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2. Determination of equilibrium transaction fees in the Bitcoin network: A rank-order contest. (2023). Webb, Robert I ; Ryu, Doojin ; Kim, Daehan.
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3. Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers. (2023). Roughgarden, Tim ; Garimidi, Pranav ; Bahrani, Maryam.
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4. Understand Waiting Time in Transaction Fee Mechanism: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. (2023). Zhang, Luyao.
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5. Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. (2023). , Matheus ; Parkes, David C.
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6. Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security. (2023). Liu, Yulin ; Lu, Yuxuan ; Zhao, Yinhong ; Zhang, Luyao ; Nayak, Kartik.
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7. Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. (2022). Sally, Ye Lin ; Weinberg, Matthew S ; Yu, Catherine.
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8. Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions. (2022). Essaidi, Meryem ; Weinberg, Matthew S.
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9. Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. (2022). Chung, Hao ; Shi, Elaine.
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10. Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. (2021). Weinberg, Matthew S.
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1. Towards data auctions with externalities. (2024). Horel, Thibaut ; Agarwal, Anish ; Dahleh, Munther ; Rui, Maryann.
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2. Strength in Numbers: Robust Mechanisms for Public Goods with Many Agents. (2023). , Jin ; Xie, Haitian.
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3. A self-organized criticality participative pricing mechanism for selling zero-marginal cost products. (2022). Fraiman, Daniel.
   In: Chaos, Solitons & Fractals.
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4. Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. (2022). Chung, Hao ; Shi, Elaine.
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   RePEc:arx:papers:2111.03151.

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5. Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals. (2021). Mitra, Manipushpak ; Long, Yan ; Ghosh, Sambuddha.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01308-7.

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6. Optimal digital product auctions with unlimited supply and rebidding behavior. (2021). Ning, YU ; Lin, Xudong ; Xu, Suxiu ; Huang, George Q.
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   RePEc:spr:annopr:v:307:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-021-04245-3.

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7. Full surplus extraction from samples. (2021). Kleinberg, Robert ; Haghpanah, Nima ; Hartline, Jason ; Fu, HU.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:193:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000478.

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8. Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market. (2021). Stern, Mitchell ; Parkes, David C ; Moroz, Daniel J.
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9. Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions. (2020). Loertscher, Simon ; Marx, Leslie M.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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10. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling. (2020). Deng, Xiaotie ; Yan, Xiang ; Wang, Wenwei ; Lin, Tao ; Lavi, Ron ; Qi, QI.
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11. Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design. (2020). Roughgarden, Tim ; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal.
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12. Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences. (2019). Juarez, Ruben ; You, Jung S.
    In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
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13. The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets. (2018). Hashimoto, Tadashi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:177:y:2018:i:c:p:708-733.

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14. A/B Testing of Auctions. (2016). Chawla, Shuchi ; Hartline, Jason D ; Nekipelov, Denis.
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15. Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs. (2015). Micali, Silvio ; Chen, Jing.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:156:y:2015:i:c:p:77-102.

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16. Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design. (2015). Yan, Qiqi ; Devanur, Nikhil R. ; Hartline, Jason D..
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:156:y:2015:i:c:p:103-143.

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17. Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads. (2015). You, Jung S.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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18. Revenue maximization with a single sample. (2015). Roughgarden, Tim ; Yan, Qiqi ; Dhangwatnotai, Peerapong.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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19. Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis. (2014). Lambert, Nicolas ; Chen, Ning ; Ghosh, Arpita.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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20. Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction. (2014). Long, Yan.
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21. Dynamic Pay-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising. (2013). Vohra, Rakesh ; Nazerzadeh, Hamid ; Saberi, Amin.
    In: Operations Research.
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22. Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. (2012). Nisan, Noam ; Dobzinski, Shahar ; Lavi, Ron.
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23. Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects. (2009). Moulin, Herve.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:96-119.

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24. Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions. (2009). Conitzer, Vincent ; Guo, Mingyu.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:1:p:69-98.

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