1. “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots. (2024). Ray, Indrajit ; Forges, Franoise.
   In: Post-Print.
   RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04929273.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots. (2024). Ray, Indrajit ; Forges, Franoise.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:114:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824001046.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games. (2022). Okano, Yoshitaka ; Aoyagi, Masaki ; Nishimura, Naoko.
   In: Experimental Economics.
   RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09719-6.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Competitive Behavior of Hydroelectric Power Plants under Uncertainty in Spot Market. (2022). Granville, Sergio ; Ferraz, Mario Veiga ; Thimotheo, Marcelle Caroline ; Cahuano, Julio Cesar ; Pereira, Amaro O.
   In: Energies.
   RePEc:gam:jeners:v:15:y:2022:i:19:p:7336-:d:934555.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium. (2022). Rabanal, Jean Paul ; Friedman, Daniel ; Zhao, Shuchen ; Rud, Olga A.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:205:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122001211.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium. (2021). Rabanal, Jean Paul ; Zhao, Shuchen ; Rud, Olga A ; Friedman, Dan.
   In: UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance.
   RePEc:hhs:stavef:2021_002.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Coordination problems triggered by sunspots in the laboratory. (2021). Siebert, Jan ; Yang, Guanzhong.
   In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
   RePEc:eee:soceco:v:94:y:2021:i:c:s2214804321000811.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Coordination problems triggered by sunspots in the laboratory. (2020). Siebert, Jan ; Yang, Guanzhong.
   In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
   RePEc:zbw:rwirep:848.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Correlated Equilibrium Under Costly Disobedience. (2020). Saglam, Ismail ; Ozdogan, Ayca.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:99370.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Nash versus coarse correlation. (2020). Ray, Indrajit ; Georgalos, Konstantinos ; Sengupta, Sonali.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09647-x.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Strategic uncertainty and the power of extrinsic signals– evidence from an experimental study of bank runs. (2019). Arifovic, Jasmina ; Jiang, Janet Hua.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:167:y:2019:i:c:p:1-17.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Learning correlated equilibria: An evolutionary approach. (2019). Duffy, John ; Boitnott, Joshua F ; Arifovic, Jasmina.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:157:y:2019:i:c:p:171-190.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Nash vs. Coarse Correlation. (2019). Sen Gupta, Sonali ; Ray, Indrajit ; Georgalos, Konstantinos.
    In: Cardiff Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2019/3.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Do we need to listen to all stakeholders?: communicating in a coordination game with private information. (2018). Ray, Indrajit ; Gürgüç, Zeynep ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Cabrales, Antonio ; Gurguc, Zeynep.
    In: Cardiff Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2018/23.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Discoordination and miscoordination caused by sunspots in the laboratory. (2017). Siebert, Jan ; Yang, Guanzhong.
    In: Working Papers on East Asian Studies.
    RePEc:zbw:udedao:1142017.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Coordination via correlation: an experimental study. (2017). Lim, Wooyoung ; Duffy, John ; Lai, Ernest K.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0998-8.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Coarse correlation and coordination in a game. (2017). Sen Gupta, Sonali ; Ray, Indrajit ; Georgalos, Konstantinos ; Sengupta, Sonali.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:lan:wpaper:151235570.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information. (2017). Ray, Indrajit ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Cabrales, Antonio ; Gurguc, Zeynep.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12353.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Transparency is Overrated: Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information. (2017). Ray, Indrajit ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Cabrales, Antonio ; Gurguy, Zeynep.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6781.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Learning to Coordinate: Co-Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium. (2016). Lee-Penagos, Alejandro .
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notcdx:2016-11.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Compliance and the power of authority. (2016). Zizzo, Daniel ; Karakostas, Alexandros.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:124:y:2016:i:c:p:67-80.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games. (2013). Sen Gupta, Sonali ; Ray, Indrajit.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:2:p:541-562.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Language and Coordination: An Experimental Study. (2013). Lim, Wooyoung ; Duffy, John.
    In: Working Paper.
    RePEc:pit:wpaper:514.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Coarse correlated Equilibria in Linear Duopoly Games. (2012). Sengupta, Sonali.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bir:birmec:11-14rr.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. Anctil, R. M., J. Dickhaut, C. Kanodia and B. Shapiro (2004), âInformation transparency and coordination failure: theory and experiment,â Journal of Accounting Research, 42, 159-195.

