This document has not been cited yet.

1. Acemoglu D., Egorov G., Sonin K. [2012]. Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs, ”Quarterly Journal of Economics”, vol. 125, no. 4, s. 1511–1576.

2. Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J. [2005], The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth, ”American Economic Review”, vol. 95, no. 3, s. 546–579.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

3. Acemoglu D., Robinson J. [2006], Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, New York.

4. Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A., Torvik R. [2013], Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?, ”Review of Economic Studies”, vol. 80, no. 3, s. 845–875.

5. Adsera A., Boix C. [2008], Constitutions and Democratic Breakdowns, w: Controlling Governments, red. J.M. Maravall, I.S. Cuenca, Cambridge University Press, New York, s. 247–301.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

6. Aghion P ., Alesina A., Trebbi F. [2004], Endogenous Political Institutions, ”Quarterly Journal of Economics”, vol. 119, s. 565–612.

7. Bardhan P . [2010], Institutional Economics and Development: Some General Remarks, w: Institutional Microeconomics of Development, red. T. Besley, R. Jayaraman, MIT Press, Cambridge, s. 15–39.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
8. Barro R. [2000], Rule of Law, Democracy, and Economic Performance, w: 2000 Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation, Washington, s. 31–49.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
9. Besley T., Kudamatsu M. [2008], Making Autocracy Work, w: Institutions and Economic Performance, red. E. Helpman, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, s. 452–510.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

10. Blume L., Müller J., Voigt S. [2009b], The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment, ”Public Choice”, vol. 140, s. 431–61.

11. Blume L., Müller J., Voigt S., Wolf C. [2009a], The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating – and Extending – Persson and Tabellini, ”Public Choice”, vol. 139, s. 197–225.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

12. Blume L., Voigt S. [2007], The Economic Effects of Human Rights, ”Kyklos”, vol. 60, no. 4, s. 509–538.

13. Blume L., Voigt S. [2011], Does Organizational Design of Supreme Audit Institutions Matter? A Crosscountry Assessment, ”European Journal of Political Economy”, vol. 27, no. 2, s. 215–229.

14. Blume L., Voigt S. [2013], The Economic Effects of Constitutional Budget Institutions, ”European Journal of Political Economy”, vol. 29, s. 236–251.

15. Buchanan J.M. [1987], Constitutional Economics, w: The New Palgrave – A Dictionary of Economics, red. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, P . Newman, MacMillian, London/Basingstoke, s. 585–588.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
16. Buchanan J.M. [1989], Explorations into Constitutional Economics, A&M University Press, College Station.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
17. Buchanan J.M., Tullock G. [1962], The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
18. Cheibub J.A., Limongi F. [2002], Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered, ”Annual Review of Political Science”, vol. 5, no. 1, s. 151–179.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
19. Constitutional Political Economy [2003], red. S. Voigt, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
20. Cooter R.D. [2000], The Strategic Constitution, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

21. Cox G.W. [2008], Electoral Institutions and Political Competition: Coordination, Persuasion and Mobilization, w: Handbook of New Institutional Economics, red. C. Menard, M.M. Shirley, Springer-Verlag, New York, s. 69–90.

22. David P .A. [1994], Why Are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’?: Path-Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, ”Structural Change and Economic Dynamics”, vol. 5, no. 2, s. 205–220.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

23. DeLong J.B., Schleifer A. [1993], Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial Revolution, ”Journal of Law and Economics”, vol. XXXVI, s. 671–702.

24. Design of Constitutions [2013], red. S. Voigt, Economic Approaches to Law Series, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
25. Dixit A. [2004], Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
26. Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., Melton J. [2009], The Endurance of National Constitutions. Cambridge University Press, New York.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
27. Elster J. [1993], Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, ”Public Administration”, vol. 71, s. 169–217.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
28. Elster J. [1993/94], Bargaining over the Presidency, ”East European Constitutional Review”, vol. 2, no. 4; vol. 3, no. 1, s. 95–98.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
29. Elster J. [1995], Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, ”Duke Law Journal”, vol. 45, no. 2, s. 364–396.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
30. Elster J. [1996], The Role of Institutional Interest in East European Constitution-Making – Explaining Legislative Dominance, ”East European Constitutional Review”, vol. 5, no. 6, s. 63–65.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
31. Elster J. [2012], Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making, w: Comparative Constitutional Design, red. T. Ginsburg, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, s. 15–30.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
32. Farber D. [2002], Rights as Signals, ”Journal of Legal Studies”, vol. 31, s. 83–98.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

33. Feld L.P ., Voigt S. [2003], Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence using a new set of indicators, ”European Journal of Political Economy”, vol. 19, no. 3, s. 497–527.

