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46. Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities. (2008). Landeo, Claudia ; Spier, Kathryn E..
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47. Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence. (2008). Sutter, Matthias ; Feri, Francesco ; Irlenbusch, Bernd.
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48. Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination - Large-Scale Experimental Evidence. (2008). Sutter, Matthias ; Feri, Francesco ; Irlenbusch, Bernd.
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49. Classic coordination failures revisited: the effects of deviation costs and loss avoidance. (2007). Ortmann, Andreas ; Devetag, Giovanna.
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51. Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs. (2007). Fatas, Enrique ; Cooper, David ; Brandts, Jordi.
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52. Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution. (2007). Weibull, Jörgen ; Demichelis, Stefano.
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53. When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory. (2006). Ortmann, Andreas ; Devetag, Giovanna.
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56. Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication. (2006). Östling, Robert ; Ellingsen, Tore.
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58. Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices. (2005). Riechmann, Thomas.
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61. What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence. (2004). Grosskopf, Brit ; Charness, Gary.
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62. Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study. (2003). Devetag, Giovanna.
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63. Coordination and information in critical mass games: an experimental study. (2002). Devetag, Giovanna.
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64. Coordination in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study. (2000). Devetag, Giovanna.
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