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1. Does a good central banker make a difference?. (2013). Tillmann, Peter ; Neuenkirch, Matthias.
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2. Does Greater Transparency Stabilize Output? Evidence from Panel Data. (2013). Mazhar, Ummad.
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3. Does a Good Central Banker make a Difference?. (2013). Tillmann, Peter ; Neuenkirch, Matthias.
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4. How Experts Decide: Preferences or Private Assessments on a Monetary Policy Committee?*. (2013). McMahon, Michael ; Hansen, Stephen ; Rivera, Carlos Velasco.
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5. How Expoerts Decide: Preferences or Private Assessments on a Monetary Policy Committee?. (2013). McMahon, Michael ; Hansen, Stephen ; Rivera, Carlos Velasco.
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6. Information acquisition and transparency in committees. (2012). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans.
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8. Probabilistic interest rate setting with a shadow board: A description of the pilot project. (2011). Wakerly, Elizabeth ; Vahey, Shaun ; Henckel, Timo.
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9. Understanding Interactions in Social Networks and Committees. (2010). Holly, Sean ; Bhattacharjee, Arnab.
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11. Committees as Substitutes for Commitment. (2010). Riboni, Alessandro.
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12. Monetary policy committees and the decision to publish voting records. (2010). Colla-De-Robertis, Esteban ; De Robertis, Last Colla .
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13. Optimal Structure of Monetary Policy Committees. (2009). Morimoto, Keiichi.
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14. How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates. (2009). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; Matsueda, Norimichi ; Farvaque, Etienne ; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume.
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15. How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates. (2008). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; Matsueda, Norimichi ; Farvaque, Etienne.
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16. Decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members. (2008). Spencer, Christopher ; Harris, Mark.
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23. How committees reduce the volatility of policy rates. (2007). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; Matsueda, Norimichi ; Farvaque, Etienne ; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume.
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24. The Limits of Transparency. (2007). Cukierman, Alex.
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26. Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules. (2007). levy, gilat.
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27. Why are Federal Central Banks more Activist?. (2006). Roelfsema, Hein.
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28. The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Members. (2006). Spencer, Christopher.
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29. Taking Personalities out of Monetary Policy Decision Making? Interactions, Heterogeneity and Committee Decisions in the Bank of England’s MPC. (2006). .
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30. The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee. (2006). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco ; Riboni, Alessandro.
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31. Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting. (2006). Gerlach-Kristen, Petra.
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32. Dissent and Disagreement on the Feds FOMC: Understanding Regional Affiliations and limits to Transparency. (2006). .
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33. Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?. (2006). Blinder, Alan.
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34. Is Central Bank Transparency Desirable?. (2006). Sibert, Anne.
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35. Inflation Targeting, Committee Decision Making and Uncertainty: The Case of the Bank of England’s MPC. (2005). .
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36. Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?. (2005). .
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37. Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making. (2005). Proudman, James ; Talbot, James ; Lombardelli, Clare.
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38. Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making. (2005). Proudman, James ; Talbot, James ; Lombardelli, Clare.
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39. How should central banks communicate?. (2005). Fratzscher, Marcel ; Ehrmann, Michael.
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40. Communication in Monetary Policy Committees. (2005). Bierut, Beata K..
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41. Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice. (2005). Geraats, Petra.
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42. Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice. (2005). Geraats, Petra.
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43. Inflation Targeting, Committee Decision Making and Uncertainty: The case of the Bank of England’s MPC. (2005). Holly, Sean ; Bhattacharjee, Arnab.
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44. Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers. (2005). Salsano, Francesco.
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46. The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees. (2004). Berk, Jan Marc ; Bierut, Beata K..
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47. A Small Corner of Intertemporal Public Finance - New Developments in Monetary Economics: 2 Ghosts, 2 Eccentricities, A Fallacy, A Mirage and A Mythos. (2004). Buiter, Willem.
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48. Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker. (2004). Kempf, Hubert ; Aaron-Cureau, Corinne.
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49. Inflation Targeting, committee Decision Making and Uncertainty: The case of the Bank of Englands MPC. (2004). Holly, Sean ; Bhattacharjee, Arnab.
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50. Bank centralny w świetle teorii agencji. (2004). Wojtyna, Andrzej.
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51. Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?. (2002). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
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52. When should central bankers be fired?. (2002). Walsh, Carl.
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53. Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees. (2002). Sibert, Anne ; Mihov, Ilian.
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54. Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions. (2001). Debrun, Xavier ; Castellani, Francesca.
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56. Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?. (2000). Rotondi, Zeno.
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58. Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?. (2000). Rotondi, Z..
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