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Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus. (2021). Thomas, Charles.
In: Journal of Industrial Economics.
RePEc:bla:jindec:v:69:y:2021:i:3:p:730-741.

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  1. Horizontal mergers with Bertrand competition and convex costs. (2024). Ferrarese, Walter ; Escrihuela-Villar, Marc ; Bakaouka, Elpiniki.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:128:y:2024:i:c:p:60-67.

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References

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Cocites

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  3. Empirical Models of Firms and Industries. (2017). Slade, Margaret ; Aguirregabiria, Victor.
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  4. Can the Private Sector Ensure the Public Interest? Evidence from Federal Procurement. (2017). Rovigatti, Gabriele ; Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria.
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  5. Identification in Ascending Auctions, with an Application to Digital Rights Management. (2017). Larsen, Bradley ; Freyberger, Joachim.
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  7. Information Transparency in B2B Auction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure. (2017). Lu, Y ; Ketter, W ; Gupta, A.
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  8. Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets. (2017). Wang, Hong.
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  9. Auctions with selective entry. (2017). Lu, Jingfeng ; Li, Tong ; Gentry, Matthew.
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  13. Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus. (2017). Thomas, Charles.
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