2. Aumann, R. J. (1974), âSubjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,â Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 67-96.

3. Aumann, R. J. (1987), âCorrelated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality,â Econometrica, 55, 1-18.

4. Battalio, R., L. Samuelson and J. Van Huyck (2001), âOptimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games,â Econometrica, 69, 749-764.

5. Blume, A. (1998), âCommunication, risk, and eïciency in games,â Games and Economic Behavior, 22, 171-202.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

6. Blume, A. and A. Ortmann (2007), âThe eïects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria,â Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 274-290.

7. Bone, J., M. Drouvelis and I. Ray (2012), âCoordination and sunspots: the letter is mightier than the colour.â Mimeo, University of Birmingham.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

8. Brandts, J. and B. W. Macleod (1995), âEquilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play,â Games and Economic Behavior, 11, 36-63.

9. Burton, A., G. Loomes and M. Sefton (2005), âCommunication and eïciency in coordination game experiments,â in J. Morgan (ed.), Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Volume 13 of Advances in Applied Macroeconomics, JAI Press, 63-85.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

10. Cabrales, A., W. GarcÃa-Fontes and M. Motta (2000), âRisk dominance selects the leader: an experimental analysis,â International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, 137-162.

11. Camera, G., M. Casari and M. Bigoni (2010), âCommunication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence,â Working Paper 1236, Department of Economics, Purdue University.

12. Camerer, C. F. (2003), Behavioral game theory, Princeton University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
13. Cason, T. N. and T. Sharma (2007), âRecommended play and correlated equilibria,â Economic Theory, 33, 11-27.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

14. Charness, G. and B. Grosskopf (2004), âWhat makes cheap talk eïective? Experimental evidence, â Economics Letters, 83, 383-389.

15. Chaudhuri, A. and T. Paichayontvijit (2010), âRecommended play and performance bonuses in the minimum eïort coordination game,â Experimental Economics, 13, 346-363.

16. Chaudhuri, A., A. Schotter and B. Sopher (2009), âCoordination in inter-generational minimum eïort games with private, almost common and common knowledge of advice,â Economic Journal, 119, 91-122.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

17. Clark, K., S. Kay and M. Sefton (2001), âWhen are Nash equilibria self enforcing? An experimental analysis,â International Journal of Game Theory, 29, 495-515.

18. Cooper, R., D. V. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T. W. Ross (1989), âCommunication in the battle of the sexes game: some experimental results,â Rand Journal of Economics, 20, 568-587.

19. Cooper, R., D. V. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T. W. Ross (1990), âSelection criteria in coordination games: some experimental results,â American Economic Review, 80, 218-233.

20. Cooper, R., D. V. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T. W. Ross (1992), âCommunication in coordination games,â Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 739-771.

21. Costa-Gomes M. (2002), âA suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication,â Journal of Economic Theory, 104, 104-136.

22. Crawford, V. P. (1998), âA survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk,â Journal of Economic Theory, 78, 286-298.

23. Croson, R. and M. Marks (2001), âThe eïect of recommended contributions in the voluntary provision of public goods,â Economic Inquiry, 39, 238-249.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

24. Devetag, G. and A. Ortmann (2007), âWhen and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory,â Experimental Economics, 10, 331-344.

25. Duïy, J. and Fisher (2005), âSunspots in the laboratory,â American Economic Review, 95, 510529.

26. Duïy, J. and N. Feltovich (2002), âDo actions speak louder than words? Observation vs. cheap talk as coordination devices,â Games and Economic Behavior, 39, 1-27.

27. Duïy, J. and N. Feltovich (2006), âWords, deeds and lies: strategic behavior in games with multiple signals,â Review of Economic Studies, 73, 669-688.

28. Duïy, J. and N. Feltovich (2010), âCorrelated equilibria good and bad: an experimental study,â International Economic Review, 51, 701-772.

29. Farell, J. (1987), âCheap talk, coordination and entry,â Rand Journal of Economics, 18, 34-39.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

30. Fischbacher, U. (2007), âz-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,â Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178.

31. GÃth, W., S. Huck and W. MÃller (2001), âThe relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games,â Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 161-169.

32. Greiner, B. (2004), âAn online recruitment system for economic experiments,â In K. Kremer and V. Macho (eds.), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003, Gesellschaft fÃr Wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung, 79-93.