34. Gifford A. [1991], A Constitutional Interpretation of a Firm, ”Public Choice”, vol. 68, s. 91–106.

35. Ginsburg T. [2005], Do Constitutions Matter? A Research Program Using the Cross-National Historical Dataset on Formal Characteristics of National Constitutions, University of Illinois, Mimeo.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
36. Ginsburg T. [2011], Constitutional Endurance, w: Comparative Constitutional Law, red. T. Ginsburg, R. Dixon, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, s. 112–125.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
37. Ginsburg T., Elkins Z., Blount J. [2009], Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, ”Annual Review of Law and Social Science”, vol. 5, no. 5, s. 201–223.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
38. Glaeser E.L., Shleifer A. [2002], Legal Origins, ”Quarterly Journal of Economics”, vol. 117, no. 4, s. 1193–1229.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
39. Greif A. [1998], Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa, w: Analytic Narratives, red. R.H. Bates, A. Greif, M. Levi, J.‑L. Rosenthal, B.R. Weingast, Princeton University Press, Princeton, s. 23–63.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

40. Greif A. [2006], Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge – New York.

41. Greif A. [2008], The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments, Toward a Political Economy of Implementation, w: Institutions and Economic Performance, red. E. Helpman, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, s. 17–63.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
42. Haber S. [2006], Authoritarian Government, w: The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, red. B. Weingast, D. Wittman, Oxford University Press, Oxford, s. 693–707.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
43. Hadfield G.K., Weingast B.R. [2011], Endogenous Institutions: Law as a Coordinating Device, University of Southern California Law School Law and Economics Working Paper Series Paper no. 141.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
44. Hardin R. [1989], Why a Constitution?, w: The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, red. B. Grofman, D. Wittman, Agathon Press, New York, s. 100–120.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
45. Hayek F.A. [1960], The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
46. Hayek F.A. [1976], Law, Legislation and Liberty: Vol. 2. The mirage of social justice, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

47. Hayo B., Voigt S. [2010a], Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why do Countries Change Their Form of Government?, ”Journal of Comparative Economics”, vol. 38, s. 283–305.

48. Hayo B., Voigt S. [2010b], Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcomes Don’t, MAGKS Joint Discussion Papers Series in Economics Paper no. 27.

49. Hayo B., Voigt S. [2010c], Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence – A Global Survey, MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics Paper no. 34.

50. Henisz W.J. [2000], The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth, ”Economics and Politics”, vol. 12, no. 1, s. 1–31.

51. Hodgson G. [2009], On the Institutional Foundations of Law: The Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering, ”Journal of Economic Issues”, vol. 43, no. 1, s. 143–166.

52. Horowitz D.L. [2000], Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, ”NOMOS”, vol. 42, s. 253–284.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
53. Jan Fałkowski, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska,Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność... 101 Bueno de Mesquita B., Smith A., Siverson R.M., Morrow J.D. [2003], The Logic of Political Survival, MIT Press, Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
54. Jan Fałkowski, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska,Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność... 103 Lijphart A. [1999], Patterns of Democracy – Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

55. Knack S., Keefer P . [1995], Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, ”Economics and Politics”, vol. 7, no. 3, s. 207–227.

56. Levinsohn D. [2011], Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, ”Harvard Law Review”, vol. 124, s. 657–746.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
57. Lijphart A. [1984], Democracies, Yale University Press, New Haven.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
58. Lijphart A. [1994], Electoral Systems and Party Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
59. Lowes S., Nunn N., Robinson J.A., Weigel J. [2014], The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom, artykuł zaprezentowany na konferencji ”Institutions, Culture and Long-Term Economic Effects” Workshop w Warszawie w czerwcu 2014r.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

60. Matsusaka J. [1995], Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years, ”Journal of Political Economy”, vol. 102, no. 2, s. 587–623.

