STPA – A Stairway to FRAM:  
Enhancing Complex System Modeling

STPA – A Stairway to FRAM: Enhancing Complex System Modeling

In the landscape of complex system modeling, two methods stand out for their distinct approaches to understanding socio-technical systems: Leveson’s System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Hollnagel’s Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). Both have proven invaluable in tackling the challenges of modern systems, where interactions between technology, humans, and organizations create a complex web of interdependencies and emergent behaviours. Each method brings its own strengths—STPA with its focus on control loops and inadequate control actions, and FRAM with its attention to the variability and resonance of everyday functions. This article proposes a novel way to combine these methods, using STPA as a foundation to map out control loops and functions, and then leveraging FRAM to explore the deeper interactions and variability within those control structures.

STPA: Mapping Control Loops and Unsafe Actions

STPA offers a structured way to analyze complex systems by focusing on control loops and the interactions between controllers (human or automated) and controlled processes. In contrast to traditional hazard analysis methods, which tend to isolate failures within individual components, STPA views safety as a dynamic control problem. Accidents are often the result of inadequate control actions or flawed feedback mechanisms within a system’s control loops not simply isolated failures. By mapping out these loops, STPA allows analysts to identify points where control actions may fail or lead to unsafe outcomes.

The strength of STPA lies in its ability to systematically model these control loops and assess the risks associated with inadequate control actions. It provides a structured framework to capture the dynamic interactions between various system elements, highlighting where and how control may break down. This analysis is particularly useful in complex environments, such as aerospace, healthcare, and autonomous systems, where safety depends on both technical systems and human decision-making.

FRAM: Understanding Function Variability and Emergent Risks

FRAM, on the other hand, takes a different approach by emphasizing the role of variability in everyday system functions. Rather than focusing on failures or isolated incidents, FRAM models a system as a set of interconnected functions, each of which has inherent variability. This variability can propagate through the system, potentially amplifying into unexpected and undesirable outcomes through what Hollnagel describes as resonance. FRAM's core premise is that complex systems are rarely static, and it is the interactions between normal functional variations that often lead to emergent behaviors and risks.

In recent years, FRAM has gained traction as a quantitative complex system modeling methodology, with studies by Slater and Hill[1] demonstrating that FRAM can be fully quantitative when integrated with metadata. This shift allows analysts to more precisely evaluate how variability within functions leads to resonant effects across the system. FRAM’s focus on emergent risks makes it particularly valuable for analyzing socio-technical systems where human variability and environmental factors play critical roles.

 

Combining STPA and FRAM: A Comprehensive Approach

By combining STPA and FRAM, we can achieve a more comprehensive and dynamic approach to modeling complex systems. STPA provides the structural backbone by identifying the control loops and potential failures in control actions. Once these loops are mapped, FRAM can be applied to examine how variability within these loops, and the interactions between them, might lead to emergent risks.

The integration works by first using STPA to map out the controllers, controlled processes, feedback mechanisms, and information flows. This provides a clear picture of the system's structure and the relationships between its various elements. STPA’s identification of unsafe control actions serves as a critical input for the next stage, where FRAM can then be used to model how these control actions interact with other system functions.

FRAM’s focus on variability is particularly valuable here, as it allows analysts to explore how changes or deviations within one control loop might propagate through the system. The six aspects of FRAM functions—input, output, preconditions, resources, time, and control—align well with the control aspects identified in STPA, providing a seamless way to transition from structural analysis to functional variability assessment. This combination offers a more holistic view of system behaviour, capturing both the structural risks identified by STPA and the dynamic, emergent risks highlighted by FRAM.

 

 

Fig. 1  – A Typical STPA Control Hierarchy in FRAM

 

 Benefits and Potential Applications

The integration of STPA and FRAM has significant potential for industries that rely on both technical reliability and human adaptability. Healthcare, for instance, involves complex interactions between medical devices, human operators, and organizational policies, all of which can be modelled using this combined approach. In autonomous systems, where human oversight and machine decision-making coexist, STPA and FRAM together offer a way to understand both the control logic of the system and the variability of human intervention.

Moreover, this combined approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of risk. STPA’s ability to identify unsafe control actions provides a clear map of structural vulnerabilities, while FRAM’s focus on functional resonance helps to understand how these vulnerabilities may evolve and manifest over time due to variability in normal operations. This holistic approach enables more robust risk assessments and can lead to more effective safety interventions.

Conclusion

The integration of STPA and FRAM represents a significant advancement in complex system modeling. By using STPA to establish a clear structure of control loops and functions, and then applying FRAM to explore the variability and interactions within those structures, analysts can achieve a deeper understanding of system behaviour. This combination offers a powerful new tool for industries where both control failures and functional variability play critical roles in system safety. As modern systems continue to grow in complexity, this dual approach could prove essential in addressing the intricate dynamics of socio-technical systems, offering a comprehensive way to model, analyze, and mitigate risks.

David Slater


[1] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/384763526_HOW_TO_USE_THE_METADATA_FACILITY_IN_FRAM

Dr. JOHNEY THOMAS

Author, Analyst, Aerospace Professional

10mo

May kindly peruse our article titled “Analysis of an Aero-engine Fuel Control System, Rooted in Systems Thinking and Control Theory” wherein both FRAM and STPA have been applied together to fully understand a complex socio-technical system in its entirety for improvement in performance, reliability and safety. The article is made available in ResearchGate.

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Daniela Ceschi

Head of High Reliability Management @ Edelweiss Air AG | Envision, engage, and repeat

10mo

Very interesting combination of methods for complex system understanding!!!

Dr Brent Halliday

Senior Human and Organisational Safety, Risk, Resilience, Wellbeing Leader | Applied Researcher Human & Organisational Resilience | Certified Resilience Coach (Driven PR6)

10mo
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