Allouch, N. and M. Wooders (2002) “Competitive pricing in socially networked economiesâ€, University of Warwick Discussion Paper No. 639.
Anderson, R.M. (1978) “An elementary core equivalence theorem,†Econometrica 46, 1438-1487.
- Anderson, R.M. (1992) “The core in perfectly competitive economies†in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 1 (R.J. Aumann and S. Hart Eds.), Amsterdam- London- New York- Tokyo: Elsevier Science Publishers (North-Holland), 413-457.
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- Aumann, R.J. (1964), “Markets with a continuum of traders,†Econometrica 32, 39-50.
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Bennett, E. and M. Wooders (1979) “Income distribution and firm formationâ€, Journal of Comparative Economics 3, 304-317.
Bloch, B. (1996) “Sequential formation of coalitions with fixed payoff divisionâ€, Games and Economic Behavior 14, 90-123.
- Bondareva, O. (1962) “Theory of the core in an n-person gameâ€, Vestnik of Leningrad State University 13, 141-142 (in Russian).
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Conley, J and M.Wooders (1996) “Taste homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choicesâ€, Richerche Economiche 50, 367-387.
Conley, J. and M. Wooders (1997) “Equivalence of the core and competitive equilibrium in a Tiebout economy with crowding typesâ€, Journal of Urban Economics 41, 421-440.
- Conley, J. and M. Wooders (1998) “Anonymous pricing in Tiebout economies and economies with clubsâ€, in Topics in Public Finance (D. Pines, E. Sadka, and I. Zilcha Eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Conley, J. and M. Wooders (2001) “Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristicsâ€, Journal of Economic Theory 98, 261-294.
Crawford, V. and E. Knoer (1981) “Job matchings with heterogeneous firms and workersâ€, Econometrica 49, 437-50.
Debreu, G. and H. Scarf (1963) “A limit theorem on the core of an economyâ€, International Economic Review 4, 235-246.
- Demange, G. (1983) “Single peaked orders on a treeâ€, Mathematical Social Sciences 3, 389-396.
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Demange, G. (1994) “Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structuresâ€, Journal of Mathematical Economics 23, 45-58.
- Edgeworth, F.Y. (1881) Mathematical Psychics, London: Kegan Paul.
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Forges, F., A. Heifetz and E. Minelli (2001) “Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economiesâ€, Economic Theory 18, 349-365.
- Gale, D. and L.S. Shapley (1962) “College admissions and the stability of marriageâ€, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9-15.
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Garratt, R. and C.-Z. Qin (1996) “Cores and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities and lotteriesâ€, Journal of Economic Theory 68, 531-543.
- Gilles, D.B. (1953) Some Theorems on n-person Games, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Mathematics, Princeton: Princeton University.
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Greenberg, J. and S. Weber (1986) “Strong Tiebout equilibrium with restricted preference domainâ€, Journal of Economic Theory 38, 101-117.
Hammond, P.J. (1999) “On f-core equivalence with general widespread externalities, Journal of Mathematical Economics 32, 177-184.
- Hammond, P.J., M. Kaneko, and M. Wooders (1989) “Continuum economies with finite coalitions; Core, equilibrium and widespread externalitiesâ€, Journal of Economic Theory 49, 113-134.
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Hildenbrand, W. and A.P. Kirman (1976) Introduction to Equilibrium Analysis, Amsterdam-Oxford: North Holland.
Kaneko, M. and M. Wooders (1982) “Cores of partitioning gamesâ€, Mathematical Social Sciences 3, 313327.
Kaneko, M. and M. Wooders (1986), “The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some resultsâ€, Mathematical Social Sciences 12, 105-137.
Kaneko, M. and M. Wooders (1989), “The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economicsâ€, Journal of Economic Theory 49, 135-168.
- Kaneko, M. and M. Wooders (1994a) Widespread externalities and perfectly competitive markets in Economic Behaviour in an Imperfect Environment, (R. Gilles, P. Ruys, and D. Talman Eds.), Kluwer Acadmic Publishing Co., Boston, 71-87.
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Kaneko, M. and M. Wooders (1996) “The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side paymentsâ€, International Journal of Game Theory 25, 245-258.
Kannai, Y. (1970) “Continuity properties of the core of a marketâ€, Econometrica 38, 791-815.
- Kannai, Y. (1992) “The core and balancedness†in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 1 (R.J. Aumann and S. Hart Eds.), Amsterdam- London- New York- Tokyo: Elsevier Science Publishers (North-Holland), 355395.