61. McGuire R.A., Ohsfeldt R.L. [1986], An Economic Model of Voting Behavior over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, ”Journal of Economic History”, vol. 46, no. 1, s. 79–111.

62. Melton J. [2013], Do Constitutional Rights Matter?: The Relationship between De Jure and De Facto Human Rights Protection, University College London working paper, http://www.ucl.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
63. Melton J., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T. [2013], Do Constitutions Matter? Some Conceptual Considerations, artykuł zaprezentowany na konferencji “How Constitutions Matter?” Workshop w Oksfordzie w czerwcu 2013r.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
64. Melton J., Ginsburg T. [2012], Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?: A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence, University of Chicago Institute for Law&Economics Olin Research Paper no. 612.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
65. Metelska-Szaniawska K. [2008], Konstytucyjne czynniki reform gospodarczych w krajach postsocjalistycznych, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

66. Metelska-Szaniawska K. [2009], Constitutions and Economic Reforms in Transition: an Empirical Study, ”Constitutional Political Economy”, vol. 20, no. 1, s. 1–41.

67. Metelska-Szaniawska K. [2012], Ekonomiczna teoria władzy, w: Teoria wyboru publicznego. Główne nurty i zastosowania, red. J. Wilkin, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa, s. 136–171.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

68. Myerson R. [2008], The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State, ”American Political Science Review”, vol. 102, s. 125–139.

69. Negretto G.L. [2008], The Durability of Constitutions in Changing Environments: A Study on Constitutional Stability in Latin America, Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 350, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
70. North D.C. [1981], Structure and Change in Economic History, Norton, New York.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
71. North D.C. [1990], Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
72. North D.C., Wallis J.J., Weingast B.R. [2009], Violence and Social Orders: a Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambridge University Press, New York.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

73. North D.C., Weingast B.R. [1989], Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England, ”Journal of Economic History”, vol. 49, s. 803–832.

74. Olson M. [1982], The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, Yale University Press, New Haven.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
75. Olson M. [2000], Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, Basic Books, New York.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
76. Persson T., Tabellini G. [2000], Political Economics – Explaining Economic Policy, The MIT Press, Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
77. Persson T., Tabellini G. [2003], The Economic Effects of Constitutions, The MIT Press, Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

78. Potts J. [2007], Evolutionary Institutional Economics, ”Journal of Economic Issues”, vol. 41, no. 2, s. 341–350.

79. Powell Jr.G.B. [1982], Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
80. Powell Jr.G.B. [2000], Elections as Instruments of Democracy, Yale University Press, New Haven–London.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
81. Raz J. [1998], On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, w: Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, red. L. Alexander, Cambridge University Press, New York, s. 152–193.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
82. Sen A. [1999], Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

83. Ticchi D., Vindigni A. [2010], Endogenous Constitutions, ”Economic Journal”, vol. 120, s. 1–39.

84. Treisman D. [2007], What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?, ”Annual Review of Political Science”, vol. 10, s. 211–244.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
85. Van Aaken A. [2008], How to Do Constitutional Law and Economics: A Methodological Proposal, University of St. Gallen Law&Economics Working Paper no. 2008–04.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
86. Vanberg V.J. [1992], Organizations as Constitutional Structures, ”Constitutional Political Economy ”, vol. 3, no. 2, s. 223–253.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
87. Voigt S. [1999], Explaining Constitutional Change – a Positive Economics Approach, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
88. Voigt S. [2011a], Positive Constitutional Economics II – a Survey of Recent Developments, ”Public Choice”, vol. 146, no. 1–2, s. 205–256.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

89. Voigt S. [2011b], Empirical Constitutional Economics: Onward and Upward?, ”Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization”, vol. 80, no. 2, s. 319–330.

