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RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN CENTRAL BANK SIGNALS: AN ANALYSIS OF MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MINUTES. (2009). Montagnoli, Alberto ; Klaes, Matthias ; Dow, Sheila.
In: Metroeconomica.
RePEc:bla:metroe:v:60:y:2009:i:4:p:584-618.

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  1. The Power of Words: Issuance and Reception of Central Bankers Discourse. (2015). Llorca, Matthieu ; Desmedt, Ludovic ; Clevenot, Mickael.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04711754.

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  2. Le banquier central, du mutisme à la communication permanente : la tonalité du discours de la B.C.E. et son impact. (2010). Llorca, Matthieu ; Clévenot, Mickaël ; Desmedt, Ludovic ; Clevenot, Mickael.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01089003.

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  3. The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. (1999). Gertler, Mark ; Galí, Jordi ; Clarida, Richard.
    In: Journal of Economic Literature.
    RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:37:y:1999:i:4:p:1661-1707.

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