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Kelso, A.S. and V.P. Crawford (1982) “Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutesâ€, Econometrica 50, 1483-1504.
Kovalenkov, A. and M. Wooders (1997) “Approximate cores of games and economies with clubâ€, Journal of Economic Theory (forthcoming).
Kovalenkov, A. and M. Wooders (2001a) “Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side paymentsâ€, Games and Economic Behavior 36, 193-218.
Kovalenkov, A. and M. Wooders (2001b) “An exact bound on epsilon for nonemptiness of epsilon cores of gamesâ€, Mathematics of Operations Research 26, 654-678.
Le Breton, M., Owen, G. and Weber, S. (1992) “Strongly balanced cooperative gamesâ€, International Journal of Game Theory 20, 419-428.
Manelli, A.M. (1991) “Monotonic preferences and core equivalenceâ€, Econometrica 59, 123-138.
Mas-Colell, A. (1979) “A refinement of the core equivalence theoremâ€, Economic Letters 3, 307-310.
Ostroy, J. (1984) “A reformulation of the marginal productivity theory of distributionâ€, Econometrica 52, 599-630.
- Pauly, M. (1970) “Cores and clubsâ€, Public Choice 9 (1970), 53-65.
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Ray, D. and R. Vohra (1996) “A Theory of endogenous coalition structuresâ€, Games and Economic Behavior 26, 286-336.
Roth, A.E. (1984) “The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theoryâ€, Journal of Political Economy 92, 991-1016.
- Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor (1990) Two-sided Matching; A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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- Scarf, H.E. (1967) “The core of an n-person gameâ€, Econometrica 35, 50-67.
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- Shapley, L. S. (1952) “Notes on the N-Person game III: Some variants of the von-Neumann-Morgenstern definition of Solutionâ€, Rand Corporation research memorandum, RM- 817.
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- Shapley, L. S. (1967) “On balanced sets and coresâ€, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14, 453-460.
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- Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1966) “Quasi-cores in a monetary economy with nonconvex preferencesâ€, Econometrica 34, 805-827.
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- Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1969a) “On market gamesâ€, Journal of Economic Theory 1, 9-25.
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- Shapley, L.S. and M. Shubik (1969b) “On the core of an economic system with externalities, American Economic Review 59, 678-684.
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- Shubik, M. (1959) “Edgeworth Market Gamesâ€, in Contributions to the Theory of Games IV, Annals of Mathematical Studies 40, (F.R. Luce, and A.W. Tucker Eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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- Shubik, M. and M. Wooders (1982) “Near-markets and market-gamesâ€, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 657, published as “Clubs, near-markets and market-games†in Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory; Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann (M. Wooders Ed.), Fields Institute Communication Volume, Providence: American Mathematical Society, 1999.
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Shubik, M. and M. Wooders (1983) “Approximate cores of replica games and economies: Part I. replica games, externalities, and approximate coresâ€, Mathematical Social Sciences 6, 27-48.
Tiebout, C. (1956) “A pure theory of local expendituresâ€, Journal of Political Economy 64, 416-424.
Wooders, M. (1978) “Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public goodâ€, Journal of Economic Theory 18, 328-348.
- Wooders, M. (1979) “A characterization of approximate equilibria and cores in a class of coalition economiesâ€, Stony Brook Department of Economics, Working Paper No.184, 1977, Revised 1979, on-line at http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/Economics/wooders/.
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Wooders, M. (1983) “The epsilon core of a large replica gameâ€, Journal of Mathematical Economics 11, 277-300.
Wooders, M. (1992) “Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property; An equivalence theoremâ€, Economic Theory 2, 129-147.
- Wooders, M. (1994a) “Large games and economies with effective small groups†in “Game Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis†(J.-F. Mertens and S. Sorin Eds.), Dordrecht- Boston- London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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Wooders, M. (1994b) “Equivalence of games and marketsâ€, Econometrica 62, 1141-1160.
- Wooders, M. (1994c), “Approximating games and economies by marketsâ€, University of Toronto Working Paper No. 9415.
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- Wooders, M. (1999) “Multijurisdictional economies, the Tiebout Hypothesis, and sortingâ€, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96, 10585-10587, on-line at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/96/19/10585.
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Wooders, M.H. and W.R. Zame (1984) “Approximate cores of large gamesâ€, Econometrica 52, 1327-1350.
Yi, S.-S. (1997) “Stable coalition structures with externalitiesâ€, Games and Economic Behavior 20, 201-227.