90. Voigt S. [2011c], Constitutional Design of Lawmaking, w: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, red. F. Parisi, wyd. II, t. 7, “Production of Legal Rules”, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, s. 3–17.

91. Voigt S., Gutmann J., Feld L. [2014], The Effects of Judicial Independence 10 Years on: CrossCountry Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators, artykuł zaprezentowany na konferencji 2014 Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society (EPCS 2014) w Cambridge w kwietniu 2014r.

92. Weingast B. [1993], Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, ”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics”, vol. 149, s. 286–311.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

93. Weingast B. [2005], The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty, ”Journal of Economic Perspectives”, vol. 19, no. 3, s. 89–108.

94. Wintrobe R. [1998], The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press, New York.

1. The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society. (2021). Gavrilets, Sergey ; Tverskoi, Denis ; Senthilnathan, Athmanathan.
   In: SocArXiv.
   RePEc:osf:socarx:24svr.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Indicators of Militarism and Democracy in Comparative Context: How Militaristic Tendencies Influence Democratic Processes in OECD Countries 2010–2016. (2020). Zafirovski, Milan.
   In: Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement.
   RePEc:spr:soinre:v:147:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11205-019-02149-1.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Industrialization and the evolution of enforcement institutions. (2020). Popov, Latchezar ; Mukoyama, Toshihiko.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:69:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01183-x.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining. (2020). Zapal, Jan.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268018303082.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. How does economic complexity influence income inequality? New evidence from international data. (2020). Chu, Lan Khanh ; Hoang, Dung Phuong.
   In: Economic Analysis and Policy.
   RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:68:y:2020:i:c:p:44-57.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Dynamic Legislative Bargaining. (2020). Zapal, Jan ; Evdokimov, Kirill ; Eraslan, Hulya.
   In: ISER Discussion Paper.
   RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1090.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence. (2020). Sonin, Konstantin ; Acemoglu, Daron ; Egorov, Georgy.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-127.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power. (2019). Baron, David P.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:67:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1090-8.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Corruption and paradoxes in alliances. (2019). Nieva, Ricardo.
   In: Economics of Governance.
   RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:20:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10101-018-0213-4.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Making the Rules: The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property Rights. (2019). Larouche, Pierre ; Husovec, Martin ; Baron, Justus ; Contreras, Jorge.
    In: JRC Research Reports.
    RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc115004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Dynamic Stable Supplier Coalitions and Invariance in Assembly Systems with Commodity Components. (2019). Nagarajan, Mahesh ; Soi, Greys ; Tong, Chunyang.
    In: Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:oropre:v:67:y:2019:i:5:p:1269-1282.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Economic growth and property rights on natural resources. (2018). Pakhnin, Mikhail ; Borissov, Kirill.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:65:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-016-1018-8.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching. (2018). Louis-Sidois, Charles ; Henry, Emeric.
    In: Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/4g5hemr5o18g7os4h53mulpcam.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Implementation via rights structures. (2018). Yildiz, Kemal ; Koray, Semih.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:479-502.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Constitutions and groups. (2018). Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Mauleon, Ana ; Roehl, Nils.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:135-152.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Guarding the Guardians. (2017). Sheedy, Kevin D ; Guimaraes, Bernardo.
    In: The Economic Journal.
    RePEc:oup:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:606:p:2441-2477..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Guarding the guardians. (2017). Sheedy, Kevin ; guimaraes, bernardo.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:65196.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Political repression in autocratic regimes. (2017). Sekeris, Petros ; Bove, Vincenzo ; Platteau, Jean-Philippe.
    In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:2:p:410-428.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Sharing the Growth Dividend: Analysis of Inequality in Asia. (2016). Kinda, Tidiane ; Jain-Chandra, Sonali ; Piao, Shi ; Kochhar, Kalpana ; Schauer, Johanna.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2016/048.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Economic Growth and Property Rights on Natural Resources. (2016). .
    In: EUSP Department of Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:eus:wpaper:ec0216.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Political turnover and the accumulation of democratic capital. (2016). Karakas, Leyla D.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:195-213.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Collective Commitment. (2015). Roessler, Christian ; Shelegia, Sandro ; Strulovici, Bruno.
