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AUCTIONS WITH LEAKS ABOUT EARLY BIDS: ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL BEHAVIOR. (2021). Zultan, Ro'i ; Kaplan, Todd ; Guth, Werner ; Fischer, Sven ; Ro'i Zultan, .
In: Economic Inquiry.
RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:59:y:2021:i:2:p:722-739.

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  1. Should underwriters be trusted? Reducing agency costs through primary market supervision. (2025). Li, Jiang ; Huang, Haozhi ; Foley, Sean.
    In: The British Accounting Review.
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  2. Who cares when Value (Mis)reporting may be found out? An Acquiring-a-Company experiment with value messages and information leaks. (2024). Marazzi, Francesca ; Lohse, Tim ; Guth, Werner ; Spadoni, Lorenzo ; di Cagno, Daniela.
    In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
    RePEc:eee:soceco:v:108:y:2024:i:c:s2214804323001775.

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  3. Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion. (2023). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Fan, Cuihong ; Jun, Byoung Heon.
    In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
    RePEc:spr:etbull:v:11:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-023-00257-3.

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  4. Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions. (2023). Sheremeta, Roman M ; Szech, Nora ; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol.
    In: European Economic Review.
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  5. Who Cares When Value (Mis)Reporting May Be Found Out? An Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with Value Messages and Information Leaks. (2023). Marazzi, Francesca ; Lohse, Tim ; Di Cagno, Daniela ; Spadoni, Lorenzo ; Guth, Werner.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10406.

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  6. Who cares when Value (Mis)reporting May Be Found Out? An Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with Value Messages and Information Leaks. (2022). Marazzi, Francesca ; Lohse, Tim ; Di Cagno, Daniela ; Spadoni, Lorenzo ; Guth, Werner.
    In: CEIS Research Paper.
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  7. Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: Who benefits and is it stable?. (2022). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Fan, Cuihong ; Jun, Byoung Heon.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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  8. Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. (2021). Mill, Wladislaw ; Kirchkamp, Oliver.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  9. Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion: The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying. (2021). Wolfstetter, Elmar ; Fan, Cuihong ; Jun, Byoung Heon.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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  47. Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents. (2009). Levin, Dan ; Kagel, John.
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  48. A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions. (2008). Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ; Reiss, J. Philipp ; Kirchkamp, Oliver.
    In: Research Memorandum.
    RePEc:unm:umamet:2008050.

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  49. Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices. (2007). Schmitz, Patrick ; Roider, Andreas.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  50. Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study. (2006). Fang, Hanming ; Cooper, David.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1557.

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