1. Collusion in capacity under irreversible investment. (2022). Fagart, Thomas.
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2. Profit-Sharing vs Price-Fixing Collusion with Heterogeneous Firms. (2021). Hattori, Keisuke.
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   RePEc:pra:mprapa:110800.

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3. Supply‐ vs. Demand‐Side Transparency: The Collusive Effects Under Imperfect Public Monitoring. (2021). Garrod, Luke ; Olczak, Matthew.
   In: Journal of Industrial Economics.
   RePEc:bla:jindec:v:69:y:2021:i:3:p:537-560.

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4. Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries. (2018). Garrod, Luke ; Olczak, Matthew.
   In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
   RePEc:eee:indorg:v:56:y:2018:i:c:p:1-25.

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1. What’s Happening to the European Electricity Market?. (2012). Varela-Candamio, Laura ; Lopez, Jose ; Soares, Isabel ; Faina, Andres .
   In: European Research Studies Journal.
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2. Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model. (2007). Wen, Quan ; Houba, Harold.
   In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:tin:wpaper:20070070.

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3. Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks. (2007). Bagwell, Kyle ; Athey, Susan.
   In: Levine's Bibliography.
   RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000898.

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4. Stochastic Market Sharing, Partial Communication and Collusion. (2006). Gerlach, Heiko.
   In: Industrial Organization.
   RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0501009.

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5. Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication. (2006). Mouraviev, Igor .
   In: Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0672.

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6. Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline. (2006). Versaevel, Bruno ; van Norden, Simon ; Gagne, Robert.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:gat:wpaper:0611.

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7. The advantage of transparency in monetary policy instruments. (2006). Kehoe, Patrick ; Atkeson, Andrew.
   In: Staff Report.
   RePEc:fip:fedmsr:297.

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8. Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences. (2006). Smith, Lones ; Prokopovych, Pavlo ; Chade, Hector.
   In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1555.

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9. Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration. (2006). Obara, Ichiro.
   In: Levine's Bibliography.
   RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000285.

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10. The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information. (2005). Miller, David.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0510002.

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11. Bank Credit Cycles. (2005). He, Ping ; Gorton, Gary.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11363.

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12. Collusion under Monitoring of Sales. (2005). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Harrington, Joseph.
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:jhu:papers:509.

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13. Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games. (2004). Smith, Lones ; Prokopovych, Pavlo.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:nasm04:287.

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14. An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy. (2004). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:nasm04:282.

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15. Sustaining Free Trade with Imperfect Private Information about Non-Tariff Barriers. (2004). Park, Jee-Hyeong.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:feam04:736.

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16. Collusion with Internal Contracting. (2004). Lee, Gea M..
    In: Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:feam04:693.

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17. Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment. (2004). Uhlig, Harald ; Krueger, Dirk.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4208.

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18. Collusion and Price Rigidity. (2004). Bagwell, Kyle.
    In: Theory workshop papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000081.

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19. Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai). (2004). Obara, Ichiro.
    In: UCLA Economics Online Papers.
    RePEc:cla:uclaol:318.

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20. Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks. (2004). Bagwell, Kyle ; Athey, Susan.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000334.

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21. Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient. (2004). Takahashi, Satoru ; Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000865.

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22. An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy. (2003). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0302004.

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23. An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy. (2003). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:171.

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24. Sticky prices, coordination and enforcement. (2003). Driscoll, John ; Ito, Harumi .
    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2003-30.

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25. Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment. (2003). Uhlig, Harald ; Krueger, Dirk.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000407.

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26. What Determines Cartel Success?. (2002). Suslow, Valerie ; Levenstein, Margaret.
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27. Economics of Joint Dominance. (2002). Stenborg, Markku.
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28. The Advantage of Transparent Instruments of Monetary Policy. (2001). Kehoe, Patrick ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8681.

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29. The advantage of transparent instruments of monetary policy. (2001). Kehoe, Patrick ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedmwp:614.

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30. On the optimality of transparent monetary policy. (2001). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
    In: Working Papers.
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31. Product Quality, Reputation and Turnover. (2001). Sekiguchi, Tadashi ; Robb, Rafael.
    In: Penn CARESS Working Papers.
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32. Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case. (2001). Genesove, David ; Mullin, Wallace P..
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:3:p:379-398.

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33. Roy Radner and Incentive Theory. (2001). Maskin, Eric.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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34. Folk Theorem with One-sided Information. (2000). Cheng, Harrison .
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:2:p:338-363.

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35. Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement. (2000). Niederle, Muriel ; Kerschbamer, Rudolf ; Perktold, Josef .
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1482.

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36. Simulating the Ecology of Oligopoly Games with Genetic Algorithms. (1999). Chen, Shu-Heng ; Ni, Chih-Chi.
    In: Computing in Economics and Finance 1999.
    RePEc:sce:scecf9:1012.

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37. Sticky Prices, Coordination and Collusion. (1999). Driscoll, John ; Ito, Harumi .
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7165.

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38. A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars. (1999). Pakes, Ariel ; Fershtman, Chaim.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6936.

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39. Collusion in a Model of Repeated Auctions. (1999). Johnson, P. ; Robert, J..
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montde:9909.

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40. Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics. (1998). Cramton, Peter ; Dees, Gregory J..
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:93beq.

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41. Consumer Beliefs and Buyer and Seller Behavior in the Vehicle Inspection Market. (1997). Hubbard, Thomas N..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6245.

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42. What do Notaries do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751. (1994). Postel-Vinay, Gilles ; Hoffman, Philip ; Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent.
    In: UCLA Economics Working Papers.
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43. Efficient Bilateral Risk Sharing Without Commitment. (1993). Kocherlakota, Narayana.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:9311001.

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44. Vertical Restraints in the Bromine Cartel: The Role of Distributors in Facilitating Collusion. (1993). Levenstein, Margaret.
    In: NBER Historical Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberhi:0049.

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45. Testing Game Theoretic Models of Price-Fixing Behaviour. (1990). hajivassiliou, vassilis.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
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46. Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games. (1989). Stacchetti, Ennio ; Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David G..
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:920.

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47. Institutional aspects of credit cooperatives. (1988). Guasch, Luis J. ; Braverman, Avishay.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
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48. Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships. (1988). Milgrom, Paul ; Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David G..
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
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49. Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation. (1987). Pearce, David G..
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
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50. Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. (1986). Stacchetti, Ennio ; Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David G..
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:791.

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