    In: Vienna Economics Papers.
    RePEc:vie:viennp:1507.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Przyczyny ustanawiania i stabilność konstytucji państwa - perspektywa ekonomiczna. (2015). Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna ; Falkowski, Jan ; Fakowski, Jan.
    In: Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2015:i:3:p:79-105.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Networked politics: political cycles and instability under social influences. (2015). Pongou, Roland ; Wambo, Pierre ; Lambo, Lawrence Diffo ; Tchantcho, Bertrand.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:65641.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Networked Politics: Political Cycles and Instability under Social Influences. (2015). Pongou, Roland ; Wambo, Pierre ; Lambo, Lawrence Diffo ; Tchantcho, Bertrand.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:65598.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Fraudulent Democracy: A Dynamic Ordinal Game Approach. (2015). Pongou, Roland ; Moyouwou, Issofa ; Tchantcho, Bertrand.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:65583.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Constitutions and Social Networks. (2015). Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Mauleon, Ana ; Roehl, Nils.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.59.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Dynamic voting in clubs. (2015). Roberts, Kevin.
    In: Research in Economics.
    RePEc:eee:reecon:v:69:y:2015:i:3:p:320-335.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Research in economics and political economy. (2015). Etro, Federico.
    In: Research in Economics.
    RePEc:eee:reecon:v:69:y:2015:i:3:p:261-264.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Bargaining over an endogenous agenda. (2014). Seidmann, Daniel ; Anesi, Vincent.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:1318.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Markovian Elections. (2014). Forand, Jean Guillaume ; Duggan, John.
    In: 2014 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed014:153.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Constitutions and Social Networks. (2014). Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Mauleon, Ana ; Roehl, Nils.
    In: Working Papers Dissertations.
    RePEc:pdn:dispap:02.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Constitutions and Social Networks. (2014). Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Mauleon, Ana ; Roehl, Nils.
    In: Working Papers CIE.
    RePEc:pdn:ciepap:74.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Why do parties use primaries?: Political selection versus candidate incentives. (2014). Aragon, Fernando.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:160:y:2014:i:1:p:205-225.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Constitutions and social networks. (2014). Vannetelbosch, Vincent ; Mauleon, Ana ; Roehl, Nils.
    In: LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE.
    RePEc:cor:louvco:2014003.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Markovian Elections. (2013). Forand, Jean Guillaume ; Duggan, John.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wat:wpaper:1305.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data. (2013). Kodila-Tedika, Oasis ; Asongu, Simplice.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:44066.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Endogenous institutions and political extremism. (2013). Wolitzky, Alexander.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:86-100.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. A new old solution for weak tournaments. (2012). Anesi, Vincent.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:4:p:919-930.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. The persistence of inferior cultural-institutional conventions. (2012). Belloc, Marianna ; Bowles, Samuel.
    In: Working Papers in Public Economics.
    RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp157.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Bargaining in Standing Committees. (2012). Seidmann, Daniel ; Anesi, Vincent.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-09.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda. (2012). Seidmann, Daniel ; Anesi, Vincent.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-03.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Markets and Jungles. (2011). Masella, Paolo ; Gall, Thomas.
    In: Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011.
    RePEc:zbw:gdec11:30.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games. (2011). Kalandrakis, Tasos ; Duggan, John.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:3:p:611-650.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria. (2011). Duggan, John.
    In: Wallis Working Papers.
    RePEc:roc:wallis:wp62.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda. (2011). Seidmann, Daniel ; Anesi, Vincent.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notcdx:2011-10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. A Newton Collocation Method for Solving Dynamic Bargaining Games. (2009). Kalandrakis, Tasos ; Duggan, John.
    In: Wallis Working Papers.
    RePEc:roc:wallis:wp60.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Civil War. (2009). Miguel, Edward ; Blattman, Christopher.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14801.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. Civil War. (2009). Miguel, Edward ; Blattman, Christopher.
    In: Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ciders:qt90n356hs.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power. (2008). Fong, Pohan.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1465.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-10-06 15:49:38 || Missing content? Let us know