Webinar Highlights:

“Most tragedies come at the end of a chain of events” ~ Ed Galea

Sudan’s devastating war is a tragedy. And tragedies do not come all at once. The webinar shed light on the overarching governance intricacies that undermine post-revolution politics. Since 2019, Sudan witnessed three major political processes. The first one culminated in the military-civilian government led by the former PM, Abdalla Hamduk. Next, the Framework Agreement (FA) promoted by the UN Mission to Sudan (UNITAMS). Finally, the declaration of TAQADUM- a new alliance that brings together the FFC-CC and a constellation of progressive civilian groups.

Thus far, these processes have failed to achieve stability as planned!!

Why?

The overarching governance intricacies can be categorized into structural, institutional, and behavioral challenges. At least one of these challenges can be singled out in each political process.

In 2019, the structural issues were evident. The political process failed to mirror the power dynamics on the ground, given the horizontal base of the revolution. Instead, political elites monopolized power and formed a government that was influenced by the interests of narrow groups.

More particularly, the civilian government fell short in promoting national consensus around the political trajectory of the transition, and afterward. The latter fueled polarity across the lines of politics, race, and regions. Examples include the 2021 sit-in demonstration, consistent road closures all over Khartoum, the regional road blockade in Port Sudan, and so on. Noteworthy that spoilers (NCP+ Military) played a role.

Moreover, urban vs rural/ central vs periphery power relations were barely addressed. Grassroots committees, native administration, and national leaders were sidelined from the political process. 

In terms of institutional setbacks, nothing is more evident than the flawed system of checks and balances. The absence of the transitional legislative council (TLC) and the quota policy enforced by the ruling coalition (FFC-CC+ JPA signatories) are good examples. The transition was doomed to fail as mistrust was the driving force of state-society relations. The military exploited the context and staged the coup.

The FA process was indifferent. In a context characterized by political, racial, and regional polarization, the political process was hopeless. Leaders from the peripheries (SLM-Minnawi, SPLM-Al Hilu, and SLM- Abdulwahid, and JEM-Jebril Ibrahim) turned away, while native administration and youth representation were substantially undermined.

Although the recent initiative (TAQADUM)- convened in Addis Ababa- is relatively better in composition, it is reading from the same playbook. The process is yet to see both the forest and trees and seems impromptu. Thus, less likely to yield better outcomes.

The behavioral setbacks can be boiled down to the lack of patriotism and shortage of political integrity. Instead of capitalizing on a national consensus to promote stability, some political actors remain clients to regional and international patrons.

What’s next?

The war can only come to an end if the warring parties (SAF & RSF) are convinced that they have no future role in Sudan’s politics. Their appetite can only be contained if civilians agree to promote independent figures with integrity to lead the nation toward stability and democratic governance.

Governance reform must be anchored into the local wisdom and informed by the socio-politics of Sudan. There is a need for an inclusive political process that considers center-peripheries power relations. Such a process can produce a National Committee to nominate a Prime Minister and prepare a roadmap to establish the TLC and to build consensus around the constitution-making.

The Second Republic stands on three pillars: secular constitution, federal democracy, and national rural development strategy. Therefore, a national policy forum is essential to promote policy-oriented reforms that can supplant the populist agenda of the political elites.

Finally, investing in the future by properly training the youth. The Youth Parliament could have catalyzed their energy to boost the democratic transition, not otherwise!