberal shift

Fico’s bargaining was not an isolated episode but part of a broader transformation of Slovakia’s politics under his fourth government, namely a deliberate slide into illiberalism paired with a foreign policy he calls Slovakia’s "Four Sides of the World" strategy. 

This doctrine, pitched as balancing ties with Brussels, Moscow, Washington and the Visegrad capitals, is in practice tilted heavily toward Moscow, reflecting Fico’s deep Euroscepticism and willingness to challenge Brussels.

Since returning to power in late 2023, Fico’s government, led by Smer-Sociálna Demokracia (Smer-SD), a left-nationalist, populist party with a history of corruption scandals, has rapidly dismantled democratic checks. 

Fico governs in coalition with the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) and Hlas, a splinter group from Smer, both of which share his Eurosceptic and conservative orientation.

Within weeks, it abolished the Special Prosecutor’s Office, weakened anti-corruption legislation, and proposed controversial reforms to bring public broadcasters under direct government control. 

Fico himself declared an end to the "era where Slovakia was ruled by nongovernmental organisations" and his coalition prepared laws to label foreign-funded NGOs as "foreign agents". 

It was a step that political scientist Juraj Marušiak warned "threatens democratic standards" and echoes Viktor Orbán’s Hungary.

Pro-Russian stance

On foreign policy, Fico routinely minimises Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and portrays Brussels as an oppressive force acting against Slovakia’s interests. 

He frames EU sanctions as "ideologically and obsessively anti-Russian," while accusing Slovak pro-European parties of being "Soros-paid puppets", a phrase lifted directly from Orbán’s songbook.

Opposition leader Michal Šimečka, head of Progressive Slovakia, a liberal, pro-EU party, said in an interview on TVP World: "At the moment there are two countries which are undermining European unity… Hungary and Slovakia." 

In December 2024, Fico travelled to Moscow for a high-profile meeting with Vladimir Putin, a gesture that most European leaders shunned and one that, as Šimečka noted, "most Slovaks would disapprove of at this particular time." 

At the July 2025 NATO summit, Fico pointedly refused to endorse the alliance’s proposed goal for members to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP, reinforcing his government’s scepticism toward Western security priorities.

In this context, the six weeks of diplomatic brinksmanship was just the next, albeit high profile assertion of Slovakia’s drift away from the European mainstream.

Thousands of Slovaks took to the streets in early 2025 to protest Fico’s moves, waving EU flags and chanting against corruption and Russian influence—a reminder that pro-European sentiment remains strong despite his rhetoric.

Fico and Orbán compared

Fico’s bare-knuckle tactics confirmed that Slovakia now mirrors Hungary’s approach under Viktor Orbán. 

For more than a decade, Orbán has used Hungary’s veto power as leverage to extract concessions from Brussels, often on unrelated matters.

European Commission Vice-President Věra Jourová has already warned that Slovakia’s judicial reforms and attacks on media freedom will be monitored closely and could trigger new rule-of-law proceedings. 

In 2020, Hungary blocked the EU’s entire multi-annual budget and COVID-19 recovery fund to protest a new rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, forcing a political compromise that delayed enforcement. 

More recently, Orbán has threatened or used vetoes to delay aid packages to Ukraine, block joint EU statements on foreign policy, and obstruct sanctions against Russia. 

Consensus under strain

Slovakia’s six-week veto revealed a deeper structural vulnerability inside the European Union. Namely, that the bloc’s foreign policy still depends on unanimity, giving every member a veto. 

This system works when all governments accept a shared commitment to collective security. But when leaders like Fico and Orbán treat EU membership as a bargaining chip rather than a bond, consensus politics becomes a hostage to vetoes.

The frustration across Europe was clear. German chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly rebuked Fico, urging him to "give up the resistance" for the sake of EU unity. 

Czech prime minister Petr Fiala warned that Slovakia was "isolating itself" from its closest allies. Poland also distanced itself from Fico’s obstruction.

EU workarounds and limits

The EU faces the dilemma of how to manage member states that openly exploit consensus decision-making while drifting into illiberalism. 

One obvious workaround is to shift key decisions to areas where unanimity is not required.

For example, the planned phase-out of Russian gas by 2028 was designed as a legislation, which only requires a qualified majority vote, 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the EU population, precisely to prevent a Slovak or Hungarian veto.

Brussels can also make greater use of conditionality mechanisms linking EU funds to respect for the rule of law. 

Billions of euros in recovery funding for Hungary remain frozen due to these conditions, and similar measures could be threatened against Slovakia if Fico’s government continues dismantling democratic checks.

But the EU’s strongest disciplinary tool, Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which allows suspension of a member state’s voting rights for serious breaches of EU values, requires unanimity minus the country concerned. 

With two countries now firmly in the illiberal camp, Hungary and Slovakia can easily shield one another, making Article 7 ineffective as long as their political alignment holds.

This mutual protection belies the scale of the EU’s challenge. Even as Brussels develops workarounds, its fundamental tools remain unworkable.

For now, unity was salvaged. But last week’s sanctions logjam leaves the EU grappling with the question how to keep the club together when some members no longer play by its rules.

A version of this article first appeared at TVP World.