33. Harsanyi, J. C. and R. Selten (1988), A general theory of equilibrium selection in games, MIT Press.

34. Heinemann, F., R. Nagel and P. Ockenfels (2004), âThe theory of global games on test: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information,â Econometrica, 72, 1583-1599.

35. Kar, A., I. Ray and R. Serrano (2010), âA diïculty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions,â Games and Economic Behavior, 69, 189-193.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

36. Manzini, P., A. Sadrieh and N. J. Vriend (2009), âOn smiles, winks, and handshakes as coordination devices,â Economic Journal, 119, 826-854.

37. Marimon, R., S. Spear, and S. Sunder, (1993), âExpectationally driven market volatility: an experimental study,â Journal of Economic Theory, 61, 74-103.

38. McCabe, K. A., A. Mukherji and D. E. Runkle (2000), âAn experimental study of information and mixed-strategy play in the three-person matching-pennies game,â Economic Theory, 15, 421-462.

39. McKelvey, R. and T. Page (1990), âPublic and private information: an experimental study of information pooling,â Econometrica, 58, 1321-1339.

40. Moreno, D. and J. Wooders (1998), âAn experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games,â Games and Economic Behavior, 24, 47-76.

41. Moulin, H. and J. P. Vial (1978), âStrategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon,â International Journal of Game Theory, 7, 201-221.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
42. Myerson, R. B. (1991), Game theory: analysis of conïict, Harvard University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

43. Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1998) âGames with procedurally rational players,â American Economic Review, 88, 834-847.

44. Ray, I. (2002), âMultiple equilibrium problem and non-canonical correlation devices,â Working Paper 2002-24, Department of Economics, Brown University.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

45. Ray, I. and S. Sen Gupta (2012), âCoarse correlated equilibria and sunspots,â Discussion Paper 12-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

46. Schmidt, D., R. Shupp, J. M. Walker and E. Ostrom (2003), âPlaying safe in coordination games: the role of risk dominance, payoï dominance, social history, and reputation.â Games and Economic Behavior, 42, 281-299.

47. Stahl, D. O. (2009), âAn experimental test of the eïcacy of simple reputation mechanisms to solve social dilemmas,â Mimeo, University of Texas at Austin.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

48. Straub, P. G. (1995), âRisk dominance and coordination failures in static games,â Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 35, 339-363.

49. van Damme, E. (1987), Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria, Springer Verlag.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

50. Van Huyck, J. B., A. B. Gillette and R. C. Battalio (1992), âCredible assignments in coordination games,â Games and Economic Behavior, 4, 606-626.

51. Van Huyck, J. B., R. C. Battalio and R. O. Beil (1990), âTacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure,â American Economic Review, 80, 234-248.

52. Van Huyck, J. B., R. C. Battalio and R. O. Beil (1991), âStrategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games,â Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 885-911.

