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1. Production and Learning in Teams. (2024). Herkenhoff, Kyle ; Lise, Jeremy ; Menzio, Guido ; Phillips, Gordon M.
   In: Econometrica.
   RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:92:y:2024:i:2:p:467-504.

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2. Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size. (2024). Kim, Eunhee.
   In: Journal of Economics.
   RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:142:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00712-024-00854-1.

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3. Reputation, Learning and Project Choice in Frictional Economies. (2024). Pourbabaee, Farzad.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2201.01813.

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4. Signaling and discrimination in collaborative projects. (2023). Ray, Debraj ; Onuchic, Paula.
   In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
   RePEc:ehl:lserod:125652.

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5. POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS. (2022). Anderson, Axel.
   In: International Economic Review.
   RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:63:y:2022:i:4:p:1659-1690.

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6. On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment. (2022). Zhang, Tao ; Zhu, Quanyan.
   In: Dynamic Games and Applications.
   RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:12:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-021-00388-x.

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7. Sorting expertise. (2022). Kaya, Ayça ; Vereshchagina, Galina.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000874.

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8. Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation. (2022). Awaya, YU ; Do, Jihwan.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:41-59.

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9. Assortative Learning. (2022). Weng, Xi ; Eeckhout, Jan.
   In: Economica.
   RePEc:bla:econom:v:89:y:2022:i:355:p:647-688.

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10. Analysis of Incentive Optimization Measures for Nurses in Public Hospitals in China. (2022). Jingxian, YU.
    In: International Journal of Science and Business.
    RePEc:aif:journl:v:16:y:2022:i:1:p:192-210.

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11. Learning From Coworkers. (2021). Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban ; Oberfield, Ezra ; Jarosch, Gregor ; Rossihansberg, Esteban.
    In: Econometrica.
    RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:2:p:647-676.

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12. Matching dynamics and optima in a multi-agents labor market setting, 2015.. (2021). Garrouste, Christelle ; Stroppa, Yvan ; Piatecki, Cyrille.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03245585.

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13. Positive Skill Clustering in Role-Assignment Matching Models. (2021). Anderson, Axel.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~21-21-20.

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14. The Comparative Statics of Sorting. (2021). Smith, Lones ; Anderson, Axel.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~21-21-06.

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15. On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment. (2021). Zhang, Tao ; Zhu, Quanyan.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1909.13720.

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16. The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm. (2020). Segura-Rodriguez, Carlos ; Kambhampati, Ashwin.
    In: PIER Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:pen:papers:20-018.

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17. Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game. (2020). Wiseman, Thomas ; Sperisen, Benjamin.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:491-511.

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18. Learning from Coworkers. (2019). Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban ; Oberfield, Ezra ; Jarosch, Gregor.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25418.

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19. A model of professional service firms performance with an application to US accounting firms. (2019). Ribes, Edouard.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01825739.

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20. Banned from the sharing economy: an agent-based model of a peer-to-peer marketplace for consumer goods and services. (2018). Querbes-Revier, Adrien.
    In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
    RePEc:spr:joevec:v:28:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s00191-017-0548-y.

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21. Matching for Social Mobility with Unobserved Heritable Characteristics. (2018). Knowles, John ; Bidner, Chris.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp18-05.

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22. Intangibles, Inequality and Stagnation. (2018). Zhang, Shengxing ; Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro.
    In: 2018 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed018:110.

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23. Intangibles, Inequality and Stagnation. (2018). Zhang, Shengxing ; Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:econom:2018-15.

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24. Cream Skimming and Information Design in Marching Markets. (2018). Smolin, Alex ; Romanyuk, Gleb.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:86713.

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25. Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics. (2017). Smith, Lones ; Eeckhout, Jan ; Chade, Hector.
    In: Journal of Economic Literature.
    RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:55:y:2017:i:2:p:493-544.

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26. JOB MATCHING WITHIN AND ACROSS FIRMS. (2015). Pastorino, Elena.
    In: International Economic Review.
    RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:56:y:2015:i:2:p:647-671.

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27. Losing Face. (2015). .
    In: Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:esx:essedp:769.

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28. Losing Face. (2015). Reinstein, David ; Gall, Thomas.
    In: Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:esx:essedp:14460.

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29. A dynamic generalization of Beckers assortative matching result. (2015). Anderson, Axel.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:290-310.

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30. A theory of targeted search. (2014). Tutino, Antonella ; Restrepo-Echavarria, Paulina ; Cheremukhin, Anton.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:feddwp:1402.

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31. Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts. (2014). Perez-Castrillo, David ; Macho-Stadler, Ines ; Porteiro, Nicolas.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:145-164.

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32. Independence and Uniqueness of the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Social Networks. (2013). .
    In: International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR).
    RePEc:tei:journl:v:6:y:2013:i:3:p:79-96.

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33. A Theory of Targeted Search. (2013). Restrepo-Echavarria, Paulina ; Cheremukhin, Anton ; Tutino, Antonella.
    In: 2013 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed013:664.

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34. Learning about ones own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty. (2013). Maruyama, Akiko.
    In: GRIPS Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:ngi:dpaper:12-24.

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35. Job matching within and across firms. (2013). Pastorino, Elena.
    In: Staff Report.
    RePEc:fip:fedmsr:482.

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36. The Assignment of Workers to Jobs with Endogenous Information Selection. (2012). Restrepo-Echavarria, Paulina ; Cheremukhin, Anton ; Tutino, Antonella.
    In: 2012 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed012:164.

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37. On the Existence of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching. (2012). .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:43125.

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38. Job market signaling and employer learning. (2012). Prat, Julien ; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:5:p:1787-1817.

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39. Identifying sorting: in theory. (2011). Kircher, Philipp ; Eeckhout, Jan.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:29708.

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40. Incentives and the structure of teams. (2011). Vereshchagina, Galina ; Mitchell, Matthew ; Franco, April.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2307-2332.

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41. Career Tournaments. (2010). Casas-Arce, Pablo.
    In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
    RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:667-698.

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42. Aligning Ambition and Incentives. (2008). Koch, Alexander ; Peyrache, Eloic .
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:aah:aarhec:2008-16.

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43. Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns. (2005). Koch, Alexander ; Peyrache, Eloic .
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1841.

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44. Transparency, Recuitment and Retention in the Public Sector. (2005). Albano, Gian Luigi ; Leaver, Clare.
    In: The Centre for Market and Public Organisation.
    RePEc:bri:cmpowp:05/132.

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