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9. Voting in Small Committees. (2012). Luporini, Annalisa ; graziano, clara ; Balduzzi, Paolo.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3732.

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10. Collusion in board of directors. (2011). Bourjade, Sylvain ; Germain, Laurent.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:34814.

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11. What do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings. (2011). Weisbach, Michael ; Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17509.

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12. Corporate Governance, Debt, and Investment Policy during the Great Depression. (2011). Hazarika, Sonali ; Narasimhan, Krishnamoorthy ; Graham, John R..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17387.

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13. Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties to Management Disqualify Themselves from Serving on the Board?. (2011). Hoitash, Udi.
    In: Journal of Business Ethics.
    RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:99:y:2011:i:3:p:399-423.

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14. Vice or Virtue? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Executive Compensation. (2011). Cai, YE ; Jo, Hoje ; Pan, Carrie.
    In: Journal of Business Ethics.
    RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:104:y:2011:i:2:p:159-173.

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15. What Do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings. (2011). Weisbach, Michael ; Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2011-19.

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16. Performance effects of appointing other firms executive directors. (2011). Talavera, Oleksandr ; Муравьев, Александр ; Weir, Charlie.
    In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:dur:durham:2011_12.

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17. DO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE “ACTORS”’ FEATURES AFFECT BANKS’ VALUE? – EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIA. (2011). Alexandra, Stefanescu Cristina .
    In: Studies in Business and Economics.
    RePEc:blg:journl:v:6:y:2011:i:2:p:136-150.

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18. Biased experts, costly lies, and binary decisions. (2010). Rohner, Dominic ; Loertscher, Simon ; Hodler, Roland.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:496.

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19. Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions. (2010). Rohner, Dominic ; Loertscher, Simon ; Hodler, Roland.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:szg:worpap:1001.

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20. An Empirical Analysis on Board Monitoring Role and Loan Portfolio Quality Measurement in Banks. (2010). Cotugno, Matteo ; Stefanelli, Valeria.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:29766.

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21. Board structures and the establishment of a risk management committee by Malaysian listed firms. (2010). Yatim, Puan.
    In: Journal of Management & Governance.
    RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:14:y:2010:i:1:p:17-36.

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22. Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks. (2010). Luporini, Annalisa ; graziano, clara.
    In: Working Papers - Economics.
    RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2010_05.rdf.

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23. Endogenous governance transparency and product market competition. (2010). Hidalgo-Cabrillana, Ana.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we1021.

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24. Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks. (2010). Luporini, Annalisa ; graziano, clara.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3028.

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25. Large shareholders and corporate governance. (2009). Frantz, Pascal ; Instefjord, Norvald.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:10:y:2009:i:4:p:297-321.

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26. The effect of board size and composition on bank efficiency. (2009). Delis, Manthos ; Agoraki, Maria-Eleni ; Staikouras, Panagiotis.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:18548.

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27. Innovation and Institutional Ownership. (2009). Zingales, Luigi ; van Reenen, John ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14769.

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28. Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance. (2009). Weisbach, Michael ; Hermalin, Benjamin.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2008-17.

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29. Board Characteristics and Audit Fees: Why Ownership Structure Matters?. (2009). Garcia-Cestona, Miguel ; Desender, Kurt ; Aguilera, Ruth V. ; Crespi, Rafel .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ecl:illbus:09-0107.

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30. Insular decision-making in the board room: why boards retain and hire sub-standard ceos. (2009). Sato, Meg .
    In: Asia Pacific Economic Papers.
    RePEc:csg:ajrcau:384.

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31. Innovation and Institutional Ownership. (2009). Zingales, Luigi ; van Reenen, John ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: CEP Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0911.

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32. The effectiveness of boards of directors of state owned enterprises in developing countries. (2008). Vagliasindi, Maria.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4579.

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33. The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey. (2008). Weisbach, Michael ; Hermalin, Benjamin ; Adams, Renee.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14486.

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34. Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of Independent Directors. (2008). Malloy, Christopher ; Frazzini, Andrea ; Cohen, Lauren.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14232.

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35. Board monitoring, firm risk, and external regulation. (2008). Chidambaran, N. ; Brick, Ivan.
    In: Journal of Regulatory Economics.
    RePEc:kap:regeco:v:33:y:2008:i:1:p:87-116.

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36. Board Structure and Price Informativeness. (2008). Ferreira, Daniel ; Raposo, Clara C..
    In: CEI Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hit:hitcei:2008-4.

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37. Determinants of the Size and Structure of Corporate Boards: 1935-2000. (2008). Patro, Sukesh ; Zhao, Mengxin ; Lehn, Kenneth.
    In: CEI Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hit:hitcei:2008-13.

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38. Communication in the boardroom. (2008). Adams, Renee.
    In: SIFR Research Report Series.
    RePEc:hhs:sifrwp:0061.

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39. Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks. (2008). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Roszbach, Kasper ; Frisell, Lars .
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0221.

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40. Why Do Firms Appoint CEOs as Outside Directors?. (2008). Stulz, René ; Fahlenbrach, Ruediger ; Low, Angie.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2008-10.

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41. Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks. (2008). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Roszbach, Kasper ; Frisell, Lars .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6888.

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42. Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managers. (2008). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Alonso-Pauli, Eduard.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:726.08.

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43. The Market for Comeback CEOs. (2007). Fahlenbrach, Ruediger ; Pan, Carrie H. ; Minton, Bernadette A..
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2007-4.

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44. What is the Role of Legal Systems in Financial Intermediation? Theory and Evidence. (2007). Hellmann, Thomas ; Da Rin, Marco ; Bottazzi, Laura.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bol:bodewp:613.

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45. CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation. (2006). Jenter, Dirk ; Kanaan, Fadi .
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12068.

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46. Financial Expertise of Directors. (2006). Malmendier, Ulrike ; Tate, Geoffrey ; Guner, Burak A..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11914.

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47. Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors. (2006). Frey, Bruno ; Osterloh, Margit.
    In: Journal of Management & Governance.
    RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:10:y:2006:i:3:p:325-345.

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48. CEO Power, Compensation and Governance. (2006). Miao, Jianjun ; Albuquerque, Rui.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5818.

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49. Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and Optimal Board Structure. (2005). Luporini, Annalisa ; graziano, clara.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.14.

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50. Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment. (2005). Inderst, Roman ; Mueller, Holger M.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5315.

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