1. Greasing the wheels of irreversible investment: International evidence on the economic effects of corruption. (2023). Cai, Qiuye ; Yung, Kenneth ; Li, Deqing Diane.
   In: Global Finance Journal.
   RePEc:eee:glofin:v:58:y:2023:i:c:s104402832300090x.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Effects of air pollution on accounting conservatism. (2022). Chang, Samuel ; Wu, Junfeng ; Liu, Baohua.
   In: International Review of Financial Analysis.
   RePEc:eee:finana:v:84:y:2022:i:c:s1057521922003301.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Limited Attention: Implications for Financial Reporting. (2022). Lu, Jinzhi.
   In: Journal of Accounting Research.
   RePEc:bla:joares:v:60:y:2022:i:5:p:1991-2027.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Family ownership, information problem and firm performance. (2021). Sultana, Reajmin.
   In: International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478).
   RePEc:rbs:ijbrss:v:10:y:2021:i:6:p:73-82.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Experimental Bank Runs. (2021). Rosa-García, Alfonso ; Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael ; Kiss, Hubert Janos ; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso.
   In: ThE Papers.
   RePEc:gra:wpaper:21/03.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Financial Distress and Information Sharing: Evidences from the Italian Credit Register. (2021). Mattarocci, Gianluca ; Gibilaro, Lucia.
   In: Risks.
   RePEc:gam:jrisks:v:9:y:2021:i:5:p:94-:d:553046.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. The Role of Information in Assessing the Risk of Conducting Bankruptcy Proceedings. (2021). Baran, Micha ; Bauer, Kinga.
   In: Risks.
   RePEc:gam:jrisks:v:9:y:2021:i:4:p:64-:d:528392.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment. (2021). Kaplan, Todd ; Fonseca, Miguel ; Choo, Lawrence ; Chakravarty, Surajeet.
   In: European Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:136:y:2021:i:c:s0014292121001173.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Should regulators always be transparent? A bank run experiment. (2020). Kaplan, Todd ; Fonseca, Miguel ; Choo, Lawrence ; Chakravarty, Surajeet.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:99948.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Nash versus coarse correlation. (2020). Ray, Indrajit ; Georgalos, Konstantinos ; Sengupta, Sonali.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09647-x.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Disclosure Quality and its Impact on Financial Reporting Quality, Audit Quality, and Investors’ Perceptions of the Quality of Financial Reporting: A Literature Review. (2019). Alwardat, Yousef.
    In: Accounting and Finance Research.
    RePEc:jfr:afr111:v:8:y:2019:i:3:p:201.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Nash vs. Coarse Correlation. (2019). Sen Gupta, Sonali ; Ray, Indrajit ; Georgalos, Konstantinos.
    In: Cardiff Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2019/3.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking. (2019). Nan, Lin ; Zhang, Gaoqing ; Corona, Carlos.
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:57:y:2019:i:5:p:1161-1200.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. The importance of higher-order beliefs to successful coordination. (2017). Bosworth, Steven.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-016-9483-2.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Public Information Precision and Coordination Failure: An Experiment. (2016). Banerjee, Sanjay ; Maier, Michael.
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:54:y:2016:i:4:p:941-986.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Measuring agents’ reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities. (2014). Heinemann, Frank ; Cornand, Camille.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:1:p:61-77.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Measuring Agents Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities. (2014). Heinemann, Frank ; Cornand, Camille.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00925018.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Measuring Agents’ Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities. (2013). Cornand, Camille ; Heinemann, Franck .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gat:wpaper:1341.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. How Do Market Prices and Cheap Talk Affect Coordination?. (2013). Qu, Hong.
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:51:y:2013:i:5:p:1221-1260.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria. (2013). Drouvelis, Michalis ; Bone, Johne ; Ray, Indrajit.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bir:birmec:12-04r.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria. (2013). Ray, Indrajit ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Bone, John.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bir:birmec:12-04.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Evidence of voluntary accounting disclosures in the Athens Stock Market. (2012). George Iatridis, Panayotis Alexakis, .
    In: Review of Accounting and Finance.
    RePEc:eme:rafpps:v:11:y:2012:i:1:p:73-92.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Does information transparency decrease coordination failure?. (2010). Anctil, Regina M. ; Dickhaut, John ; Kanodia, Chandra ; Johnson, Cathleen.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:228-241.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Measuring Agents Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities. (2010). Heinemann, Frank ; Cornand, Camille.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2947.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Expected Mispricing: The Joint Influence of Accounting Transparency and Investor Base. (2010). Krische, Susan D. ; Peecher, Mark E. ; Elliott, Brooke W..
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:48:y:2010:i:2:p:343-381.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. Does graph disclosure bias reduce the cost of equity capital?. (2009). Trombetta, Marco ; Muio, Flora.
    In: Accounting and Business Research.
    RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:39:y:2009:i:2:p:83-102.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. The value relevance of disclosure: Evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt. (2009). Romilly, Peter ; Giorgioni, Gianluigi ; Hassan, Omaima A. G., ; Power, David.
    In: The International Journal of Accounting.
    RePEc:eee:accoun:v:44:y:2009:i:1:p:79-102.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency. (2008). Gao, Pingyang.
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:46:y:2008:i:4:p:785-807.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency. (2007). Gao, Pingyang.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:9480.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. The pros and cons of higher transparency : the case of speculative attacks. (2006). Cornand, Camille ; Allegret, Jean-Pierre.
    In: Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain).
    RePEc:ctl:louvre:2006031.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Discussion of Information Transparency and Coordination Failure: Theory and Experiment. (2004). Walther, Beverly R..
    In: Journal of Accounting Research.
    RePEc:bla:joares:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:197-205.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-10-01 09:26:25 || Missing content? Let us know