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Monotonic Knowledge Models, Cycles, Linear Versions and Auctions with Differential, Finite Information. (2015). Rodrigues-Neto, José.
In: The Economic Record.
RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:91:y:2015:i:s1:p:25-37.

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  2. Davey, 2002. Introduction to Lattices and Order
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  3. Einy, 2002. Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, (37), 247

  4. Forges, 2011. Core-Stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, (47), 760

  5. Harsanyi, 1967. Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I, II, III. In: Management Science, (14), 320

  6. Krishna, 2002. Auction Theory
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  7. Laffont, 2002. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
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  8. Morris, 1994. Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information. In: Econometrica, (62), 1326

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  11. Rodrigues-Neto, 2012. The Cycles Approach. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, (48), 207

  12. Rodrigues-Neto, 2014. Monotonic Models and Cycles. In: International Journal of Game Theory, (43), 403

  13. Rubinstein, 1989. The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under “Almost Common Knowledge". In: American Economic Review, (79), 385

  14. Tirole, 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization

  15. Vickers, 1986. Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information. In: Oxford Economic Papers, (38), 443

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design. (2023). McClellan, Andrew.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:140:y:2023:i:c:p:173-180.

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  2. Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information. (2020). Athey, Susan ; Babaioff, Moshe ; Grubb, Michael D ; Abraham, Ittai.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:454-477.

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  3. Information in Tullock contests. (2019). Sela, Aner ; Moreno, Diego ; Haimanko, Ori ; Einy, E ; Shitovitz, B ; Aiche, A.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:86:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-018-9682-8.

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  4. Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals. (2019). Syrgkanis, Vasilis ; Tardos, Eva ; Kempe, David.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:44:y:2019:i:4:p:1450-1476.

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  5. Agency Equilibrium. (2019). Newton, Jonathan.
    In: Games.
    RePEc:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:1:p:14-:d:213728.

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  6. Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information. (2017). Sela, Aner ; Haimanko, Ori ; Orzach, Ram ; Goswami, Mridu Prabal ; Einy, Ezra.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-015-0524-4.

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  7. INFORMATION IN TULLOCK CONTESTS. (2017). Sela, Aner ; Moreno, Diego ; Haimanko, Ori ; Einy, Ezra ; Shitovitz, B ; Aiche, A.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1710.

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  8. Information Advantage in Common-Value Classic Tullock Contests. (2016). Sela, Aner ; Moreno, Diego ; Haimanko, Ori ; Einy, Ezra ; Shitovitz, Benyamin ; Aiche, Avishay.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1614.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Monotonic Knowledge Models, Cycles, Linear Versions and Auctions with Differential, Finite Information. (2015). Rodrigues-Neto, José.
    In: The Economic Record.
    RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:91:y:2015:i:s1:p:25-37.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps. (2014). Sela, Aner ; Haimanko, Ori ; Orzach, Ram ; Einy, Ezra.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10173.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps. (2014). Sela, Aner ; Haimanko, Ori ; Orzach, Ram ; Einy, Ezra.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1402.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information. (2013). Sela, Aner ; Moreno, Diego ; Haimanko, Ori ; Einy, E ; Shitovitz, B.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hit:econdp:2013-11.

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  13. Tullock contests with asymmetric information. (2013). Sela, Aner ; Moreno, Diego ; Haimanko, Ori ; Einy, Ezra ; Shitovitz, Benyamin.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we1314.

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  14. Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information. (2013). Sela, Aner ; Haimanko, Ori ; Orzach, Ram ; Einy, Ezra.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9315.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. COMMON-VALUE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. (2013). Sela, Aner ; Haimanko, Ori ; Orzach, Ram ; Einy, Ezra.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1306.

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  16. TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. (2013). Sela, Aner ; Moreno, Diego ; Haimanko, Ori ; Einy, Ezra ; Shitovitz, Benyamin.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1303.

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  17. Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information. (2012). Malueg, David ; Orzach, Ram.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:2:p:219-254.

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  18. Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions. (2012). Levin, Dan ; Azrieli, Yaron.
    In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:12:y:2012:i:1:n:17.

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  19. Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values. (2011). Forges, Francoise ; Orzach, Ram.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:760-767.

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  20. Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions. (2011). Levin, Dan ; Azrieli, Yaron.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:301-309.

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  21. Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples. (2009). Malueg, David ; Orzach, Ram.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:2:p:177-180.

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